[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6P9D85DP1ASMBKR9VGQFB2N":3,"skill-same:01M6P9D85DP1ASMBKR9VGQFB2N":68},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":38,"linkOnly":39,"markdownContent":40,"markdownBody":41,"frontMatter":42,"refName":30,"commitSha":49,"skillDirectory":50,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":51,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":52,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":53,"install":54,"resources":67},"01M6P9D85DP1ASMBKR9VGQFB2N","meme-coin-audit",null,"Meme coin and token security audit","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fmeme-coin-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"meme coin audit","audit","meme","commands","for","relevant","helper","offensive","scripts","scope","token","testing","main","community","only","security audit","Tools","license","research","security","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: meme-coin-audit\ndescription: Meme coin and token security audit\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: public_research\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# MEME COIN & TOKEN SECURITY AUDIT\n\nFast-kill rug pull detection and deep token security analysis for EVM and Solana meme coins.\n\n---\n\n## PRE-DIVE KILL SIGNALS\n\nCheck these BEFORE reading a single line of code. If any are true, skip the audit — the token is likely a rug or not worth the time.\n\n### Hard Kills (Skip Immediately)\n- **Contract not verified** on Etherscan\u002FSolscan → Cannot audit source = cannot trust\n- **Deployer wallet** has history of rug pulls (check Etherscan deployer page)\n- **Token age \u003C 1 hour** AND no known team → Too early, wait for more data\n- **Mint authority retained** (Solana) AND no cap → Infinite mint = certain rug\n- **Freeze authority retained** (Solana) on meme coin → Honeypot confirmed\n- **Transfer hook present** (Token-2022) with mutable hook program → Honeypot vector\n- **Permanent delegate** extension (Token-2022) → Can steal all holder tokens\n\n### Soft Kills (Proceed with Extreme Caution)\n- Top holder > 20% of supply (excluding DEX pools)\n- LP not burned or locked in verified contract\n- Contract is upgradeable \u002F proxy with retained admin\n- Less than $5K liquidity in the pool\n- No social presence \u002F anonymous deployer with no history\n\n---\n\n## THE ONE RULE\n\n> **\"Check ALL authorities and owner functions. The retained authority IS the rug vector.\"**\n>\n> Every rug pull requires a privileged operation: mint, blacklist, fee change, LP removal, or authority abuse. If you find the privilege, you found the bug.\n\n---\n\n## BUG CLASSES (8 TOKEN-SPECIFIC)\n\n### 1. HIDDEN MINT \u002F UNLIMITED SUPPLY\n> Common rug pattern. Deployer mints tokens post-launch, dumps on LP.\n\n**Quick grep (EVM):**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"function mint\\|_mint(\\|_balances\\[.*\\] +=\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" | grep -v \"test\\|lib\\|node_modules\"\n```\n\n**Quick grep (Solana):**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"MintTo\\|mint_to\\|mint_authority\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\" | grep -v \"test\\|target\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** MAX_SUPPLY enforced in every mint path, or mint function removed entirely.\n\n### 2. HONEYPOT \u002F TRANSFER RESTRICTION\n> Common scam pattern. Buy works, sell blocked.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"blacklist\\|isBlacklisted\\|_bots\\|maxTxAmount\\|approve.*override\\|tradingEnabled\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Solana equivalent:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"freeze_authority\\|transfer_hook\\|TransferHook\\|permanent_delegate\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** No blacklist mapping, no transfer hooks, no freeze authority.\n\n### 3. FEE MANIPULATION\n> Common rug pattern. Sell fee set to 99% after initial buys.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"setFee\\|setSellFee\\|_taxFee\\|_sellFee\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\ngrep -rn \"function set.*Fee\" -A5 src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" | grep -v \"require\\|MAX\\|\u003C=\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** Fee setter has `require(fee \u003C= MAX_FEE)` with MAX_FEE \u003C= 10%.\n\n### 4. LIQUIDITY POOL DRAIN\n> LP removal, migration, or manipulation to crash price.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"migrateLP\\|emergencyWithdraw\\|\\.sync()\\|setPair\\|setRouter\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** LP tokens burned to dead address, no migration function, no pair setter.\n\n### 5. BONDING CURVE MANIPULATION\n> Exploits in pump.fun-style bonding curves.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"virtualReserve\\|setCurve\\|graduate\\|bonding_curve\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" --include=\"*.rs\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** Curve parameters immutable, graduation permissionless.\n\n### 6. AUTHORITY RETENTION (SOLANA)\n> Retained mint\u002Ffreeze\u002Fupdate authorities on Solana tokens.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"mint_authority\\|freeze_authority\\|update_authority\\|close_authority\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\"\ngrep -rn \"set_authority.*None\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\"  # Good sign: revocation\n```\n\n**Kill if:** All authorities = None, verified on-chain.\n\n### 7. FAKE RENOUNCE \u002F HIDDEN OWNERSHIP\n> Ownership appears renounced but backdoor control retained.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"renounceOwnership.*override\\|_shadowAdmin\\|_backupOwner\\|selfdestruct\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** renounceOwnership NOT overridden, no second admin role, no selfdestruct.\n\n### 8. SANDWICH AMPLIFICATION BY DESIGN\n> Contract makes holders maximally sandwichable.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"swapExactTokensForETH\" -A5 src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" | grep \"0,\"\ngrep -rn \"swapThreshold\\|_rebase\\|mandatoryPool\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** Auto-swap has proper slippage, no rebase mechanics.\n\n---\n\n## FAST RED-FLAG SWEEP\n\nRun the 8 bug-class greps above across the source tree for fast red-flag detection. Together they catch:\n- Direct mint\u002Fbalance manipulation\n- Blacklist and transfer restriction patterns\n- Unbounded fee setters\n- LP migration and emergency withdraw functions\n- Fake renounce overrides\n- Zero slippage auto-swaps\n- All Solana authority patterns\n- Token-2022 dangerous extensions\n\n**Source grep does NOT check** (verify these out-of-band):\n- On-chain state (use Etherscan\u002FSolscan for authority verification)\n- Holder distribution (use DEXTools\u002FBirdeye)\n- LP lock status (use Unicrypt\u002FPinkLock\u002FSolscan)\n- Deployer wallet history (manual check)\n\n---\n\n## FOUNDRY POC TEMPLATE (TOKEN EXPLOITS)\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.0;\n\nimport \"forge-std\u002FTest.sol\";\nimport \"..\u002Fsrc\u002FToken.sol\";\n\ncontract TokenExploitTest is Test {\n    Token token;\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address victim = makeAddr(\"victim\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    \u002F\u002F Uniswap V2 router (mainnet fork)\n    address constant ROUTER = 0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D;\n    address constant WETH = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.createSelectFork(\"mainnet\");\n        \u002F\u002F Deploy token as owner\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        token = new Token();\n        \u002F\u002F Add liquidity...\n        vm.stopPrank();\n    }\n\n    function test_hiddenMint_rug() public {\n        \u002F\u002F Step 1: Victim buys tokens\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        \u002F\u002F ... buy tokens on Uniswap\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 2: Owner mints and dumps\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        uint256 supplyBefore = token.totalSupply();\n        token.mint(owner, 1_000_000_000e18);\n        assertGt(token.totalSupply(), supplyBefore, \"Supply should increase\");\n        \u002F\u002F ... sell minted tokens\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 3: Victim's tokens are now worthless\n        \u002F\u002F Assert token price crashed\n    }\n\n    function test_honeypot_blacklist() public {\n        \u002F\u002F Step 1: Victim buys\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        \u002F\u002F ... buy tokens\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 2: Owner blacklists victim\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        token.blacklist(victim);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 3: Victim cannot sell\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        vm.expectRevert(\"Blacklisted\");\n        token.transfer(address(1), 100e18);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n    }\n\n    function test_fee_manipulation_rug() public {\n        \u002F\u002F Step 1: Verify initial fee is low\n        assertEq(token.sellFee(), 3); \u002F\u002F 3%\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 2: Owner sets fee to 99%\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        token.setFees(3, 99); \u002F\u002F Buy 3%, Sell 99%\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 3: Victim sells — loses 99% to fees\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        uint256 balanceBefore = address(victim).balance;\n        \u002F\u002F ... sell tokens\n        \u002F\u002F Assert: received almost nothing\n        vm.stopPrank();\n    }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## SOLANA QUICK CHECKS (NO SOURCE CODE NEEDED)\n\nWhen you don't have source code, check on-chain:\n\n```\n1. MINT AUTHORITY → solana account \u003CMINT> --output json | check mint_authority\n   - Should be null\n   - If Some(pubkey) → CRITICAL: can mint infinite tokens\n\n2. FREEZE AUTHORITY → same as above, check freeze_authority\n   - Should be null\n   - If Some(pubkey) → CRITICAL: honeypot\n\n3. LP STATUS → Check Raydium\u002FOrca pool\n   - LP burned? (tokens sent to 1111...1111)\n   - LP locked? (in verified locker with no backdoor)\n   - LP held by deployer? → CRITICAL: instant rug\n\n4. TOP HOLDERS → Birdeye\u002FSolscan holders tab\n   - Top 10 \u003C 30% of supply (excluding pools)\n   - Creator wallets (check first transactions)\n\n5. PROGRAM UPGRADEABILITY\n   - Is the program upgradeable? → can change any logic\n   - Upgrade authority should be None for immutable programs\n\n6. TOKEN-2022 EXTENSIONS\n   - Any transfer hook? → potential honeypot\n   - Permanent delegate? → CRITICAL\n```\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`web3-audit`** — When the target is a DeFi protocol (not just a token). Workflow primitive: this skill's 8 token-specific bug classes are a subset of `web3-audit`'s scope; if the target has lending \u002F vault \u002F oracle logic beyond the token contract itself, also load `web3-audit` for the broader 10 DeFi bug classes.\n- **`triage-validation`** — When deciding if a rug-pull finding qualifies as a bug bounty submission. Workflow primitive: many \"rug vector\" observations are pre-rug warnings, not exploitable bugs in a deployed protocol; run 7Q gate to distinguish \"the deployer COULD rug\" (informational) from \"the contract IS exploitable now\" (reportable).\n- **`report-writing`** — When writing up a confirmed token security finding for Immunefi \u002F private bounty. Workflow primitive: Foundry PoC template here feeds into `report-writing`'s Immunefi body template.\n- **`offensive-osint`** — When the token has off-chain infrastructure (project website, Telegram, deployer doxxing). Workflow primitive: on-chain audit is this skill's domain; deployer wallet history, social presence, and project legitimacy checks route to `offensive-osint`.\n- **`bb-methodology`** — When confirming engagement mode. Workflow primitive: PART 0 separates \"pre-investment due diligence\" (this skill's primary use) from \"Immunefi bug bounty submission\" (different reporting + severity standards); the answer routes which post-audit handoff is correct.\n\n---\n\n## Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)\n\n> Engagement-derived + 2026-specific additions to the vendored foundation.\n> Wisdom from real authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across\n> this repo's 31+ skill-area live tests. The upstream content covers the WHAT;\n> this layer covers the WHEN-IT-WORKS-vs-WHEN-IT-DOESN'T.\n\n### Solana-specific signals — 2025-2026 reality\n\nToken-2022 transfer hooks are the new rug-pull vector. Hook authority can be set to a single key; that key can pause \u002F blacklist \u002F fee-on-transfer arbitrary addresses post-launch. Always check hook authority + permanent-delegate authority for Token-2022 mints:\n\n```bash\n# get mint extensions for a Token-2022 mint\nspl-token display \u003CMINT_ADDRESS> --program-id TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb\n# look for: TransferHook { authority: ... }, PermanentDelegate { delegate: ... }\n```\n\nIf TransferHook authority is non-null → the holder of that key can revoke transfer rights mid-trade. If PermanentDelegate is non-null → that delegate can move any holder's tokens at any time (effectively a built-in confiscation). Either alone is rug-class.\n\npump.fun bonding curves can be manipulated via the curve's K-parameter; mint authority retained beyond bonding-curve completion is the classic exit-scam shape. Check `mintAuthority` AFTER the curve completes — legitimate launches null it, scams retain it for the post-graduation dump.\n\n### Honeypot detection — beyond the obvious\n\n`transfer()` succeeds in dry-run but fails on certain addresses (sender allowlist \u002F blocklist). Test with: simulated buy → simulated transfer to a different address → simulated sell. If buy + transfer succeed but sell fails, it's a honeypot.\n\nQuick triage matrix:\n\n| Test | Honeypot Signal |\n|------|----------------|\n| Buy from random wallet | Succeeds (must — or no one would touch it) |\n| Transfer to second random wallet | Often fails on honeypot |\n| Sell from original wallet | Fails or applies > 50% tax |\n| Sell from team-controlled wallet | Succeeds (the giveaway) |\n\nCross-source verification: solana-rugcheck, rugcheck.xyz, dexscreener risk signals, honeypot.is (EVM). Never trust a single source — rug-checkers can be fooled by deferred-malice patterns (clean for first 7 days, hook activates later).\n\n### LP lock claims — verify, don't trust\n\nLP-lock badges on DexScreener mean nothing without on-chain verification. Check the actual lock contract (Unicrypt, TeamFinance, Bonkbot, PinkLock) for:\n\n- **Unlock date** — the on-chain timestamp, not the badge text\n- **Lock owner** — is it the deployer's wallet? Are there multiple lockers fragmenting the LP?\n- **Extension \u002F shortening permission** — some lock contracts allow the owner to SHORTEN the lock; that's an exit hatch dressed as a lock\n- **Lock contract bytecode** — verify it's the canonical locker, not a fork with backdoors\n\nSome \"locked\" LPs are 1-day locks renewed weekly — visually the same as a year lock to the buyer, but the deployer can let it lapse on any Tuesday. Always read the lock contract source on the chain explorer.\n\n### Pre-investment due diligence in under 5 minutes\n\nThe 6-question fast filter:\n\n1. Mint authority null?\n2. Freeze authority null?\n3. Update authority null (for metadata immutability)?\n4. LP locked in a verified contract for > 6 months?\n5. Top 10 holders concentration \u003C 30% (excluding pools\u002Fburn addresses)?\n6. Bonding curve completed (for pump.fun) AND post-completion mint authority null?\n\nFive \"no\"s = walk away. Three \"no\"s = high risk, only enter with size you'd walk away from. Two \"no\"s with strong narrative + thin liquidity = the canonical retail trap.\n\n### MEV \u002F sandwich amplification on illiquid mints\n\nBuying into a mint with \u003C $50K liquidity guarantees you'll be sandwiched. The bot infrastructure on Solana and Ethereum is institutionalized in 2026 — Jito MEV-share and private order-flow auctions. If your trade size > 1% of available liquidity, expect sandwich loss > 5%; > 5% of liquidity, expect > 20% slippage from sandwich alone.\n\nMitigations (rank by 2026 effectiveness):\n\n1. **Jito bundles** (Solana) — submit with priority tip, atomic with no MEV window\n2. **Flashbots Protect RPC** (Ethereum) — private mempool submission\n3. **MEV-protected DEX aggregators** — Jupiter's slippage protection, 1inch Fusion, CoWSwap\n4. **Splitting orders** — N smaller trades vs 1 large; reduces sandwich profitability per trade\n\nIf the mint is so illiquid that even split orders sandwich — that's the signal to skip the trade, not the signal to use better tooling.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# MEME COIN & TOKEN SECURITY AUDIT\n\nFast-kill rug pull detection and deep token security analysis for EVM and Solana meme coins.\n\n---\n\n## PRE-DIVE KILL SIGNALS\n\nCheck these BEFORE reading a single line of code. If any are true, skip the audit — the token is likely a rug or not worth the time.\n\n### Hard Kills (Skip Immediately)\n- **Contract not verified** on Etherscan\u002FSolscan → Cannot audit source = cannot trust\n- **Deployer wallet** has history of rug pulls (check Etherscan deployer page)\n- **Token age \u003C 1 hour** AND no known team → Too early, wait for more data\n- **Mint authority retained** (Solana) AND no cap → Infinite mint = certain rug\n- **Freeze authority retained** (Solana) on meme coin → Honeypot confirmed\n- **Transfer hook present** (Token-2022) with mutable hook program → Honeypot vector\n- **Permanent delegate** extension (Token-2022) → Can steal all holder tokens\n\n### Soft Kills (Proceed with Extreme Caution)\n- Top holder > 20% of supply (excluding DEX pools)\n- LP not burned or locked in verified contract\n- Contract is upgradeable \u002F proxy with retained admin\n- Less than $5K liquidity in the pool\n- No social presence \u002F anonymous deployer with no history\n\n---\n\n## THE ONE RULE\n\n> **\"Check ALL authorities and owner functions. The retained authority IS the rug vector.\"**\n>\n> Every rug pull requires a privileged operation: mint, blacklist, fee change, LP removal, or authority abuse. If you find the privilege, you found the bug.\n\n---\n\n## BUG CLASSES (8 TOKEN-SPECIFIC)\n\n### 1. HIDDEN MINT \u002F UNLIMITED SUPPLY\n> Common rug pattern. Deployer mints tokens post-launch, dumps on LP.\n\n**Quick grep (EVM):**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"function mint\\|_mint(\\|_balances\\[.*\\] +=\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" | grep -v \"test\\|lib\\|node_modules\"\n```\n\n**Quick grep (Solana):**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"MintTo\\|mint_to\\|mint_authority\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\" | grep -v \"test\\|target\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** MAX_SUPPLY enforced in every mint path, or mint function removed entirely.\n\n### 2. HONEYPOT \u002F TRANSFER RESTRICTION\n> Common scam pattern. Buy works, sell blocked.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"blacklist\\|isBlacklisted\\|_bots\\|maxTxAmount\\|approve.*override\\|tradingEnabled\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Solana equivalent:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"freeze_authority\\|transfer_hook\\|TransferHook\\|permanent_delegate\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** No blacklist mapping, no transfer hooks, no freeze authority.\n\n### 3. FEE MANIPULATION\n> Common rug pattern. Sell fee set to 99% after initial buys.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"setFee\\|setSellFee\\|_taxFee\\|_sellFee\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\ngrep -rn \"function set.*Fee\" -A5 src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" | grep -v \"require\\|MAX\\|\u003C=\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** Fee setter has `require(fee \u003C= MAX_FEE)` with MAX_FEE \u003C= 10%.\n\n### 4. LIQUIDITY POOL DRAIN\n> LP removal, migration, or manipulation to crash price.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"migrateLP\\|emergencyWithdraw\\|\\.sync()\\|setPair\\|setRouter\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** LP tokens burned to dead address, no migration function, no pair setter.\n\n### 5. BONDING CURVE MANIPULATION\n> Exploits in pump.fun-style bonding curves.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"virtualReserve\\|setCurve\\|graduate\\|bonding_curve\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" --include=\"*.rs\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** Curve parameters immutable, graduation permissionless.\n\n### 6. AUTHORITY RETENTION (SOLANA)\n> Retained mint\u002Ffreeze\u002Fupdate authorities on Solana tokens.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"mint_authority\\|freeze_authority\\|update_authority\\|close_authority\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\"\ngrep -rn \"set_authority.*None\" src\u002F --include=\"*.rs\"  # Good sign: revocation\n```\n\n**Kill if:** All authorities = None, verified on-chain.\n\n### 7. FAKE RENOUNCE \u002F HIDDEN OWNERSHIP\n> Ownership appears renounced but backdoor control retained.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"renounceOwnership.*override\\|_shadowAdmin\\|_backupOwner\\|selfdestruct\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** renounceOwnership NOT overridden, no second admin role, no selfdestruct.\n\n### 8. SANDWICH AMPLIFICATION BY DESIGN\n> Contract makes holders maximally sandwichable.\n\n**Quick grep:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"swapExactTokensForETH\" -A5 src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\" | grep \"0,\"\ngrep -rn \"swapThreshold\\|_rebase\\|mandatoryPool\" src\u002F --include=\"*.sol\"\n```\n\n**Kill if:** Auto-swap has proper slippage, no rebase mechanics.\n\n---\n\n## FAST RED-FLAG SWEEP\n\nRun the 8 bug-class greps above across the source tree for fast red-flag detection. Together they catch:\n- Direct mint\u002Fbalance manipulation\n- Blacklist and transfer restriction patterns\n- Unbounded fee setters\n- LP migration and emergency withdraw functions\n- Fake renounce overrides\n- Zero slippage auto-swaps\n- All Solana authority patterns\n- Token-2022 dangerous extensions\n\n**Source grep does NOT check** (verify these out-of-band):\n- On-chain state (use Etherscan\u002FSolscan for authority verification)\n- Holder distribution (use DEXTools\u002FBirdeye)\n- LP lock status (use Unicrypt\u002FPinkLock\u002FSolscan)\n- Deployer wallet history (manual check)\n\n---\n\n## FOUNDRY POC TEMPLATE (TOKEN EXPLOITS)\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.0;\n\nimport \"forge-std\u002FTest.sol\";\nimport \"..\u002Fsrc\u002FToken.sol\";\n\ncontract TokenExploitTest is Test {\n    Token token;\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address victim = makeAddr(\"victim\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    \u002F\u002F Uniswap V2 router (mainnet fork)\n    address constant ROUTER = 0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D;\n    address constant WETH = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.createSelectFork(\"mainnet\");\n        \u002F\u002F Deploy token as owner\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        token = new Token();\n        \u002F\u002F Add liquidity...\n        vm.stopPrank();\n    }\n\n    function test_hiddenMint_rug() public {\n        \u002F\u002F Step 1: Victim buys tokens\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        \u002F\u002F ... buy tokens on Uniswap\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 2: Owner mints and dumps\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        uint256 supplyBefore = token.totalSupply();\n        token.mint(owner, 1_000_000_000e18);\n        assertGt(token.totalSupply(), supplyBefore, \"Supply should increase\");\n        \u002F\u002F ... sell minted tokens\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 3: Victim's tokens are now worthless\n        \u002F\u002F Assert token price crashed\n    }\n\n    function test_honeypot_blacklist() public {\n        \u002F\u002F Step 1: Victim buys\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        \u002F\u002F ... buy tokens\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 2: Owner blacklists victim\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        token.blacklist(victim);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 3: Victim cannot sell\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        vm.expectRevert(\"Blacklisted\");\n        token.transfer(address(1), 100e18);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n    }\n\n    function test_fee_manipulation_rug() public {\n        \u002F\u002F Step 1: Verify initial fee is low\n        assertEq(token.sellFee(), 3); \u002F\u002F 3%\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 2: Owner sets fee to 99%\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        token.setFees(3, 99); \u002F\u002F Buy 3%, Sell 99%\n\n        \u002F\u002F Step 3: Victim sells — loses 99% to fees\n        vm.startPrank(victim);\n        uint256 balanceBefore = address(victim).balance;\n        \u002F\u002F ... sell tokens\n        \u002F\u002F Assert: received almost nothing\n        vm.stopPrank();\n    }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## SOLANA QUICK CHECKS (NO SOURCE CODE NEEDED)\n\nWhen you don't have source code, check on-chain:\n\n```\n1. MINT AUTHORITY → solana account \u003CMINT> --output json | check mint_authority\n   - Should be null\n   - If Some(pubkey) → CRITICAL: can mint infinite tokens\n\n2. FREEZE AUTHORITY → same as above, check freeze_authority\n   - Should be null\n   - If Some(pubkey) → CRITICAL: honeypot\n\n3. LP STATUS → Check Raydium\u002FOrca pool\n   - LP burned? (tokens sent to 1111...1111)\n   - LP locked? (in verified locker with no backdoor)\n   - LP held by deployer? → CRITICAL: instant rug\n\n4. TOP HOLDERS → Birdeye\u002FSolscan holders tab\n   - Top 10 \u003C 30% of supply (excluding pools)\n   - Creator wallets (check first transactions)\n\n5. PROGRAM UPGRADEABILITY\n   - Is the program upgradeable? → can change any logic\n   - Upgrade authority should be None for immutable programs\n\n6. TOKEN-2022 EXTENSIONS\n   - Any transfer hook? → potential honeypot\n   - Permanent delegate? → CRITICAL\n```\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`web3-audit`** — When the target is a DeFi protocol (not just a token). Workflow primitive: this skill's 8 token-specific bug classes are a subset of `web3-audit`'s scope; if the target has lending \u002F vault \u002F oracle logic beyond the token contract itself, also load `web3-audit` for the broader 10 DeFi bug classes.\n- **`triage-validation`** — When deciding if a rug-pull finding qualifies as a bug bounty submission. Workflow primitive: many \"rug vector\" observations are pre-rug warnings, not exploitable bugs in a deployed protocol; run 7Q gate to distinguish \"the deployer COULD rug\" (informational) from \"the contract IS exploitable now\" (reportable).\n- **`report-writing`** — When writing up a confirmed token security finding for Immunefi \u002F private bounty. Workflow primitive: Foundry PoC template here feeds into `report-writing`'s Immunefi body template.\n- **`offensive-osint`** — When the token has off-chain infrastructure (project website, Telegram, deployer doxxing). Workflow primitive: on-chain audit is this skill's domain; deployer wallet history, social presence, and project legitimacy checks route to `offensive-osint`.\n- **`bb-methodology`** — When confirming engagement mode. Workflow primitive: PART 0 separates \"pre-investment due diligence\" (this skill's primary use) from \"Immunefi bug bounty submission\" (different reporting + severity standards); the answer routes which post-audit handoff is correct.\n\n---\n\n## Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)\n\n> Engagement-derived + 2026-specific additions to the vendored foundation.\n> Wisdom from real authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across\n> this repo's 31+ skill-area live tests. The upstream content covers the WHAT;\n> this layer covers the WHEN-IT-WORKS-vs-WHEN-IT-DOESN'T.\n\n### Solana-specific signals — 2025-2026 reality\n\nToken-2022 transfer hooks are the new rug-pull vector. Hook authority can be set to a single key; that key can pause \u002F blacklist \u002F fee-on-transfer arbitrary addresses post-launch. Always check hook authority + permanent-delegate authority for Token-2022 mints:\n\n```bash\n# get mint extensions for a Token-2022 mint\nspl-token display \u003CMINT_ADDRESS> --program-id TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb\n# look for: TransferHook { authority: ... }, PermanentDelegate { delegate: ... }\n```\n\nIf TransferHook authority is non-null → the holder of that key can revoke transfer rights mid-trade. If PermanentDelegate is non-null → that delegate can move any holder's tokens at any time (effectively a built-in confiscation). Either alone is rug-class.\n\npump.fun bonding curves can be manipulated via the curve's K-parameter; mint authority retained beyond bonding-curve completion is the classic exit-scam shape. Check `mintAuthority` AFTER the curve completes — legitimate launches null it, scams retain it for the post-graduation dump.\n\n### Honeypot detection — beyond the obvious\n\n`transfer()` succeeds in dry-run but fails on certain addresses (sender allowlist \u002F blocklist). Test with: simulated buy → simulated transfer to a different address → simulated sell. If buy + transfer succeed but sell fails, it's a honeypot.\n\nQuick triage matrix:\n\n| Test | Honeypot Signal |\n|------|----------------|\n| Buy from random wallet | Succeeds (must — or no one would touch it) |\n| Transfer to second random wallet | Often fails on honeypot |\n| Sell from original wallet | Fails or applies > 50% tax |\n| Sell from team-controlled wallet | Succeeds (the giveaway) |\n\nCross-source verification: solana-rugcheck, rugcheck.xyz, dexscreener risk signals, honeypot.is (EVM). Never trust a single source — rug-checkers can be fooled by deferred-malice patterns (clean for first 7 days, hook activates later).\n\n### LP lock claims — verify, don't trust\n\nLP-lock badges on DexScreener mean nothing without on-chain verification. Check the actual lock contract (Unicrypt, TeamFinance, Bonkbot, PinkLock) for:\n\n- **Unlock date** — the on-chain timestamp, not the badge text\n- **Lock owner** — is it the deployer's wallet? Are there multiple lockers fragmenting the LP?\n- **Extension \u002F shortening permission** — some lock contracts allow the owner to SHORTEN the lock; that's an exit hatch dressed as a lock\n- **Lock contract bytecode** — verify it's the canonical locker, not a fork with backdoors\n\nSome \"locked\" LPs are 1-day locks renewed weekly — visually the same as a year lock to the buyer, but the deployer can let it lapse on any Tuesday. Always read the lock contract source on the chain explorer.\n\n### Pre-investment due diligence in under 5 minutes\n\nThe 6-question fast filter:\n\n1. Mint authority null?\n2. Freeze authority null?\n3. Update authority null (for metadata immutability)?\n4. LP locked in a verified contract for > 6 months?\n5. Top 10 holders concentration \u003C 30% (excluding pools\u002Fburn addresses)?\n6. Bonding curve completed (for pump.fun) AND post-completion mint authority null?\n\nFive \"no\"s = walk away. Three \"no\"s = high risk, only enter with size you'd walk away from. Two \"no\"s with strong narrative + thin liquidity = the canonical retail trap.\n\n### MEV \u002F sandwich amplification on illiquid mints\n\nBuying into a mint with \u003C $50K liquidity guarantees you'll be sandwiched. The bot infrastructure on Solana and Ethereum is institutionalized in 2026 — Jito MEV-share and private order-flow auctions. If your trade size > 1% of available liquidity, expect sandwich loss > 5%; > 5% of liquidity, expect > 20% slippage from sandwich alone.\n\nMitigations (rank by 2026 effectiveness):\n\n1. **Jito bundles** (Solana) — submit with priority tip, atomic with no MEV window\n2. **Flashbots Protect RPC** (Ethereum) — private mempool submission\n3. **MEV-protected DEX aggregators** — Jupiter's slippage protection, 1inch Fusion, CoWSwap\n4. **Splitting orders** — N smaller trades vs 1 large; reduces sandwich profitability per trade\n\nIf the mint is so illiquid that even split orders sandwich — that's the signal to skip the trade, not the signal to use better tooling.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":25,"source":43,"license":14,"sources":44,"category":37,"date_added":45,"description":7,"source_repo":46,"source_type":31,"compatibility":47,"license_source":48},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","public_research","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fmeme-coin-audit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":55,"prompt":65,"zipAvailable":66},[56,59,62],{"tool":57,"command":58},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill meme-coin-audit",{"tool":60,"command":61},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill meme-coin-audit",{"tool":63,"command":64},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill meme-coin-audit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fmeme-coin-audit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[69,94,118,141,169,193],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. Use when implementing modern security architectures.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzero-trust\u002FSKILL.md",[75],{"categoryNo":76,"categoryName":77,"taxonomyType":78,"taxonomyTypeDesc":79},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[81,82,83,84,85,86,71,87,88,89,90,32,31,30,91,92,27,26,23,93],"ZeRO","trust","zero trust","architecture","assessment","verification","segmentation","devops-security","access","configure","active","critical","implementing",{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0F1YZJW3KX5FBKEVZ8CV4","zcode-delegate","Delegate coding tasks to the Z.AI ZCode CLI only when the user explicitly requests it, while the orchestrator retains review and landing responsibility.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzcode-delegate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,32,114,31,115,116,92,117],"delegate","zcode","zcode delegate","review","cli","orchestration","tasks","run","Bash","model","node","read","orchestrator","files","desktop app","app","agent-orchestration",{"skillNo":119,"name":120,"nameZh":6,"description":121,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":122,"categories":123,"keywords":124,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0ETK41VGNMYEXW0T00AJN","youtube-transcript","Fetch YouTube transcripts through DeepAPI or local fallback tooling and save clean text output.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[125,126,127,128,129,130,36,35,131,132,133,134,135,31,30,136,137,138,139,140],"transcript","youtube transcript","youtube","safe","github","codex","https","text","fetch","tooling","clean","local","output","deepapi","youtube transcripts","blob",{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":158,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EPPH2PVMDW40017F8WX0","youtube-transcript-skills","Fetch YouTube video transcripts, search videos\u002Fchannels, browse channels, and extract playlists via the getyoutubetranscript.com API - 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