[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6HE963PDY68CD028CXD80WC":3,"skill-same:01M6HE963PDY68CD028CXD80WC":124},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":67,"commitSha":68,"skillDirectory":69,"forksCount":70,"repositoryHtmlUrl":71,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":72,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":73,"updatedAt":74,"install":75,"resources":88},"01M6HE963PDY68CD028CXD80WC","detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk",null,"Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service abuse.","HenriqueMC17\u002Fagente-core","HenriqueMC17","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F206460478?v=4","01M6HB63HBBF18AC4H09XTB549","Henrique Monteiro Cardoso","01M6HB63NGSQXWKWCFWW2B20W0",1,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHenriqueMC17\u002Fagente-core\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fmodules\u002Fdetecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"lateral movement","detecting","with","splunk","detecting lateral movement with splunk","analysis","traffic","hunting","remote","across","community","cm","cybersecurity","smb","ta0008","mitre-attack","server","logs","authentication","siem","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk\ndescription: Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service abuse.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- mitre-attack\n- lateral-movement\n- splunk\n- siem\n- proactive-detection\n- ta0008\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Network Traffic Community Deviation\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1021\ncategory: detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk\n---\n# Detecting Lateral Movement with Splunk\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for adversary movement between compromised systems\n- After detecting credential theft to trace subsequent lateral activity\n- When investigating unusual authentication patterns across the network\n- During incident response to scope the breadth of compromise\n- When proactively hunting for TA0008 (Lateral Movement) techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Splunk Enterprise or Splunk Cloud with Windows event data ingested\n- Windows Security Event Logs forwarded (4624, 4625, 4648, 4672, 4768, 4769)\n- Sysmon deployed for process creation and network connection data\n- Network flow data or firewall logs for SMB\u002FRDP\u002FWinRM correlation\n- Active Directory user and group membership reference data\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Define Lateral Movement Scope**: Identify which lateral movement techniques to hunt (RDP, SMB\u002FAdmin Shares, WinRM, PsExec, WMI, DCOM, SSH).\n2. **Query Authentication Events**: Use SPL to search for Type 3 (Network) and Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) logons across the environment.\n3. **Build Authentication Graphs**: Map source-to-destination authentication relationships to identify unusual connection patterns.\n4. **Detect First-Time Relationships**: Identify new source-destination pairs that have not been seen in the historical baseline.\n5. **Correlate with Process Activity**: Link authentication events to subsequent process creation on destination hosts.\n6. **Identify Anomalous Patterns**: Flag lateral movement to sensitive servers, unusual hours, service account misuse, or rapid multi-host access.\n7. **Report and Contain**: Document lateral movement path, affected systems, and coordinate containment response.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1021 | Remote Services (parent technique) |\n| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) |\n| T1021.002 | SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares |\n| T1021.003 | Distributed COM (DCOM) |\n| T1021.004 | SSH |\n| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management (WinRM) |\n| T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |\n| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |\n| T1569.002 | Service Execution (PsExec) |\n| Logon Type 3 | Network logon (SMB, WinRM, mapped drives) |\n| Logon Type 10 | Remote Interactive (RDP) |\n| Event ID 4624 | Successful logon |\n| Event ID 4648 | Explicit credential logon (runas, PsExec) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM for log aggregation and SPL queries |\n| Splunk Enterprise Security | Threat detection and notable events |\n| Windows Event Forwarding | Centralize Windows logs |\n| Sysmon | Detailed process and network telemetry |\n| BloodHound | AD attack path analysis |\n| PingCastle | AD security assessment |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **PsExec Lateral Movement**: Adversary uses PsExec to execute commands on remote systems via SMB, generating Type 3 logon with ADMIN$ share access.\n2. **RDP Pivoting**: Attacker RDPs to internal systems using stolen credentials, creating Type 10 logon events.\n3. **WMI Remote Execution**: Adversary uses WMIC process call create to spawn processes on remote hosts.\n4. **WinRM PowerShell Remoting**: Attacker uses Enter-PSSession or Invoke-Command to execute code on remote systems.\n5. **Pass-the-Hash via SMB**: Compromised NTLM hashes used to authenticate to remote systems without knowing the plaintext password.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LATMOV-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nMovement Type: [RDP\u002FSMB\u002FWinRM\u002FWMI\u002FDCOM\u002FPsExec]\nSource Host: [Hostname\u002FIP]\nDestination Host: [Hostname\u002FIP]\nAccount Used: [Username]\nLogon Type: [3\u002F10\u002Fother]\nFirst Seen: [Timestamp]\nEvent Count: [Number of events]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nLateral Movement Path: [A -> B -> C -> D]\n```\n","# Detecting Lateral Movement with Splunk\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for adversary movement between compromised systems\n- After detecting credential theft to trace subsequent lateral activity\n- When investigating unusual authentication patterns across the network\n- During incident response to scope the breadth of compromise\n- When proactively hunting for TA0008 (Lateral Movement) techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Splunk Enterprise or Splunk Cloud with Windows event data ingested\n- Windows Security Event Logs forwarded (4624, 4625, 4648, 4672, 4768, 4769)\n- Sysmon deployed for process creation and network connection data\n- Network flow data or firewall logs for SMB\u002FRDP\u002FWinRM correlation\n- Active Directory user and group membership reference data\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Define Lateral Movement Scope**: Identify which lateral movement techniques to hunt (RDP, SMB\u002FAdmin Shares, WinRM, PsExec, WMI, DCOM, SSH).\n2. **Query Authentication Events**: Use SPL to search for Type 3 (Network) and Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) logons across the environment.\n3. **Build Authentication Graphs**: Map source-to-destination authentication relationships to identify unusual connection patterns.\n4. **Detect First-Time Relationships**: Identify new source-destination pairs that have not been seen in the historical baseline.\n5. **Correlate with Process Activity**: Link authentication events to subsequent process creation on destination hosts.\n6. **Identify Anomalous Patterns**: Flag lateral movement to sensitive servers, unusual hours, service account misuse, or rapid multi-host access.\n7. **Report and Contain**: Document lateral movement path, affected systems, and coordinate containment response.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1021 | Remote Services (parent technique) |\n| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) |\n| T1021.002 | SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares |\n| T1021.003 | Distributed COM (DCOM) |\n| T1021.004 | SSH |\n| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management (WinRM) |\n| T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |\n| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |\n| T1569.002 | Service Execution (PsExec) |\n| Logon Type 3 | Network logon (SMB, WinRM, mapped drives) |\n| Logon Type 10 | Remote Interactive (RDP) |\n| Event ID 4624 | Successful logon |\n| Event ID 4648 | Explicit credential logon (runas, PsExec) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM for log aggregation and SPL queries |\n| Splunk Enterprise Security | Threat detection and notable events |\n| Windows Event Forwarding | Centralize Windows logs |\n| Sysmon | Detailed process and network telemetry |\n| BloodHound | AD attack path analysis |\n| PingCastle | AD security assessment |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **PsExec Lateral Movement**: Adversary uses PsExec to execute commands on remote systems via SMB, generating Type 3 logon with ADMIN$ share access.\n2. **RDP Pivoting**: Attacker RDPs to internal systems using stolen credentials, creating Type 10 logon events.\n3. **WMI Remote Execution**: Adversary uses WMIC process call create to spawn processes on remote hosts.\n4. **WinRM PowerShell Remoting**: Attacker uses Enter-PSSession or Invoke-Command to execute code on remote systems.\n5. **Pass-the-Hash via SMB**: Compromised NTLM hashes used to authenticate to remote systems without knowing the plaintext password.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LATMOV-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nMovement Type: [RDP\u002FSMB\u002FWinRM\u002FWMI\u002FDCOM\u002FPsExec]\nSource Host: 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