[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71C4G5KABN3XV16FKMPHMF0":3,"skill-same:01M71C4G5KABN3XV16FKMPHMF0":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":24,"linkOnly":25,"markdownContent":26,"markdownBody":27,"frontMatter":28,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":34,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M71C4G5KABN3XV16FKMPHMF0","cloud-azure-ad-azure",null,"Cloud Azure Ad Azure.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-azure-ad-azure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23],"azure","cloud","ad","cloud azure ad azure","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: cloud-azure-ad-azure\ndescription: \"Cloud Azure Ad Azure.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| Microsoft Entra ID | Microsoft's cloud identity and access management service, formerly Azure Active Directory, providing authentication and authorization |\n| Conditional Access | Policy engine that evaluates signals (user, device, location, risk) to enforce access controls like MFA, device compliance, or block access |\n| Security Defaults | Microsoft's baseline identity protection settings that enforce MFA registration, block legacy auth, and protect privileged actions |\n| Privileged Identity Management | Azure AD Premium P2 feature enabling just-in-time privileged access with approval workflows and time-bound role activation |\n| Legacy Authentication | Older authentication protocols (POP3, IMAP, SMTP, ActiveSync) that do not support MFA and are commonly exploited for credential attacks |\n| Risky Sign-In | Microsoft Entra Identity Protection detection of sign-in anomalies including impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, and malware-linked IPs |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Microsoft Graph API**: Primary programmatic interface for querying Entra ID configuration, policies, roles, and audit logs\n- **Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK**: PowerShell module for Entra ID management and security auditing tasks\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud auditing tool with Azure provider support for IAM, storage, networking, and identity checks\n- **AzureADRecon**: Community tool for comprehensive Azure AD reconnaissance and security assessment reporting\n- **Microsoft Defender for Identity**: Cloud-based security solution for detecting identity-based threats and compromised credentials\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Post-Acquisition Azure Tenant Security Assessment\n\n**Context**: After acquiring a company, the security team needs to assess the Azure tenant identity posture before integrating it with the corporate Entra ID.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Enumerate all Global Administrators and check for personal accounts in admin roles\n2. Review conditional access policies to verify MFA is enforced for all users, not just admins\n3. Identify guest users with privileged access that may indicate third-party vendor over-permissioning\n4. Check for stale accounts (no sign-in for 90+ days) that could be targets for credential attacks\n5. Review sign-in logs for legacy authentication usage that bypasses MFA\n6. Verify Security Defaults or equivalent CA policies block legacy auth protocols\n7. Produce a risk report with prioritized remediation steps before tenant integration\n\n**Pitfalls**: Azure AD Premium P2 is required for risky sign-in detections and PIM. If the acquired tenant uses a lower license tier, many identity protection features will be unavailable. Guest users from partner tenants may have implicit access through dynamic groups that are not visible in standard role assignment queries.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nAzure Active Directory Security Audit Report\n===============================================\nTenant: acme-acquired.onmicrosoft.com\nTenant ID: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890\nAudit Date: 2026-02-23\nLicense: Azure AD Premium P2\n\nIDENTITY CONFIGURATION:\n  Security Defaults: Disabled (Conditional Access in use)\n  Conditional Access Policies: 12 (8 enforced, 3 report-only, 1 disabled)\n  Legacy Auth Blocked: Partial (blocked for admins only)\n\nPRIVILEGED ACCESS:\n  Global Administrators:              8 (recommended: \u003C= 4)\n  Permanent admin assignments:        6 (no PIM activation required)\n  Service principals with admin:      3\n  Guest users with privileged roles:  2\n\nACCOUNT HYGIENE:\n  Total users:                        1,247\n  Stale accounts (90+ days):          89\n  Guest users:                        234\n  Users without MFA registered:       156\n\nSIGN-IN RISK:\n  Risky sign-ins (last 30 days):      34\n  Legacy auth sign-ins (last 7 days): 67\n  Impossible travel detections:        5\n  Unfamiliar location sign-ins:       12\n\nCRITICAL FINDINGS:\n  1. 8 Global Administrators with permanent assignments (use PIM)\n  2. Legacy authentication not blocked for non-admin users\n  3. 156 users without MFA registration\n  4. 2 guest users with Privileged Role Administrator role\n```\n","|\n| Microsoft Entra ID | Microsoft's cloud identity and access management service, formerly Azure Active Directory, providing authentication and authorization |\n| Conditional Access | Policy engine that evaluates signals (user, device, location, risk) to enforce access controls like MFA, device compliance, or block access |\n| Security Defaults | Microsoft's baseline identity protection settings that enforce MFA registration, block legacy auth, and protect privileged actions |\n| Privileged Identity Management | Azure AD Premium P2 feature enabling just-in-time privileged access with approval workflows and time-bound role activation |\n| Legacy Authentication | Older authentication protocols (POP3, IMAP, SMTP, ActiveSync) that do not support MFA and are commonly exploited for credential attacks |\n| Risky Sign-In | Microsoft Entra Identity Protection detection of sign-in anomalies including impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, and malware-linked IPs |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Microsoft Graph API**: Primary programmatic interface for querying Entra ID configuration, policies, roles, and audit logs\n- **Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK**: PowerShell module for Entra ID management and security auditing tasks\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud auditing tool with Azure provider support for IAM, storage, networking, and identity checks\n- **AzureADRecon**: Community tool for comprehensive Azure AD reconnaissance and security assessment reporting\n- **Microsoft Defender for Identity**: Cloud-based security solution for detecting identity-based threats and compromised credentials\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Post-Acquisition Azure Tenant Security Assessment\n\n**Context**: After acquiring a company, the security team needs to assess the Azure tenant identity posture before integrating it with the corporate Entra ID.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Enumerate all Global Administrators and check for personal accounts in admin roles\n2. Review conditional access policies to verify MFA is enforced for all users, not just admins\n3. Identify guest users with privileged access that may indicate third-party vendor over-permissioning\n4. Check for stale accounts (no sign-in for 90+ days) that could be targets for credential attacks\n5. Review sign-in logs for legacy authentication usage that bypasses MFA\n6. Verify Security Defaults or equivalent CA policies block legacy auth protocols\n7. Produce a risk report with prioritized remediation steps before tenant integration\n\n**Pitfalls**: Azure AD Premium P2 is required for risky sign-in detections and PIM. If the acquired tenant uses a lower license tier, many identity protection features will be unavailable. Guest users from partner tenants may have implicit access through dynamic groups that are not visible in standard role assignment queries.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nAzure Active Directory Security Audit Report\n===============================================\nTenant: acme-acquired.onmicrosoft.com\nTenant ID: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890\nAudit Date: 2026-02-23\nLicense: Azure AD Premium P2\n\nIDENTITY CONFIGURATION:\n  Security Defaults: Disabled (Conditional Access in use)\n  Conditional Access Policies: 12 (8 enforced, 3 report-only, 1 disabled)\n  Legacy Auth Blocked: Partial (blocked for admins only)\n\nPRIVILEGED ACCESS:\n  Global Administrators:              8 (recommended: \u003C= 4)\n  Permanent admin assignments:        6 (no PIM activation required)\n  Service principals with admin:      3\n  Guest users with privileged roles:  2\n\nACCOUNT HYGIENE:\n  Total users:                        1,247\n  Stale accounts (90+ days):          89\n  Guest users:                        234\n  Users without MFA registered:       156\n\nSIGN-IN RISK:\n  Risky sign-ins (last 30 days):      34\n  Legacy auth sign-ins (last 7 days): 67\n  Impossible travel detections:        5\n  Unfamiliar location sign-ins:       12\n\nCRITICAL FINDINGS:\n  1. 8 Global Administrators with permanent assignments (use PIM)\n  2. Legacy authentication not blocked for non-admin users\n  3. 156 users without MFA registration\n  4. 2 guest users with Privileged Role Administrator role\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":23,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fcloud-azure-ad-azure","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-azure-ad-azure",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-azure-ad-azure",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill cloud-azure-ad-azure","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-azure-ad-azure\u002FSKILL.md",true,[50],{"path":51,"resourceType":52,"resourceTypeDesc":53,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",480,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-azure-ad-azure\u002Findex.json",[57,82,105,127,149,165],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,23,81],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[89,64,90,67,91,92,93,23,94,95,96,97,98,99,69,100,101,102,103,104],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":111,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[112,113,114,115,116,117,23,94,118,95,119,120,69,102,121,122,123,124,125,126],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":128,"name":129,"nameZh":6,"description":130,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":131,"categories":132,"keywords":133,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[65,134,135,136,137,138,139,70,140,23,81,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,69],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":150,"name":151,"nameZh":6,"description":152,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":153,"categories":154,"keywords":155,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[156,157,65,158,136,138,159,70,160,140,23,81,95,161,162,163,164,148,69,71],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":166,"name":167,"nameZh":6,"description":168,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":169,"categories":170,"keywords":171,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[172,65,136,173,159,70,174,175,23,81,176,177,178,179,180,181,69,71,182,183],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]