[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71CBH92WDZ29KHCXGRTKJNS":3,"skill-same:01M71CBH92WDZ29KHCXGRTKJNS":55},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":23,"linkOnly":24,"markdownContent":25,"markdownBody":26,"frontMatter":27,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":33,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M71CBH92WDZ29KHCXGRTKJNS","cloud-zerotrust-saas",null,"Cloud Zerotrust Saas.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-zerotrust-saas\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22],"cloud","saas","cloud zerotrust saas","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: cloud-zerotrust-saas\ndescription: \"Cloud Zerotrust Saas.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| CASB | Cloud Access Security Broker - intermediary enforcing security policies between users and SaaS applications |\n| SSPM | SaaS Security Posture Management - continuous monitoring of SaaS application security configurations |\n| OAuth Governance | Review and control of third-party application permissions granted through OAuth consent flows |\n| Session Controls | Real-time access restrictions (block downloads, DLP inspection, watermarking) applied during active SaaS sessions |\n| Shadow IT | Unauthorized SaaS applications used by employees without IT approval or security review |\n| Conditional Access | Policy engine evaluating identity, device, location, and risk signals before granting SaaS access |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps**: CASB providing shadow IT discovery, session controls, DLP, and SSPM\n- **Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access**: Policy engine for identity-based access control to SaaS applications\n- **Netskope CASB**: Cloud-native CASB with inline and API-based SaaS security controls\n- **Okta Identity Governance**: OAuth app governance and access certification for SaaS applications\n- **SSPM Tools**: AppOmni, Adaptive Shield, Valence Security for SaaS configuration monitoring\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Securing Microsoft 365 and Salesforce for 1,000-User Organization\n\n**Context**: A professional services firm with 1,000 users uses Microsoft 365, Salesforce, Slack, and 20+ other SaaS apps. Several data breaches in the industry drive a zero trust initiative for all SaaS access.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Federate all SaaS authentication through Entra ID with SAML SSO\n2. Create conditional access policies requiring MFA + compliant device for all SaaS apps\n3. Deploy Defender for Cloud Apps for shadow IT discovery (identify 150+ unauthorized apps)\n4. Mark unauthorized apps as unsanctioned and block via SWG\u002Fproxy\n5. Configure session controls: block downloads on unmanaged devices, DLP for file uploads\n6. Review OAuth app permissions: revoke 45 high-risk consent grants, enable admin approval workflow\n7. Enable SSPM monitoring for Microsoft 365 and Salesforce configurations\n8. Set up weekly automated posture reports for security leadership\n\n**Pitfalls**: Conditional access policies need break-glass exclusions. Some legacy SaaS apps may not support modern authentication. Session controls require proxy-based CASB which can impact performance. OAuth app revocation may break integrations; coordinate with app owners first.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nZero Trust SaaS Security Report\n==================================================\nOrganization: ProServices Corp\nReport Date: 2026-02-23\n\nSAAS INVENTORY:\n  Sanctioned Apps: 25\n  Unsanctioned (blocked): 127\n  Shadow IT Users: 342 (discovered in last 30 days)\n\nCONDITIONAL ACCESS:\n  Policies active: 8\n  Sign-ins evaluated: 456,789\n  Blocked by policy: 2,345 (0.5%)\n  MFA enforced: 100% of sign-ins\n\nDEVICE COMPLIANCE:\n  Compliant device required: All 25 sanctioned apps\n  Sign-ins from compliant: 448,123 (98.1%)\n  Sign-ins blocked (non-compliant): 8,666\n\nCASB \u002F DLP:\n  DLP violations detected: 89\n  Files blocked from upload: 34\n  Downloads blocked (unmanaged): 1,234\n\nOAUTH GOVERNANCE:\n  Total OAuth apps: 312\n  High-risk permissions: 12 (reviewed)\n  Revoked consents: 45\n  Pending admin approval: 8\n\nSSPM FINDINGS:\n  Critical misconfigurations: 3\n  High: 7\n  Medium: 15\n  Remediated this month: 18\n```\n","|\n| CASB | Cloud Access Security Broker - intermediary enforcing security policies between users and SaaS applications |\n| SSPM | SaaS Security Posture Management - continuous monitoring of SaaS application security configurations |\n| OAuth Governance | Review and control of third-party application permissions granted through OAuth consent flows |\n| Session Controls | Real-time access restrictions (block downloads, DLP inspection, watermarking) applied during active SaaS sessions |\n| Shadow IT | Unauthorized SaaS applications used by employees without IT approval or security review |\n| Conditional Access | Policy engine evaluating identity, device, location, and risk signals before granting SaaS access |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps**: CASB providing shadow IT discovery, session controls, DLP, and SSPM\n- **Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access**: Policy engine for identity-based access control to SaaS applications\n- **Netskope CASB**: Cloud-native CASB with inline and API-based SaaS security controls\n- **Okta Identity Governance**: OAuth app governance and access certification for SaaS applications\n- **SSPM Tools**: AppOmni, Adaptive Shield, Valence Security for SaaS configuration monitoring\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Securing Microsoft 365 and Salesforce for 1,000-User Organization\n\n**Context**: A professional services firm with 1,000 users uses Microsoft 365, Salesforce, Slack, and 20+ other SaaS apps. Several data breaches in the industry drive a zero trust initiative for all SaaS access.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Federate all SaaS authentication through Entra ID with SAML SSO\n2. Create conditional access policies requiring MFA + compliant device for all SaaS apps\n3. Deploy Defender for Cloud Apps for shadow IT discovery (identify 150+ unauthorized apps)\n4. Mark unauthorized apps as unsanctioned and block via SWG\u002Fproxy\n5. Configure session controls: block downloads on unmanaged devices, DLP for file uploads\n6. Review OAuth app permissions: revoke 45 high-risk consent grants, enable admin approval workflow\n7. Enable SSPM monitoring for Microsoft 365 and Salesforce configurations\n8. Set up weekly automated posture reports for security leadership\n\n**Pitfalls**: Conditional access policies need break-glass exclusions. Some legacy SaaS apps may not support modern authentication. Session controls require proxy-based CASB which can impact performance. OAuth app revocation may break integrations; coordinate with app owners first.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nZero Trust SaaS Security Report\n==================================================\nOrganization: ProServices Corp\nReport Date: 2026-02-23\n\nSAAS INVENTORY:\n  Sanctioned Apps: 25\n  Unsanctioned (blocked): 127\n  Shadow IT Users: 342 (discovered in last 30 days)\n\nCONDITIONAL ACCESS:\n  Policies active: 8\n  Sign-ins evaluated: 456,789\n  Blocked by policy: 2,345 (0.5%)\n  MFA enforced: 100% of sign-ins\n\nDEVICE COMPLIANCE:\n  Compliant device required: All 25 sanctioned apps\n  Sign-ins from compliant: 448,123 (98.1%)\n  Sign-ins blocked (non-compliant): 8,666\n\nCASB \u002F DLP:\n  DLP violations detected: 89\n  Files blocked from upload: 34\n  Downloads blocked (unmanaged): 1,234\n\nOAUTH GOVERNANCE:\n  Total OAuth apps: 312\n  High-risk permissions: 12 (reviewed)\n  Revoked consents: 45\n  Pending admin approval: 8\n\nSSPM FINDINGS:\n  Critical misconfigurations: 3\n  High: 7\n  Medium: 15\n  Remediated this month: 18\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":22,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fcloud-zerotrust-saas","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-zerotrust-saas",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-zerotrust-saas",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-zerotrust-saas","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-zerotrust-saas\u002FSKILL.md",true,[49],{"path":50,"resourceType":51,"resourceTypeDesc":52,"sizeBytes":53,"sourceHtmlUrl":54},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",480,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-zerotrust-saas\u002Findex.json",[56,81,104,126,148,164],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,22,80],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[88,63,89,66,90,91,92,22,93,94,95,96,97,98,68,99,100,101,102,103],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[111,112,113,114,115,116,22,93,117,94,118,119,68,101,120,121,122,123,124,125],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":127,"name":128,"nameZh":6,"description":129,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":130,"categories":131,"keywords":132,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,133,134,135,136,137,138,69,139,22,80,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,68],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[155,156,64,157,135,137,158,69,159,139,22,80,94,160,161,162,163,147,68,70],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":165,"name":166,"nameZh":6,"description":167,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":168,"categories":169,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[171,64,135,172,158,69,173,174,22,80,175,176,177,178,179,180,68,70,181,182],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]