[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6HE78FVNAEH7E2TZ3697WVB":3,"skill-same:01M6HE78FVNAEH7E2TZ3697WVB":124},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":67,"commitSha":68,"skillDirectory":69,"forksCount":70,"repositoryHtmlUrl":71,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":72,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":73,"updatedAt":74,"install":75,"resources":88},"01M6HE78FVNAEH7E2TZ3697WVB","detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks",null,"Detect DLL side-loading attacks where adversaries place malicious DLLs alongside legitimate applications to hijack execution flow for defense evasion.","HenriqueMC17\u002Fagente-core","HenriqueMC17","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F206460478?v=4","01M6HB63HBBF18AC4H09XTB549","Henrique Monteiro Cardoso","01M6HB63NGSQXWKWCFWW2B20W0",1,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHenriqueMC17\u002Fagente-core\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fmodules\u002Fdetecting-dll-sideloading-attacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"attacks","detecting","detecting dll sideloading attacks","analysis","for","consistency","defense evasion","loading","platform","conversion","cm","malicious","applications","execution","t1574","dll-sideloading","defense-evasion","edr","file","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks\ndescription: Detect DLL side-loading attacks where adversaries place malicious DLLs alongside legitimate applications to hijack execution flow for defense evasion.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- mitre-attack\n- dll-sideloading\n- defense-evasion\n- t1574\n- edr\n- proactive-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Content Format Conversion\n- File Content Analysis\n- Platform Hardening\n- File Format Verification\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1027\ncategory: detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks\n---\n# Detecting DLL Sideloading Attacks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating potential DLL hijacking in enterprise environments\n- After EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs loaded by signed applications\n- When hunting for APT persistence using legitimate application wrappers\n- During incident response to identify trojanized applications\n- When threat intel indicates DLL sideloading campaigns targeting specific software\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR with DLL load monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with hash verification\n- Application whitelisting or DLL integrity monitoring\n- Software inventory of legitimate applications and expected DLL paths\n- Code signing verification capabilities\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Sideloading Targets**: Research known vulnerable applications that load DLLs without full path qualification (LOLBAS, DLL-sideload databases).\n2. **Monitor DLL Load Events**: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loads where the DLL path differs from the application's expected directory.\n3. **Check DLL Signatures**: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables.\n4. **Detect Path Anomalies**: Identify legitimate executables running from unusual locations (Temp, AppData, Public) that may be decoy wrappers.\n5. **Hash Verification**: Compare loaded DLL hashes against known-good versions and threat intel feeds.\n6. **Correlate with Process Behavior**: Check if the host process exhibits unusual behavior (network connections, child processes) after loading the suspicious DLL.\n7. **Document and Remediate**: Report sideloading instances, quarantine malicious DLLs, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading |\n| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |\n| T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |\n| T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking |\n| DLL Search Order | Windows DLL loading priority path |\n| Side-Loading | Placing malicious DLL where legitimate app loads it |\n| Phantom DLL | DLL that legitimate apps try to load but does not exist |\n| DLL Proxying | Malicious DLL forwarding calls to legitimate DLL |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Event ID 7 DLL load monitoring |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | DLL load detection with process context |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | DLL load anomaly detection |\n| Process Monitor | Real-time DLL load tracing |\n| DLL Export Viewer | Verify DLL export functions |\n| Sigcheck | Digital signature verification |\n| pe-sieve | PE analysis for proxied DLLs |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Legitimate App Wrapper**: Adversary copies signed application (e.g., OneDrive updater) to temp folder alongside malicious DLL with same name as expected dependency.\n2. **Phantom DLL Exploitation**: Malicious DLL placed in PATH location where legitimate app searches for non-existent DLL.\n3. **DLL Proxy Loading**: Malicious version.dll proxies all exports to real version.dll while executing malicious code on DllMain.\n4. **Software Update Hijack**: Attacker replaces DLL in update staging directory before legitimate updater loads it.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-SIDELOAD-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1574.002\nHost Application: [Legitimate signed executable]\nSideloaded DLL: [Malicious DLL name and path]\nExpected DLL Path: [Where DLL should legitimately be]\nDLL Signed: [Yes\u002FNo]\nApp Location: [Expected\u002FAnomalous]\nHost: [Hostname]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Detecting DLL Sideloading Attacks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating potential DLL hijacking in enterprise environments\n- After EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs loaded by signed applications\n- When hunting for APT persistence using legitimate application wrappers\n- During incident response to identify trojanized applications\n- When threat intel indicates DLL sideloading campaigns targeting specific software\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR with DLL load monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with hash verification\n- Application whitelisting or DLL integrity monitoring\n- Software inventory of legitimate applications and expected DLL paths\n- Code signing verification capabilities\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Sideloading Targets**: Research known vulnerable applications that load DLLs without full path qualification (LOLBAS, DLL-sideload databases).\n2. **Monitor DLL Load Events**: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loads where the DLL path differs from the application's expected directory.\n3. **Check DLL Signatures**: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables.\n4. **Detect Path Anomalies**: Identify legitimate executables running from unusual locations (Temp, AppData, Public) that may be decoy wrappers.\n5. **Hash Verification**: Compare loaded DLL hashes against known-good versions and threat intel feeds.\n6. **Correlate with Process Behavior**: Check if the host process exhibits unusual behavior (network connections, child processes) after loading the suspicious DLL.\n7. **Document and Remediate**: Report sideloading instances, quarantine malicious DLLs, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading |\n| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |\n| T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |\n| T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking |\n| DLL Search Order | Windows DLL loading priority path |\n| Side-Loading | Placing malicious DLL where legitimate app loads it |\n| Phantom DLL | DLL that legitimate apps try to load but does not exist |\n| DLL Proxying | Malicious DLL forwarding calls to legitimate DLL |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Event ID 7 DLL load monitoring |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | DLL load detection with process context |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | DLL load anomaly detection |\n| Process Monitor | Real-time DLL load tracing |\n| DLL Export Viewer | Verify DLL export functions |\n| Sigcheck | Digital signature verification |\n| pe-sieve | PE analysis for proxied DLLs |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Legitimate App Wrapper**: Adversary copies signed application (e.g., OneDrive updater) to temp folder alongside malicious DLL with same name as expected dependency.\n2. **Phantom DLL Exploitation**: Malicious DLL placed in PATH location where legitimate app searches for non-existent DLL.\n3. **DLL Proxy Loading**: Malicious version.dll proxies all exports to real version.dll while executing malicious code on DllMain.\n4. **Software Update Hijack**: Attacker replaces DLL in update staging directory before legitimate updater loads it.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-SIDELOAD-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1574.002\nHost Application: [Legitimate signed executable]\nSideloaded DLL: [Malicious DLL name and path]\nExpected DLL Path: [Where DLL should legitimately be]\nDLL Signed: [Yes\u002FNo]\nApp Location: [Expected\u002FAnomalous]\nHost: [Hostname]\nRisk Level: 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