cloud-containers-pod
Cloud Containers Pod.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-01
- Stars
- ★ 0
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- cloud-containers-pod
- domain
- cybersecurity
- description
- Cloud Containers Pod.
02 资源文件 1
- 参考文档index.json480 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
-| | enforce | Reject pods violating policy | Production enforcement | | audit | Log violations to audit log | Pre-enforcement assessment | | warn | Show warnings to user | Developer feedback |
Implementation
Apply to Namespace via Labels
# Restricted enforcement with audit and warn
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: production
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: v1.28
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-version: v1.28
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn-version: v1.28
# Baseline enforcement for staging
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: staging
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: baseline
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: v1.28
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-version: v1.28
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn-version: v1.28
# Privileged for system namespaces
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: kube-system
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
Apply Labels with kubectl
# Set restricted enforcement
kubectl label namespace production \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.28 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted
# Set baseline enforcement
kubectl label namespace staging \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted
# Check current labels
kubectl get namespace production -o jsonpath='{.metadata.labels}' | jq .
Dry-Run Testing
# Test what would happen with restricted policy on a namespace
kubectl label --dry-run=server --overwrite namespace staging \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted
# Output shows existing pods that would violate the policy
# Warning: existing pods in namespace "staging" violate the new PodSecurity enforce level "restricted:latest"
Cluster-Wide Defaults (AdmissionConfiguration)
# /etc/kubernetes/psa-config.yaml
apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: AdmissionConfiguration
plugins:
- name: PodSecurity
configuration:
apiVersion: pod-security.admission.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: PodSecurityConfiguration
defaults:
enforce: baseline
enforce-version: latest
audit: restricted
audit-version: latest
warn: restricted
warn-version: latest
exemptions:
usernames: []
runtimeClasses: []
namespaces:
- kube-system
- kube-public
- kube-node-lease
- calico-system
- gatekeeper-system
- monitoring
- falco
Apply to API Server
# Add to kube-apiserver manifests
# /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml
spec:
containers:
- command:
- kube-apiserver
- --admission-control-config-file=/etc/kubernetes/psa-config.yaml
volumeMounts:
- name: psa-config
mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/psa-config.yaml
readOnly: true
volumes:
- name: psa-config
hostPath:
path: /etc/kubernetes/psa-config.yaml
type: File
Compliant Pod Examples
Restricted-Compliant Pod
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: restricted-pod
namespace: production
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 3000
fsGroup: 2000
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
automountServiceAccountToken: false
containers:
- name: app
image: myregistry/myapp:v1.0.0
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
resources:
limits:
cpu: 500m
memory: 256Mi
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 128Mi
volumeMounts:
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
volumes:
- name: tmp
emptyDir: {}
Baseline-Compliant Pod
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: baseline-pod
namespace: staging
spec:
containers:
- name: app
image: myregistry/myapp:v1.0.0
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
resources:
limits:
cpu: 500m
memory: 256Mi
Migration from PodSecurityPolicy
Step 1: Audit Current State
# Check existing PSPs
kubectl get psp
# Check which service accounts use which PSP
kubectl get clusterrolebinding -o json | \
jq '.items[] | select(.roleRef.name | startswith("psp-")) | {name: .metadata.name, subjects: .subjects}'
Step 2: Map PSP to PSA Profiles
# For each namespace, determine required PSA level
for ns in $(kubectl get ns -o jsonpath='{.items[*].metadata.name}'); do
echo "Namespace: $ns"
kubectl label --dry-run=server namespace $ns \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted 2>&1 | head -5
done
Step 3: Apply PSA Labels (Audit First)
# Start with audit mode
kubectl label namespace production \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted
Step 4: Review and Fix Violations
# Check audit logs for violations
kubectl get events --field-selector reason=FailedCreate -A
Step 5: Enable Enforcement
kubectl label namespace production \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted
Monitoring
# Check PSA violations in events
kubectl get events --all-namespaces --field-selector reason=FailedCreate
# Check audit logs
kubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | grep "pod-security.kubernetes.io"
# List namespace PSA labels
kubectl get namespaces -L pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce
Best Practices
- Start with audit+warn before enforce to assess impact
- Use dry-run to test enforcement before applying
- Exempt system namespaces (kube-system, monitoring) in cluster defaults
- Pin version (enforce-version) for predictable behavior across upgrades
- Set cluster-wide baseline as default, then restrict specific namespaces
- Combine with Gatekeeper for additional custom policies beyond PSA
- Use restricted profile for all production workloads
- Document exemptions with clear justification
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