[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6MMHSW1YVFPP91T3SKV11WX":3,"skill-same:01M6MMHSW1YVFPP91T3SKV11WX":79},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":49,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":52,"repositoryHtmlUrl":53,"repositoryHomepageUrl":54,"ownerHtmlUrl":55,"ownerBlogUrl":56,"ownerDescription":57,"updatedAt":58,"install":59,"resources":72},"01M6MMHSW1YVFPP91T3SKV11WX","package-trust-check",null,"Investigate whether one specific npm package is trustworthy — maintainer\u002Fownership takeover signals, publish-provenance mismatches, and risky install scripts. Use when the user asks if a single named package is safe, compromised, hijacked, suspicious, or \"can I trust this\" — not for auditing a full package.json\u002Flockfile (see dependency-audit) and not for a plain factual question like \"what does X do.\"","hashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins","hashgraph-online","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F160371962?v=4","01M6CNB6NRJVNNGN14TR01Q6D3","HOL (Hashgraph Online)","01M6JT1HSKKG9V68KQAQGBA7XP",1566,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Fsalemalem\u002Fnpmscan-mcp-plugin\u002Fskills\u002Fpackage-trust-check\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"package","package trust check","check","trust","use","when","risky install","for","can","scripts","full","signals","npm package","do","dependency","suspicious","install","question","takeover","investigate","provenance","publish","lockfile","audit","safe","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: package-trust-check\ndescription: Investigate whether one specific npm package is trustworthy — maintainer\u002Fownership takeover signals, publish-provenance mismatches, and risky install scripts. Use when the user asks if a single named package is safe, compromised, hijacked, suspicious, or \"can I trust this\" — not for auditing a full package.json\u002Flockfile (see dependency-audit) and not for a plain factual question like \"what does X do.\"\n---\n\n# NPMScan package trust check\n\nUse this skill when the user names **one specific package** (optionally a\nversion) and asks a trust question about it — \"is X safe to use,\" \"was X\ncompromised,\" \"should I be worried about X,\" \"check X's maintainers.\" This\nis a deep, single-package investigation: it runs checks `dependency-audit`\ndeliberately skips for every package in a batch because they're too\nexpensive to run at scale.\n\nIf the user instead pastes a `package.json`\u002Flockfile\u002Fdependency list or asks\nto audit multiple packages, use the `dependency-audit` skill instead — don't\nrun this skill's checks across a whole inventory. If the question is purely\nfactual with no trust\u002Fsafety angle (\"what does lodash do,\" \"what's the\nlatest version of express\"), just answer directly with `get_package` — don't\ninvoke the full investigation for that. If the user is instead choosing\nbetween candidates for something not yet installed (\"should we add X,\" \"X\nvs Y for this job\"), that's a forward-looking pick, not a trust\ninvestigation — use the `new-dependency-evaluation` skill.\n\n## Connecting the npmscan tools\n\nThis skill calls the npmscan MCP server's tools (listed under \"Tools used\"\nbelow). They only read public package data: no API key or account, nothing is\ninstalled or changed on the user's machine, and the only server contacted is\n`https:\u002F\u002Fnpmscan.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmcp`.\n\n- **Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Kimi, Grok:** the npmscan plugin connects\n  the server for you.\n- **OpenClaw:** `openclaw mcp add npmscan --url https:\u002F\u002Fnpmscan.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmcp --transport streamable-http`,\n  then `openclaw mcp doctor npmscan --probe` to check it.\n- **Any other MCP client:** add a remote (streamable HTTP) server with that URL.\n\nSome clients prefix tool names with the server name (for example\n`npmscan__get_package`). If the tools aren't available at all, tell the user\nhow to connect them for their client instead of answering from memory.\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Baseline with `get_package` (or `get_package_version` if the user gave an\n   exact version). Pull `deprecated`, `maintenanceSummary`,\n   `possibleTyposquatOf`, `isLatestVersionVulnerable`\u002F`highestSeverity`,\n   `downloadTrend`, and days-since-last-publish. This alone answers a good\n   chunk of \"should I trust this\" and grounds the deeper checks that follow —\n   don't skip straight to the maintainer\u002Fprovenance tools without it. If\n   `get_package_version` comes back with `versionExists: false`, that version\n   is no longer on npm but OSV still has advisories for it — usually a\n   release npm pulled for being malicious (ua-parser-js 0.7.29, debug\n   4.4.2). Report its `vulnerabilities` as real; it is not a \"not found.\"\n2. Check for malware. Every vulnerability finding carries `isMalware` — true\n   for a confirmed-malicious package (an OSV `MAL-*` record, or a GitHub\n   advisory with CWE-506 such as ua-parser-js's GHSA-pjwm), not an ordinary\n   bug. Read it on the step-1 findings for this version, and call\n   `query_vulnerabilities({ name })` with no version to see whether ANY\n   release of this package was ever malicious — a past compromise is worth\n   naming even when the current version is clean. Any `isMalware: true`\n   finding on the version in question is the most severe possible outcome:\n   report it plainly as known malware, never as \"worth verifying.\"\n   `get_latest_advisories({ type: \"malware\", affects: name })` (GitHub's\n   malware feed) and `({ type: \"osv\", affects: name })` (OpenSSF's) only\n   cover recently published advisories — useful for a brand-new incident\n   OSV hasn't indexed yet, but an empty result says nothing about history.\n3. Call `check_maintainer_changes({ name })`. It reconstructs maintainer\n   add\u002Fremove history from the npm packument and flags:\n   - a maintainer added recently who then published shortly after (the\n     account-takeover pattern behind the Sept 2025 chalk\u002Fdebug \"qix\"\n     compromise and ua-parser-js),\n   - a full sudden replacement of the maintainer list,\n   - a long-standing maintainer quietly dropped,\n   - a maintainer-list change on npm not yet tied to any release — flag this\n     as the *more* urgent case, since access changed hands but nothing has\n     shipped with it yet, so there's no version to warn the user off of.\n   Also reports GitHub repository transfer\u002Farchival — a transfer isn't\n   automatically hostile (e.g. jade → pug was a documented rename), say so\n   rather than treating every transfer as a red flag. If it flags a newly\n   added or fully turned-over maintainer, immediately follow up with\n   `check_maintainer_blast_radius({ maintainerUsername })` on that account\n   — it lists every other package the same account currently touches and\n   flags a tight cluster of packages published within a short window of\n   each other, the compromised-account shape behind incidents like the 2025\n   chalk\u002Fdebug (\"qix\") compromise and the 2026 keyv\u002Fcacheable \"Shai-Hulud\"\n   worm. Don't stop at the one named package if the maintainer signal is\n   already concerning — a tight cluster across several packages is a\n   materially worse finding than a single-package maintainer change, and\n   this is a single-package investigation's best chance to catch that\n   before the user asks about the next affected package separately. A large\n   `totalPackagesFound` alone is not a red flag; only a tight cluster is. A\n   cluster note starting \"Discounted:\" means it's at least 30 days old and\n   OSV.dev lists no malware for its versions — a past burst that stayed\n   clean, not a current threat; one naming a malware advisory is the\n   opposite.\n4. Call `check_package_provenance({ name, version })`. Three checks in one\n   call: does the Sigstore build attestation's source repo\u002Fcommit match\n   `package.json`'s declared repository; is this version missing provenance\n   while its npm-scope or maintainer peers consistently publish with it (a\n   real anomaly, not just \"no provenance\" — a version published before npm\n   provenance existed, 2023-04-19, skips this comparison, and `peers.note`\n   says so); and does the tarball's actual install scripts\u002F\n   dependencies match what's committed at the attested source commit — a\n   script or dependency on npm that was never committed in source is the\n   stolen-npm-token publish pattern. This is structural verification, not a\n   cryptographic re-check of the Sigstore bundle — say so if the user asks\n   how deep it goes. For a version npm no longer lists, this tool returns a\n   not-found error that names any OSV advisories — use those, don't stop at\n   the 404.\n5. If `get_package`\u002F`get_package_version` in step 1 showed\n   `hasLifecycleScripts`\u002Fa `preinstall`\u002F`postinstall`\u002F`prepare` entry, follow\n   up with `analyze_install_script({ name, version })`. It fetches the\n   published tarball and statically scans the script — and the files it\n   references — against npmscan's red-flags rubric (child_process,\n   network calls, `.ssh`\u002F`.aws`\u002F`.npmrc`\u002F`*TOKEN`\u002F`*KEY` access,\n   obfuscation, remote binaries off untrusted hosts, exfil endpoints,\n   eval-on-decoded-content), returning a `totalScore`\u002F`riskTier`. A nonzero\n   score isn't automatically malicious — a legitimate binary download (e.g.\n   `cypress`) scores nonzero too — so report the actual `findings`, not just\n   the score. A `prepare`-only package scores 0 unless its command does\n   something alarming: npm never runs a dependency's `prepare` on install.\n6. If the combined picture ends up genuinely concerning (a maintainer-\n   takeover pattern, a malware finding, a provenance mismatch, a\n   `possibleTyposquatOf` hit, or a critical install-script finding), offer — don't force —\n   `suggest_alternative({ name, reason })` with `reason` set to whichever of\n   `\"vulnerable\"`\u002F`\"abandoned\"`\u002F`\"typosquat\"`\u002F`\"general\"` best fits, so the\n   user has a next step instead of just a warning.\n7. Produce one findings report, most-concerning signal first:\n   - State the verdict per check plainly (e.g. \"no maintainer-change red\n     flags in the lookback window,\" not silence-as-clean).\n   - Every finding from `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F`check_package_provenance`\n     is a hedged signal meant to prompt verification, not proof — say\n     \"worth verifying independently,\" matching the tools' own language,\n     especially for anything below their `high`\u002F`critical` tiers.\n   - Include the `npmscanUrl` so the user can read the full write-up.\n   - If nothing turned up anything but a low\u002Fnone `riskTier` and no maintainer\n     or provenance findings, say so plainly — this skill exists to give\n     confident \"looks clean\" answers as often as it flags real risk.\n\n## Do not\n\n- Do not run this skill's checks across every package in a list — that's\n  `dependency-audit`'s job, and `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F\n  `check_package_provenance` are deliberately reserved there for\n  already-flagged packages only, not a full inventory.\n- Do not treat a missing `provenance` field, a repository transfer, or a\n  single maintainer addition as confirmed compromise on its own — report\n  what the tool actually flagged (or didn't) and let the `riskTier`\u002Fpoints\n  speak, don't editorialize past it.\n- Do not skip `get_package` and jump straight to the deep checks — the\n  baseline (deprecated, popularity\u002Fmaintenance tiers, typosquat) is cheap\n  and often already answers the question.\n- Do not invent a replacement package name yourself — let\n  `suggest_alternative` return its own `whySuggested`\u002F`nonPackageAlternatives`\n  rather than guessing.\n- Do not silently skip `analyze_install_script` when lifecycle scripts exist\n  just because `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F`check_package_provenance` came\n  back clean — a legitimate maintainer can still ship a genuinely risky\n  script, and vice versa; report all applicable signals, not just whichever\n  ran first.\n- Do not skip `check_maintainer_blast_radius` once `check_maintainer_changes`\n  flags a newly added or fully turned-over maintainer — that combination is\n  exactly when the follow-up matters most, not an optional extra step.\n- Do not treat a large `totalPackagesFound` from `check_maintainer_blast_radius`\n  as a red flag by itself — many legitimate maintainers publish hundreds of\n  packages over a career. Only a tight-cluster finding (several packages'\n  latest versions landing within a short window of each other) is the\n  actual signal.\n\n- Do not soften an `isMalware: true` finding into a hedged \"worth verifying\"\n  the way a `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F`check_package_provenance` signal is\n  — it is a confirmed report of malicious code, not a heuristic.\n- Do not treat an empty `get_latest_advisories` malware\u002Fosv result as a\n  clearance — those feeds only cover recent advisories. The `isMalware`\n  flags on the OSV findings are the malware check.\n- Do not read a `versionExists: false` result, or a provenance not-found\n  error that names advisories, as \"the version doesn't exist so it's fine\" —\n  that is exactly how npm removes malicious releases.\n- Do not attempt to install, upgrade, or publish packages yourself; this\n  skill only reads data through NPMScan's read-only MCP tools.\n\n## Tools used\n\n`get_package`, `get_package_version`, `query_vulnerabilities`,\n`get_latest_advisories`, `check_maintainer_changes`,\n`check_maintainer_blast_radius`, `check_package_provenance`,\n`analyze_install_script`, `suggest_alternative`\n— all provided by the `npmscan` MCP server bundled with this plugin\n(`.mcp.json`). See [references\u002Ftest-prompts.md](references\u002Ftest-prompts.md)\nfor prompts to manually verify this skill after installing or editing it.\n","# NPMScan package trust check\n\nUse this skill when the user names **one specific package** (optionally a\nversion) and asks a trust question about it — \"is X safe to use,\" \"was X\ncompromised,\" \"should I be worried about X,\" \"check X's maintainers.\" This\nis a deep, single-package investigation: it runs checks `dependency-audit`\ndeliberately skips for every package in a batch because they're too\nexpensive to run at scale.\n\nIf the user instead pastes a `package.json`\u002Flockfile\u002Fdependency list or asks\nto audit multiple packages, use the `dependency-audit` skill instead — don't\nrun this skill's checks across a whole inventory. If the question is purely\nfactual with no trust\u002Fsafety angle (\"what does lodash do,\" \"what's the\nlatest version of express\"), just answer directly with `get_package` — don't\ninvoke the full investigation for that. If the user is instead choosing\nbetween candidates for something not yet installed (\"should we add X,\" \"X\nvs Y for this job\"), that's a forward-looking pick, not a trust\ninvestigation — use the `new-dependency-evaluation` skill.\n\n## Connecting the npmscan tools\n\nThis skill calls the npmscan MCP server's tools (listed under \"Tools used\"\nbelow). They only read public package data: no API key or account, nothing is\ninstalled or changed on the user's machine, and the only server contacted is\n`https:\u002F\u002Fnpmscan.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmcp`.\n\n- **Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Kimi, Grok:** the npmscan plugin connects\n  the server for you.\n- **OpenClaw:** `openclaw mcp add npmscan --url https:\u002F\u002Fnpmscan.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmcp --transport streamable-http`,\n  then `openclaw mcp doctor npmscan --probe` to check it.\n- **Any other MCP client:** add a remote (streamable HTTP) server with that URL.\n\nSome clients prefix tool names with the server name (for example\n`npmscan__get_package`). If the tools aren't available at all, tell the user\nhow to connect them for their client instead of answering from memory.\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Baseline with `get_package` (or `get_package_version` if the user gave an\n   exact version). Pull `deprecated`, `maintenanceSummary`,\n   `possibleTyposquatOf`, `isLatestVersionVulnerable`\u002F`highestSeverity`,\n   `downloadTrend`, and days-since-last-publish. This alone answers a good\n   chunk of \"should I trust this\" and grounds the deeper checks that follow —\n   don't skip straight to the maintainer\u002Fprovenance tools without it. If\n   `get_package_version` comes back with `versionExists: false`, that version\n   is no longer on npm but OSV still has advisories for it — usually a\n   release npm pulled for being malicious (ua-parser-js 0.7.29, debug\n   4.4.2). Report its `vulnerabilities` as real; it is not a \"not found.\"\n2. Check for malware. Every vulnerability finding carries `isMalware` — true\n   for a confirmed-malicious package (an OSV `MAL-*` record, or a GitHub\n   advisory with CWE-506 such as ua-parser-js's GHSA-pjwm), not an ordinary\n   bug. Read it on the step-1 findings for this version, and call\n   `query_vulnerabilities({ name })` with no version to see whether ANY\n   release of this package was ever malicious — a past compromise is worth\n   naming even when the current version is clean. Any `isMalware: true`\n   finding on the version in question is the most severe possible outcome:\n   report it plainly as known malware, never as \"worth verifying.\"\n   `get_latest_advisories({ type: \"malware\", affects: name })` (GitHub's\n   malware feed) and `({ type: \"osv\", affects: name })` (OpenSSF's) only\n   cover recently published advisories — useful for a brand-new incident\n   OSV hasn't indexed yet, but an empty result says nothing about history.\n3. Call `check_maintainer_changes({ name })`. It reconstructs maintainer\n   add\u002Fremove history from the npm packument and flags:\n   - a maintainer added recently who then published shortly after (the\n     account-takeover pattern behind the Sept 2025 chalk\u002Fdebug \"qix\"\n     compromise and ua-parser-js),\n   - a full sudden replacement of the maintainer list,\n   - a long-standing maintainer quietly dropped,\n   - a maintainer-list change on npm not yet tied to any release — flag this\n     as the *more* urgent case, since access changed hands but nothing has\n     shipped with it yet, so there's no version to warn the user off of.\n   Also reports GitHub repository transfer\u002Farchival — a transfer isn't\n   automatically hostile (e.g. jade → pug was a documented rename), say so\n   rather than treating every transfer as a red flag. If it flags a newly\n   added or fully turned-over maintainer, immediately follow up with\n   `check_maintainer_blast_radius({ maintainerUsername })` on that account\n   — it lists every other package the same account currently touches and\n   flags a tight cluster of packages published within a short window of\n   each other, the compromised-account shape behind incidents like the 2025\n   chalk\u002Fdebug (\"qix\") compromise and the 2026 keyv\u002Fcacheable \"Shai-Hulud\"\n   worm. Don't stop at the one named package if the maintainer signal is\n   already concerning — a tight cluster across several packages is a\n   materially worse finding than a single-package maintainer change, and\n   this is a single-package investigation's best chance to catch that\n   before the user asks about the next affected package separately. A large\n   `totalPackagesFound` alone is not a red flag; only a tight cluster is. A\n   cluster note starting \"Discounted:\" means it's at least 30 days old and\n   OSV.dev lists no malware for its versions — a past burst that stayed\n   clean, not a current threat; one naming a malware advisory is the\n   opposite.\n4. Call `check_package_provenance({ name, version })`. Three checks in one\n   call: does the Sigstore build attestation's source repo\u002Fcommit match\n   `package.json`'s declared repository; is this version missing provenance\n   while its npm-scope or maintainer peers consistently publish with it (a\n   real anomaly, not just \"no provenance\" — a version published before npm\n   provenance existed, 2023-04-19, skips this comparison, and `peers.note`\n   says so); and does the tarball's actual install scripts\u002F\n   dependencies match what's committed at the attested source commit — a\n   script or dependency on npm that was never committed in source is the\n   stolen-npm-token publish pattern. This is structural verification, not a\n   cryptographic re-check of the Sigstore bundle — say so if the user asks\n   how deep it goes. For a version npm no longer lists, this tool returns a\n   not-found error that names any OSV advisories — use those, don't stop at\n   the 404.\n5. If `get_package`\u002F`get_package_version` in step 1 showed\n   `hasLifecycleScripts`\u002Fa `preinstall`\u002F`postinstall`\u002F`prepare` entry, follow\n   up with `analyze_install_script({ name, version })`. It fetches the\n   published tarball and statically scans the script — and the files it\n   references — against npmscan's red-flags rubric (child_process,\n   network calls, `.ssh`\u002F`.aws`\u002F`.npmrc`\u002F`*TOKEN`\u002F`*KEY` access,\n   obfuscation, remote binaries off untrusted hosts, exfil endpoints,\n   eval-on-decoded-content), returning a `totalScore`\u002F`riskTier`. A nonzero\n   score isn't automatically malicious — a legitimate binary download (e.g.\n   `cypress`) scores nonzero too — so report the actual `findings`, not just\n   the score. A `prepare`-only package scores 0 unless its command does\n   something alarming: npm never runs a dependency's `prepare` on install.\n6. If the combined picture ends up genuinely concerning (a maintainer-\n   takeover pattern, a malware finding, a provenance mismatch, a\n   `possibleTyposquatOf` hit, or a critical install-script finding), offer — don't force —\n   `suggest_alternative({ name, reason })` with `reason` set to whichever of\n   `\"vulnerable\"`\u002F`\"abandoned\"`\u002F`\"typosquat\"`\u002F`\"general\"` best fits, so the\n   user has a next step instead of just a warning.\n7. Produce one findings report, most-concerning signal first:\n   - State the verdict per check plainly (e.g. \"no maintainer-change red\n     flags in the lookback window,\" not silence-as-clean).\n   - Every finding from `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F`check_package_provenance`\n     is a hedged signal meant to prompt verification, not proof — say\n     \"worth verifying independently,\" matching the tools' own language,\n     especially for anything below their `high`\u002F`critical` tiers.\n   - Include the `npmscanUrl` so the user can read the full write-up.\n   - If nothing turned up anything but a low\u002Fnone `riskTier` and no maintainer\n     or provenance findings, say so plainly — this skill exists to give\n     confident \"looks clean\" answers as often as it flags real risk.\n\n## Do not\n\n- Do not run this skill's checks across every package in a list — that's\n  `dependency-audit`'s job, and `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F\n  `check_package_provenance` are deliberately reserved there for\n  already-flagged packages only, not a full inventory.\n- Do not treat a missing `provenance` field, a repository transfer, or a\n  single maintainer addition as confirmed compromise on its own — report\n  what the tool actually flagged (or didn't) and let the `riskTier`\u002Fpoints\n  speak, don't editorialize past it.\n- Do not skip `get_package` and jump straight to the deep checks — the\n  baseline (deprecated, popularity\u002Fmaintenance tiers, typosquat) is cheap\n  and often already answers the question.\n- Do not invent a replacement package name yourself — let\n  `suggest_alternative` return its own `whySuggested`\u002F`nonPackageAlternatives`\n  rather than guessing.\n- Do not silently skip `analyze_install_script` when lifecycle scripts exist\n  just because `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F`check_package_provenance` came\n  back clean — a legitimate maintainer can still ship a genuinely risky\n  script, and vice versa; report all applicable signals, not just whichever\n  ran first.\n- Do not skip `check_maintainer_blast_radius` once `check_maintainer_changes`\n  flags a newly added or fully turned-over maintainer — that combination is\n  exactly when the follow-up matters most, not an optional extra step.\n- Do not treat a large `totalPackagesFound` from `check_maintainer_blast_radius`\n  as a red flag by itself — many legitimate maintainers publish hundreds of\n  packages over a career. Only a tight-cluster finding (several packages'\n  latest versions landing within a short window of each other) is the\n  actual signal.\n\n- Do not soften an `isMalware: true` finding into a hedged \"worth verifying\"\n  the way a `check_maintainer_changes`\u002F`check_package_provenance` signal is\n  — it is a confirmed report of malicious code, not a heuristic.\n- Do not treat an empty `get_latest_advisories` malware\u002Fosv result as a\n  clearance — those feeds only cover recent advisories. The `isMalware`\n  flags on the OSV findings are the malware check.\n- Do not read a `versionExists: false` result, or a provenance not-found\n  error that names advisories, as \"the version doesn't exist so it's fine\" —\n  that is exactly how npm removes malicious releases.\n- Do not attempt to install, upgrade, or publish packages yourself; this\n  skill only reads data through NPMScan's read-only MCP tools.\n\n## Tools used\n\n`get_package`, `get_package_version`, `query_vulnerabilities`,\n`get_latest_advisories`, `check_maintainer_changes`,\n`check_maintainer_blast_radius`, `check_package_provenance`,\n`analyze_install_script`, `suggest_alternative`\n— all provided by the `npmscan` MCP server bundled with this plugin\n(`.mcp.json`). See [references\u002Ftest-prompts.md](references\u002Ftest-prompts.md)\nfor prompts to manually verify this skill after installing or editing it.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","2b63f856ce19c2a797929cacabd9e0fc936812fa","plugins\u002Fsalemalem\u002Fnpmscan-mcp-plugin\u002Fskills\u002Fpackage-trust-check",483,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins","https:\u002F\u002Fhol.org\u002Fplugins\u002Fbest-codex-plugins","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online","https:\u002F\u002Fhol.org","Open-source standards and developer tools for interoperable AI agents: discovery, identity, communication, payments, privacy and security.","2026-11-13 02:16:32",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":60,"prompt":70,"zipAvailable":71},[61,64,67],{"tool":62,"command":63},"npx","npx skills add hashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins --skill package-trust-check",{"tool":65,"command":66},"bunx","bunx skills add hashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins --skill package-trust-check",{"tool":68,"command":69},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add hashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins --skill package-trust-check","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Fsalemalem\u002Fnpmscan-mcp-plugin\u002Fskills\u002Fpackage-trust-check\u002FSKILL.md",true,[73],{"path":74,"resourceType":75,"resourceTypeDesc":76,"sizeBytes":77,"sourceHtmlUrl":78},"references\u002Ftest-prompts.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",11660,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Fsalemalem\u002Fnpmscan-mcp-plugin\u002Fskills\u002Fpackage-trust-check\u002Freferences\u002Ftest-prompts.md",[80,88,95,102,128,153],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":87},"01M746ZWACVKMZ1BJXJZHYJSSX","migrate-to-e2e","Moves an existing Playwright, Cypress, Selenium, Appium, Detox, Maestro, or TesterArmy suite to e2e one slice at a time, with the old suite running beside the new one until each ported test is proven. Keeps a MIGRATION.md progress file so any later session resumes where the last stopped. Optionally plants a defect to show both suites catch it. Use for \u002Fmigrate-to-e2e, \"migrate our tests to e2e\", \"port these Maestro flows\", \"move our TesterArmy tests\", or when a project has an e2e config and an older suite still running.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Ftester-army\u002Fe2e\u002Fskills\u002Fmigrate-to-e2e\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":87},"01M746ZPTAX1Q0FBKAB1CYND7E","e2e","Writes, runs, and debugs end-to-end tests for web and mobile apps with e2e, the agentic test runner, which mixes agent.act goals with exact locator assertions on a Playwright browser or an iOS or Android device. Also drives a project's running app live over the e2e MCP server to look at a screen, check a UI change, take a screenshot or record a video, and try a locator; and runs bug bashes, parallel e2e explore runs with each bug proven by a repro test. Use when a project depends on e2e or has an e2e.config.ts, when asked for end-to-end, browser, mobile, or agentic UI tests, to check a change in the running app, to QA or bug bash an app or branch, or when an e2e run fails.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Ftester-army\u002Fe2e\u002Fskills\u002Fe2e\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":87},"01M746ZJN784HVHMDP9MQGCSGG","create-verification-skill","Generate a project-local verify-\u003Capp> skill on top of e2e, so any coding agent can launch the app, check it is worth driving, exercise a feature the way a user does, keep evidence, and bug bash it. Writes the skill, a feature map with one explore charter per feature, and proves it once. Use for \u002Fcreate-verification-skill, \"make a verification skill for this repo\", or when a project has no scripted way to prove UI behavior.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Ftester-army\u002Fe2e\u002Fskills\u002Fcreate-verification-skill\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":103,"name":104,"nameZh":6,"description":105,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":106,"categories":107,"keywords":108,"publishedAt":44},"01M716A6ETNB9B1SQ3GXZC75VR","deja-search","deja-vu memory — search the user's past AI coding sessions with the deja CLI. Holds what they already settled and never wrote into the repo (naming rules, banned or already-tried tools, required checks before merge, preferred values, who owns what). Use before your first edit in a task, before you call a change done or ready to merge, before you recommend a tool, library, design or reviewer, before re-debugging an error that may already be solved, when they say 'didn't we fix this before', 'what did we decide about X' or 'I already have that', and before telling them something on this machine does not exist.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Fvshulcz\u002Fdeja-vu\u002Fskills\u002Fdeja-search\u002FSKILL.md",[],[109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,24,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127],"search","deja search","never","error","ready","memory","re","decide","fix","design","debugging","you","done","reviewer","io","change","cli","merge","past",{"skillNo":129,"name":130,"nameZh":6,"description":131,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":132,"categories":133,"keywords":134,"publishedAt":44},"01M716A3J2W5SENSE9VGMXB375","deja-reflect","End-of-session reflection and memory curation with deja-vu. Review what was decided, what commands broke and what repaired them, and record durable project rules or decisions with deja remember so the next session starts with them.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Fvshulcz\u002Fdeja-vu\u002Fskills\u002Fdeja-reflect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[135,136,137,123,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,114,148,149,150,151,152],"deja reflect","reflect","review","with","record","github","next","https","node","Rules","decisions","brew","remember","project rules","project","session","end","reflection",{"skillNo":154,"name":155,"nameZh":6,"description":156,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":157,"categories":158,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":44},"01M715T3RR4BAYSR57HPPTJ0PF","revid","Make, edit, export and post AI videos with Revid (revid.ai) through the Revid MCP server. Use whenever the user wants a short-form or long-form video made (from an idea, a script, a URL, an article, a PDF, a tweet, a product page, their own clips, or a song), wants to find what is going viral on TikTok, YouTube, Instagram or X before making something, wants to edit or re-export an existing Revid project, generate a standalone AI image or clip, make a series episode, or publish and schedule a finished video to connected social accounts. Covers setup (hosted MCP with OAuth, or an API key), the 36 tools, credits, polling and the rules for publishing. Routes to the more specific revid-* skills when one fits.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhashgraph-online\u002Fawesome-codex-plugins\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Ftmakersas\u002Frevid-skills\u002Fskills\u002Frevid\u002FSKILL.md",[159,164,167],{"categoryNo":160,"categoryName":161,"taxonomyType":162,"taxonomyTypeDesc":163},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":165,"categoryName":166,"taxonomyType":162,"taxonomyTypeDesc":163},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",{"categoryNo":168,"categoryName":169,"taxonomyType":162,"taxonomyTypeDesc":163},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",[155,171,172,173,174,175,176,149,177,115,178,179,180,181,24,182,183,184,185,40],"URL","Video","short-form","standalone","PDF","viral","tiktok","short","social","MCP","song","image","mcp server","schedule","api"]