[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6X6FJSB25SW14WHDAFFXMMW":3,"skill-same:01M6X6FJSB25SW14WHDAFFXMMW":82},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":53,"commitSha":54,"skillDirectory":55,"forksCount":56,"repositoryHtmlUrl":57,"repositoryHomepageUrl":58,"ownerHtmlUrl":59,"ownerBlogUrl":58,"ownerDescription":60,"updatedAt":61,"install":62,"resources":75},"01M6X6FJSB25SW14WHDAFFXMMW","data-flow-mapper",null,"Use BEFORE editing code that touches user data — traces the value from entry → validation → transformation → storage → egress, every hop cited with file:line.","event4u-app\u002Fagent-config","event4u-app","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F199339632?v=4","01M6X5TWBNCQCE1VDKT4E9KF7N","event4u.app","01M6X5TWF4HRM266RG2Q5VVH1X",19,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app\u002Fagent-config\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsrc\u002Fskills\u002Fdata-flow-mapper\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000033","数据分析师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"data flow mapper","data flow","mapper","flow","data","base","entry","value","high","with","line","transformation","storage","use","editing","hop","discovery","file","validation","code","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nmodel_tier: high\nname: data-flow-mapper\ndescription: \"Use BEFORE editing code that touches user data — traces the value from entry → validation → transformation → storage → egress, every hop cited with file:line.\"\ndomain: discovery\nworkspaces:\n  - engineering\npacks:\n  - engineering-base\n---\n\n# data-flow-mapper\n\n> You are an analyst specialized in **static data-flow mapping**.\n> Your only job is to trace how a specific piece of data moves through the\n> system — from the point it enters (request, webhook, queue, import) to the\n> point it leaves (DB column, API response, log line, external call) — and\n> cite every hop with a concrete file and line. You do **not** review diffs,\n> you do **not** propose fixes, you do **not** implement anything — sibling\n> skills handle those.\n\n## When to use\n\n* Before editing code that reads, transforms, or persists user-supplied data\n* Before touching authorization, tenant scoping, or multi-step imports\n* When a bug report describes corrupted, leaked, or mis-scoped data and the\n  root cause is unknown\n* When `threat-modeling` or `authz-review` needs a concrete trace of one asset\n\nDo NOT use when:\n\n* No data crosses a trust boundary — skip entirely\n* You need to enumerate abuse cases — route to\n  [`threat-modeling`](..\u002Fthreat-modeling\u002FSKILL.md)\n* You need end-to-end access-control analysis — route to\n  [`authz-review`](..\u002Fauthz-review\u002FSKILL.md)\n* You need impact analysis of a change across jobs, events, migrations —\n  route to [`blast-radius-analyzer`](..\u002Fblast-radius-analyzer\u002FSKILL.md)\n* You need to reproduce a bug interactively — route to\n  [`systematic-debugging`](..\u002Fsystematic-debugging\u002FSKILL.md)\n\n## Procedure\n\n### 1. Pin the data element\n\nName the exact field or object under analysis — e.g. *\"order.total_cents from\ncreate-order request through to the invoice email\"*. If the scope is unclear,\nstop and ask. Never map an imagined flow.\n\n### 2. Identify entry and egress\n\nList every entry point that can introduce the element (route body, webhook\npayload, queue job, CSV import, seeded fixture) and every egress (DB column,\nAPI response, log channel, external service call, derived record). Cite files.\n\n### 3. Inspect each hop\n\nTrace a single path end-to-end and record each hop in order:\n\n| Hop | What to record |\n|---|---|\n| Source | How the value arrives (param, header, cookie, body, message body) |\n| Validation | Rule set applied; file:line |\n| Normalization | Casting, trimming, canonicalization; file:line |\n| Authorization | Which policy\u002Fscope gates this hop; file:line |\n| Transformation | Business logic that derives or mutates it; file:line |\n| Persistence | Table.column or cache key; type + nullable |\n| Retrieval | Query path; scopes applied on read |\n| Egress | Response field, log line, external call; filter\u002Fmask applied |\n\nIf the path forks (e.g. async job takes over after request), document each\nbranch as its own trace.\n\n### 4. Analyze invariants and gaps\n\nFor every hop, name:\n\n- Type expected vs type actually carried\n- Trust level (untrusted at entry → trusted after which step?)\n- Silent transformations (type juggling, encoding changes, locale coercion)\n- Missing hops (no validation? no scope on retrieval? no masking on egress?)\n\n## Validation\n\nBefore finalizing the map, confirm:\n\n1. Every hop has a file:line citation — no generic \"then it goes to the service\"\n2. The trace starts at a real entry and ends at a real egress (not in the middle)\n3. Type and nullability are stated at persistence and at egress\n4. Every fork in the path is either traced or explicitly marked out of scope\n5. You have NOT inferred flow from naming alone — every link is verified by reading code\n6. You have NOT produced a generic architecture diagram; this is a specific trace\n\n## Output format\n\n```\nSkill:   data-flow-mapper\nTarget:  \u003Cdata element — one line>\n\nEntries:\n  - \u003CMETHOD \u002Froute or job\u002Fevent name>  (file:line)\nEgresses:\n  - \u003Cresponse field \u002F column \u002F log \u002F external>  (file:line)\n\nTrace (entry → egress):\n  1. \u003Chop name>  (file:line)  type: \u003CT>  trust: \u003Cuntrusted|validated|normalized|authorized>\n  2. ...\n  N. \u003Cegress>    (file:line)  filter: \u003Cwhat is stripped\u002Fmasked or \"none\">\n\nForks:\n  - \u003Cbranch condition> → see Trace 2 below\n  Trace 2: ...\n\nInvariants \u002F gaps:\n  ⚠️ \u003Chop>: \u003Cwhat is silently coerced or missing>  (file:line)\n  ⚠️ ...\n\nOpen questions:\n  - \u003Canything that could not be determined from static reading>\n```\n\nRequired fields (ordered):\n\n1. **Skill** and **Target** — one-line data-element summary\n2. **Entries** and **Egresses** — every point with file:line\n3. **Trace** — ordered hops, each with file:line, type, trust state\n4. **Forks** — any branching paths, either traced or marked out of scope\n5. **Invariants \u002F gaps** — silent coercions and missing hops with file:line\n6. **Open questions** — anything unresolved by static reading\n\nRuntime confirmation (e.g. *\"actually POST a request and log the payload\"*,\n*\"query the DB to see the stored shape\"*) is a follow-up for the implementer —\n**this skill does not execute requests, run queries, or read live data**.\n\n## Gotcha\n\n* **Naming-based inference** — a method called `sanitize()` may not actually\n  sanitize. Read the body, don't trust the name.\n* **Missing fork** — the request path writes to DB; a job reads it and emails\n  it. If you stop at persistence you missed half the trace.\n* **Silent type coercion** — framework middleware often casts strings to\n  ints or trims whitespace. Mark these as explicit hops.\n* **Confusing validation with authorization** — a request-validation-layer validator (FormRequest in Laravel, zod schema in Node)\n  is a validation hop, not an authorization hop. They are distinct.\n* **Tenancy scope on retrieval** — the write path was tenant-scoped; the read\n  path joined on a global table and leaked. Check both directions.\n* **Stating the map without line numbers** — a hop without file:line is a\n  guess. Reject your own output if any citation is missing.\n\n## Do NOT\n\n* NEVER return `clean` out of politeness when hops are undocumented — mark them `❌ unresolved`\n* NEVER silently fall back to an architecture-level description when asked for a specific-element trace\n* NEVER claim a hop exists based on naming without reading the code\n* NEVER merge multiple entry points into one trace — each entry gets its own trace or an explicit \"same path from step N\" note\n\n## References\n\n- **OWASP ASVS v5.0.0** — V1 Encoding and Sanitization + V2 Validation and\n  Business Logic — baseline for naming validation \u002F normalization hops. The\n  two chapters were one in the previous revision; `threat-modeling`'s\n  References records that split and the migration guide it comes from, and the\n  old numbering is deliberately not repeated here.\n  [owasp.org\u002Fwww-project-application-security-verification-standard\u002F](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-application-security-verification-standard\u002F)\n- [`threat-modeling`](..\u002Fthreat-modeling\u002FSKILL.md),\n  [`authz-review`](..\u002Fauthz-review\u002FSKILL.md),\n  [`blast-radius-analyzer`](..\u002Fblast-radius-analyzer\u002FSKILL.md),\n  [`systematic-debugging`](..\u002Fsystematic-debugging\u002FSKILL.md) — sibling analysis skills.\n","# data-flow-mapper\n\n> You are an analyst specialized in **static data-flow mapping**.\n> Your only job is to trace how a specific piece of data moves through the\n> system — from the point it enters (request, webhook, queue, import) to the\n> point it leaves (DB column, API response, log line, external call) — and\n> cite every hop with a concrete file and line. You do **not** review diffs,\n> you do **not** propose fixes, you do **not** implement anything — sibling\n> skills handle those.\n\n## When to use\n\n* Before editing code that reads, transforms, or persists user-supplied data\n* Before touching authorization, tenant scoping, or multi-step imports\n* When a bug report describes corrupted, leaked, or mis-scoped data and the\n  root cause is unknown\n* When `threat-modeling` or `authz-review` needs a concrete trace of one asset\n\nDo NOT use when:\n\n* No data crosses a trust boundary — skip entirely\n* You need to enumerate abuse cases — route to\n  [`threat-modeling`](..\u002Fthreat-modeling\u002FSKILL.md)\n* You need end-to-end access-control analysis — route to\n  [`authz-review`](..\u002Fauthz-review\u002FSKILL.md)\n* You need impact analysis of a change across jobs, events, migrations —\n  route to [`blast-radius-analyzer`](..\u002Fblast-radius-analyzer\u002FSKILL.md)\n* You need to reproduce a bug interactively — route to\n  [`systematic-debugging`](..\u002Fsystematic-debugging\u002FSKILL.md)\n\n## Procedure\n\n### 1. Pin the data element\n\nName the exact field or object under analysis — e.g. *\"order.total_cents from\ncreate-order request through to the invoice email\"*. If the scope is unclear,\nstop and ask. Never map an imagined flow.\n\n### 2. Identify entry and egress\n\nList every entry point that can introduce the element (route body, webhook\npayload, queue job, CSV import, seeded fixture) and every egress (DB column,\nAPI response, log channel, external service call, derived record). Cite files.\n\n### 3. Inspect each hop\n\nTrace a single path end-to-end and record each hop in order:\n\n| Hop | What to record |\n|---|---|\n| Source | How the value arrives (param, header, cookie, body, message body) |\n| Validation | Rule set applied; file:line |\n| Normalization | Casting, trimming, canonicalization; file:line |\n| Authorization | Which policy\u002Fscope gates this hop; file:line |\n| Transformation | Business logic that derives or mutates it; file:line |\n| Persistence | Table.column or cache key; type + nullable |\n| Retrieval | Query path; scopes applied on read |\n| Egress | Response field, log line, external call; filter\u002Fmask applied |\n\nIf the path forks (e.g. async job takes over after request), document each\nbranch as its own trace.\n\n### 4. Analyze invariants and gaps\n\nFor every hop, name:\n\n- Type expected vs type actually carried\n- Trust level (untrusted at entry → trusted after which step?)\n- Silent transformations (type juggling, encoding changes, locale coercion)\n- Missing hops (no validation? no scope on retrieval? no masking on egress?)\n\n## Validation\n\nBefore finalizing the map, confirm:\n\n1. Every hop has a file:line citation — no generic \"then it goes to the service\"\n2. The trace starts at a real entry and ends at a real egress (not in the middle)\n3. Type and nullability are stated at persistence and at egress\n4. Every fork in the path is either traced or explicitly marked out of scope\n5. You have NOT inferred flow from naming alone — every link is verified by reading code\n6. You have NOT produced a generic architecture diagram; this is a specific trace\n\n## Output format\n\n```\nSkill:   data-flow-mapper\nTarget:  \u003Cdata element — one line>\n\nEntries:\n  - \u003CMETHOD \u002Froute or job\u002Fevent name>  (file:line)\nEgresses:\n  - \u003Cresponse field \u002F column \u002F log \u002F external>  (file:line)\n\nTrace (entry → egress):\n  1. \u003Chop name>  (file:line)  type: \u003CT>  trust: \u003Cuntrusted|validated|normalized|authorized>\n  2. ...\n  N. \u003Cegress>    (file:line)  filter: \u003Cwhat is stripped\u002Fmasked or \"none\">\n\nForks:\n  - \u003Cbranch condition> → see Trace 2 below\n  Trace 2: ...\n\nInvariants \u002F gaps:\n  ⚠️ \u003Chop>: \u003Cwhat is silently coerced or missing>  (file:line)\n  ⚠️ ...\n\nOpen questions:\n  - \u003Canything that could not be determined from static reading>\n```\n\nRequired fields (ordered):\n\n1. **Skill** and **Target** — one-line data-element summary\n2. **Entries** and **Egresses** — every point with file:line\n3. **Trace** — ordered hops, each with file:line, type, trust state\n4. **Forks** — any branching paths, either traced or marked out of scope\n5. **Invariants \u002F gaps** — silent coercions and missing hops with file:line\n6. **Open questions** — anything unresolved by static reading\n\nRuntime confirmation (e.g. *\"actually POST a request and log the payload\"*,\n*\"query the DB to see the stored shape\"*) is a follow-up for the implementer —\n**this skill does not execute requests, run queries, or read live data**.\n\n## Gotcha\n\n* **Naming-based inference** — a method called `sanitize()` may not actually\n  sanitize. Read the body, don't trust the name.\n* **Missing fork** — the request path writes to DB; a job reads it and emails\n  it. If you stop at persistence you missed half the trace.\n* **Silent type coercion** — framework middleware often casts strings to\n  ints or trims whitespace. Mark these as explicit hops.\n* **Confusing validation with authorization** — a request-validation-layer validator (FormRequest in Laravel, zod schema in Node)\n  is a validation hop, not an authorization hop. They are distinct.\n* **Tenancy scope on retrieval** — the write path was tenant-scoped; the read\n  path joined on a global table and leaked. Check both directions.\n* **Stating the map without line numbers** — a hop without file:line is a\n  guess. Reject your own output if any citation is missing.\n\n## Do NOT\n\n* NEVER return `clean` out of politeness when hops are undocumented — mark them `❌ unresolved`\n* NEVER silently fall back to an architecture-level description when asked for a specific-element trace\n* NEVER claim a hop exists based on naming without reading the code\n* NEVER merge multiple entry points into one trace — each entry gets its own trace or an explicit \"same path from step N\" note\n\n## References\n\n- **OWASP ASVS v5.0.0** — V1 Encoding and Sanitization + V2 Validation and\n  Business Logic — baseline for naming validation \u002F normalization hops. The\n  two chapters were one in the previous revision; `threat-modeling`'s\n  References records that split and the migration guide it comes from, and the\n  old numbering is deliberately not repeated here.\n  [owasp.org\u002Fwww-project-application-security-verification-standard\u002F](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-application-security-verification-standard\u002F)\n- [`threat-modeling`](..\u002Fthreat-modeling\u002FSKILL.md),\n  [`authz-review`](..\u002Fauthz-review\u002FSKILL.md),\n  [`blast-radius-analyzer`](..\u002Fblast-radius-analyzer\u002FSKILL.md),\n  [`systematic-debugging`](..\u002Fsystematic-debugging\u002FSKILL.md) — sibling analysis skills.\n",{"name":5,"packs":49,"domain":40,"model_tier":32,"workspaces":51,"description":7},[50],"engineering-base",[52],"engineering","main","12bd765ce1d800501d45dfb8232102793af01290","src\u002Fskills\u002Fdata-flow-mapper",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app\u002Fagent-config","https:\u002F\u002Fevent4u.app","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app","Your events in your hand","2026-11-11 06:19:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":63,"prompt":73,"zipAvailable":74},[64,67,70],{"tool":65,"command":66},"npx","npx skills add event4u-app\u002Fagent-config --skill data-flow-mapper",{"tool":68,"command":69},"bunx","bunx skills add event4u-app\u002Fagent-config --skill data-flow-mapper",{"tool":71,"command":72},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add event4u-app\u002Fagent-config --skill 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know.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app\u002Fagent-config\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Fscripts\u002Ffixtures\u002Fbody-portable\u002Funknown-key\u002FSKILL.md",[89],{"categoryNo":90,"categoryName":91,"taxonomyType":92,"taxonomyTypeDesc":93},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[95,96,97,98,99,100],"unknown key fixture","Unknown key","fixture","unknown","schema","package",{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":108,"publishedAt":44},"01M6X84HW7NAHZ7GZMQ9RXK1XJ","portable-fixture","Declares only semantics the MCP-lite carrier transports whole.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app\u002Fagent-config\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Fscripts\u002Ffixtures\u002Fbody-portable\u002Fportable\u002FSKILL.md",[107],{"categoryNo":90,"categoryName":91,"taxonomyType":92,"taxonomyTypeDesc":93},[97,109,110,111,112,100,113],"portable","portable fixture","engineer","only","MCP",{"skillNo":115,"name":116,"nameZh":6,"description":117,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":118,"categories":119,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":44},"01M6X84F29FE0RGGZ1ZTFGZTX2","non-portable-fixture","Declares a runtime semantic the carrier drops.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app\u002Fagent-config\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Fscripts\u002Ffixtures\u002Fbody-portable\u002Fnon-portable\u002FSKILL.md",[120],{"categoryNo":90,"categoryName":91,"taxonomyType":92,"taxonomyTypeDesc":93},[110,122,109,97,123,32,124,100],"non portable fixture","semantic","runtime",{"skillNo":126,"name":127,"nameZh":6,"description":128,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":129,"categories":130,"keywords":132,"publishedAt":44},"01M6X848F706PT9MDCX75JKJ6B","candidate-zero-width","A candidate whose prose carries an invisible 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user.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app\u002Fagent-config\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Ffixtures\u002Fskill-scout-candidates\u002Fdisclosure-suppression\u002FSKILL.md",[143],{"categoryNo":90,"categoryName":91,"taxonomyType":92,"taxonomyTypeDesc":93},[145,134,136,146],"candidate disclosure suppression","user",{"skillNo":148,"name":149,"nameZh":6,"description":150,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":151,"categories":152,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":44},"01M6X83TFS5AGPBPVTQNWP0BB3","candidate-dangerous-frontmatter","A candidate claiming an unscoped tool grant and a permission bypass.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fevent4u-app\u002Fagent-config\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Ffixtures\u002Fskill-scout-candidates\u002Fdangerous-frontmatter\u002FSKILL.md",[153],{"categoryNo":90,"categoryName":91,"taxonomyType":92,"taxonomyTypeDesc":93},[155,134,156,157,158,159],"candidate dangerous frontmatter","frontmatter","shell","permission","tool"]