[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71C9XWN9KRMHCP5HMR3AWC9":3,"skill-same:01M71C9XWN9KRMHCP5HMR3AWC9":69},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":37,"linkOnly":38,"markdownContent":39,"markdownBody":40,"frontMatter":41,"refName":42,"commitSha":43,"skillDirectory":44,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":45,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":46,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":47,"updatedAt":48,"install":49,"resources":62},"01M71C9XWN9KRMHCP5HMR3AWC9","cloud-security-pentest",null,"| | Shared Responsibility Model | Cloud security framework where the provider secures infrastructure and the customer secures data, configurations, and access controls | | IMDS | Instance Metadata Service at 169.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-security-pentest\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36],"cloud security pentest","pentest","cloud","security","cloud security","framework","infrastructure","metadata","service","data","at","customer","access","cybersecurity","controls","provider","model","shared","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: cloud-security-pentest\ndescription: \"| | Shared Responsibility Model | Cloud security framework where the provider secures infrastructure and the customer secures data, configurations, and access controls | | IMDS | Instance Metadata Service at 169.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| Shared Responsibility Model | Cloud security framework where the provider secures infrastructure and the customer secures data, configurations, and access controls |\n| IMDS | Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254 that provides instance identity, credentials, and configuration data; IMDSv2 requires token-based access |\n| Privilege Escalation | Exploiting IAM misconfigurations to elevate from limited permissions to administrative access within a cloud account |\n| Lateral Movement | Using compromised credentials or trust relationships to access resources in other accounts, VPCs, or cloud providers |\n| Pacu | Open-source AWS exploitation framework for penetration testing, providing modules for enumeration, escalation, and persistence |\n| ScoutSuite | Multi-cloud security auditing tool that collects configuration data and generates HTML reports with risk findings |\n| MITRE ATT&CK Cloud | Adversary tactics and techniques matrix specific to cloud environments including Initial Access, Execution, Persistence, and Exfiltration |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Pacu**: AWS-focused exploitation framework with modules for IAM enumeration, privilege escalation, and persistence testing\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud (AWS, Azure, GCP) security auditing tool generating comprehensive risk reports from API data collection\n- **CloudFox**: AWS and Azure enumeration tool for identifying attack paths, privilege escalation vectors, and data access opportunities\n- **Prowler**: Open-source cloud security assessment tool with 300+ checks across AWS, Azure, and GCP\n- **Cartography**: Neo4j-based tool that maps relationships between cloud resources for visual attack path analysis\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise\n\n**Context**: A penetration tester discovers an SSRF vulnerability in a web application hosted on an EC2 instance running IMDSv1. The instance has an IAM role with broad S3 and Lambda permissions.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Exploit the SSRF to reach http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\u003Crole-name>\n2. Extract temporary IAM credentials (AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken)\n3. Use the credentials to enumerate accessible S3 buckets and download sensitive data\n4. Check if the role has iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction for privilege escalation to admin\n5. Document the full attack chain from SSRF to account-level compromise\n6. Recommend: enforce IMDSv2, reduce IAM role scope, add VPC endpoint policies blocking IMDS from application tier\n\n**Pitfalls**: Not testing IMDSv2 enforcement separately from IMDSv1 gives incomplete results. Failing to clean up test artifacts (backdoor users, Lambda functions) leaves real vulnerabilities after the engagement.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nCloud Penetration Test Report\n===============================\nTarget: AWS Account 123456789012 (Production)\nTesting Period: 2025-02-24 to 2025-02-28\nMethodology: MITRE ATT&CK Cloud + OWASP Cloud Testing Guide\nTester: Security Team - Authorized Engagement\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY:\n  Starting with read-only developer credentials, the assessment achieved\n  full administrative access to the production account within 3 hours through\n  an IAM privilege escalation chain. 47 findings identified across 7 ATT&CK tactics.\n\nCRITICAL FINDINGS:\n[PT-001] IAM Privilege Escalation via iam:CreatePolicyVersion\n  ATT&CK: T1098.001 (Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials)\n  Severity: CRITICAL\n  Starting Point: Developer role with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission\n  Impact: Full administrative access to all account resources\n  Evidence: Created policy version granting iam:* and s3:* to test role\n  Remediation: Remove iam:CreatePolicyVersion from developer roles, add permission boundary\n\n[PT-002] SSRF to IMDS Credential Theft\n  ATT&CK: T1552.005 (Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API)\n  Severity: CRITICAL\n  Starting Point: Web application URL parameter vulnerable to SSRF\n  Impact: Extracted IAM role credentials with S3 and Lambda access\n  Remediation: Enforce IMDSv2, apply WAF rules for SSRF, restrict IAM role scope\n\nFINDING SUMMARY BY MITRE ATT&CK TACTIC:\n  Initial Access:       4 findings\n  Execution:            3 findings\n  Persistence:          6 findings\n  Privilege Escalation: 8 findings (3 Critical)\n  Defense Evasion:      5 findings\n  Credential Access:    7 findings\n  Discovery:           14 findings\n  Total:               47 findings\n```\n","|\n| Shared Responsibility Model | Cloud security framework where the provider secures infrastructure and the customer secures data, configurations, and access controls |\n| IMDS | Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254 that provides instance identity, credentials, and configuration data; IMDSv2 requires token-based access |\n| Privilege Escalation | Exploiting IAM misconfigurations to elevate from limited permissions to administrative access within a cloud account |\n| Lateral Movement | Using compromised credentials or trust relationships to access resources in other accounts, VPCs, or cloud providers |\n| Pacu | Open-source AWS exploitation framework for penetration testing, providing modules for enumeration, escalation, and persistence |\n| ScoutSuite | Multi-cloud security auditing tool that collects configuration data and generates HTML reports with risk findings |\n| MITRE ATT&CK Cloud | Adversary tactics and techniques matrix specific to cloud environments including Initial Access, Execution, Persistence, and Exfiltration |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Pacu**: AWS-focused exploitation framework with modules for IAM enumeration, privilege escalation, and persistence testing\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud (AWS, Azure, GCP) security auditing tool generating comprehensive risk reports from API data collection\n- **CloudFox**: AWS and Azure enumeration tool for identifying attack paths, privilege escalation vectors, and data access opportunities\n- **Prowler**: Open-source cloud security assessment tool with 300+ checks across AWS, Azure, and GCP\n- **Cartography**: Neo4j-based tool that maps relationships between cloud resources for visual attack path analysis\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise\n\n**Context**: A penetration tester discovers an SSRF vulnerability in a web application hosted on an EC2 instance running IMDSv1. The instance has an IAM role with broad S3 and Lambda permissions.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Exploit the SSRF to reach http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\u003Crole-name>\n2. Extract temporary IAM credentials (AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken)\n3. Use the credentials to enumerate accessible S3 buckets and download sensitive data\n4. Check if the role has iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction for privilege escalation to admin\n5. Document the full attack chain from SSRF to account-level compromise\n6. Recommend: enforce IMDSv2, reduce IAM role scope, add VPC endpoint policies blocking IMDS from application tier\n\n**Pitfalls**: Not testing IMDSv2 enforcement separately from IMDSv1 gives incomplete results. Failing to clean up test artifacts (backdoor users, Lambda functions) leaves real vulnerabilities after the engagement.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nCloud Penetration Test Report\n===============================\nTarget: AWS Account 123456789012 (Production)\nTesting Period: 2025-02-24 to 2025-02-28\nMethodology: MITRE ATT&CK Cloud + OWASP Cloud Testing Guide\nTester: Security Team - Authorized Engagement\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY:\n  Starting with read-only developer credentials, the assessment achieved\n  full administrative access to the production account within 3 hours through\n  an IAM privilege escalation chain. 47 findings identified across 7 ATT&CK tactics.\n\nCRITICAL FINDINGS:\n[PT-001] IAM Privilege Escalation via iam:CreatePolicyVersion\n  ATT&CK: T1098.001 (Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials)\n  Severity: CRITICAL\n  Starting Point: Developer role with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission\n  Impact: Full administrative access to all account resources\n  Evidence: Created policy version granting iam:* and s3:* to test role\n  Remediation: Remove iam:CreatePolicyVersion from developer roles, add permission boundary\n\n[PT-002] SSRF to IMDS Credential Theft\n  ATT&CK: T1552.005 (Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API)\n  Severity: CRITICAL\n  Starting Point: Web application URL parameter vulnerable to SSRF\n  Impact: Extracted IAM role credentials with S3 and Lambda access\n  Remediation: Enforce IMDSv2, apply WAF rules for SSRF, restrict IAM role scope\n\nFINDING SUMMARY BY MITRE ATT&CK TACTIC:\n  Initial Access:       4 findings\n  Execution:            3 findings\n  Persistence:          6 findings\n  Privilege Escalation: 8 findings (3 Critical)\n  Defense Evasion:      5 findings\n  Credential Access:    7 findings\n  Discovery:           14 findings\n  Total:               47 findings\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":32,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fcloud-security-pentest","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":50,"prompt":60,"zipAvailable":61},[51,54,57],{"tool":52,"command":53},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-security-pentest",{"tool":55,"command":56},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-security-pentest",{"tool":58,"command":59},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill 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CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[102,77,103,80,104,105,106,32,107,108,109,110,111,112,82,113,114,115,116,117],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":119,"name":120,"nameZh":6,"description":121,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":122,"categories":123,"keywords":124,"publishedAt":37},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, 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memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[185,78,149,186,172,83,187,188,32,94,189,190,191,192,193,194,82,84,195,196],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]