cloud-gcp-forseti
Cloud Gcp Forseti.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-01
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- cloud-gcp-forseti
- domain
- cybersecurity
- description
- Cloud Gcp Forseti.
02 资源文件 1
- 参考文档index.json468 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
| | Security Command Center | GCP-native security and risk management platform that provides asset inventory, vulnerability detection, and threat monitoring | | Forseti Security | Open-source GCP security toolkit (now deprecated in favor of SCC) that provided inventory, scanning, enforcement, and notification capabilities | | Cloud Asset Inventory | GCP service that provides a complete inventory of cloud resources with metadata, IAM policies, and org policy configurations | | CIS GCP Foundations Benchmark | Security best practice guidelines from Center for Internet Security specific to Google Cloud Platform configuration | | Uniform Bucket-Level Access | GCP storage setting that disables legacy ACLs and enforces access exclusively through IAM policies for consistent access control | | Organization Policy | GCP constraint-based governance mechanism that restricts resource configurations across the organization hierarchy |
Tools & Systems
- Security Command Center: GCP-native CSPM providing asset inventory, vulnerability findings, and compliance scoring
- ScoutSuite: Multi-cloud security auditing tool with comprehensive GCP checks for IAM, compute, storage, and networking
- gcloud CLI: Primary command-line interface for querying GCP resource configurations and security settings
- Cloud Asset Inventory: API for searching and exporting resource metadata and IAM policies across GCP projects
- Forseti Security: Legacy open-source GCP security toolkit, superseded by SCC but still referenced in compliance frameworks
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Assessing a Newly Acquired GCP Organization
Context: After a company acquisition, the security team needs to assess the security posture of the acquired company's GCP organization with 30+ projects.
Approach:
- Enable Cloud Asset API and export full resource inventory to BigQuery for analysis
- Run
gcloud asset search-all-iam-policiesto find all Owner/Editor bindings and public access grants - Audit firewall rules across all projects for overly permissive ingress from
0.0.0.0/0 - Check all storage buckets for public access using
gsutil iam get - Run ScoutSuite for a comprehensive automated assessment with HTML report
- Enable SCC and review all CRITICAL and HIGH findings
- Generate a risk-prioritized remediation roadmap for the integration team
Pitfalls: GCP IAM bindings are inherited from organization to folder to project. A permissive binding at the organization level affects all downstream projects. Always audit IAM at every level of the hierarchy, not just at the project level.
Output Format
GCP Security Assessment Report
=================================
Organization: acme-acquired-org (ORG_ID: 123456789)
Projects Assessed: 34
Assessment Date: 2026-02-23
Standards: CIS GCP Foundations 2.0
IAM FINDINGS:
Users with Owner role at org level: 3
Service accounts with Editor role: 12
Resources with allUsers binding: 5
Service account keys > 90 days: 18
NETWORK FINDINGS:
Firewall rules allowing 0.0.0.0/0: 14
SSH open to internet: 7
RDP open to internet: 2
Subnets without VPC flow logs: 22
STORAGE FINDINGS:
Publicly accessible buckets: 5
Buckets without CMEK encryption: 28
Buckets without uniform access: 15
CRITICAL FINDINGS: 12
HIGH FINDINGS: 34
MEDIUM FINDINGS: 78
LOW FINDINGS: 145
TOP REMEDIATION PRIORITIES:
1. Remove allUsers bindings from 5 storage buckets (CRITICAL)
2. Restrict 0.0.0.0/0 firewall rules to specific CIDRs (HIGH)
3. Rotate 18 service account keys older than 90 days (HIGH)
4. Enable VPC flow logs on 22 subnets (MEDIUM)
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