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Write memories only through:\r\n\r\n- the maintained sync script (preferred in cron):\r\n  `\"%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\New project\\hermes-agent\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe\" \"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\scripts\\sync_execute.py\"`\r\n  (`--dry-run` to count only; it logs one `JSON_RESULT:` line with counts), or\r\n- the `ebbinghaus_memory` tool (`action: remember`) inside an agent session.\r\n\r\n`remember` deduplicates on `content` itself (a repeat reinforces the existing\r\ntrace), so no pre-check or extra index is needed. Do not write new temp sync\r\nscripts. See `ebbinghaus-memory:references\u002Febbinghaus-schema.md`.\r\n\r\n## X Post Extraction Rules\r\n\r\nOnly extract confirmed public posts from `~\u002F.hermes\u002Flm-twitterer\u002Factivity.jsonl`:\r\n- `action == 'post'`\r\n- `ok == true`\r\n- `dry_run == false`\r\n- `posted == true`\r\n- URL starts with `https:\u002F\u002Fx.com\u002Fi\u002Fweb\u002Fstatus\u002F`\r\n\r\nStore URL-only artifacts (never full text) in `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory-sync\u002Fsocial_sync.db`\r\ntable `x_artifacts` (`INSERT OR IGNORE` on `url`). `sync_execute.py` does this;\r\nX URLs are not written to `ebbinghaus_memory.db`.\r\n\r\nThe same rule applies to the `ebbinghaus_memory` tool (Memory Source Policy (2026-09-26)): never `remember` X\u002Flm-twitterer post text, `x.com` URLs, \"公開投稿\" summaries, or raw LINE\u002FTelegram\u002FDiscord message text. At most one aggregated `social-summary` fact per run (counts or action items, salience \u003C= 0.4) may go to memory; `sync_execute.py` writes exactly that and nothing else. See `ebbinghaus-memory` -> Memory Source Policy.\r\n\r\n## Windows\u002FMSYS Path Handling\r\n\r\nIn Windows\u002FGit-Bash environments:\r\n- Build Hermes paths as `Path(r'C:\\Users\\\u003Cuser>\\.hermes')`\r\n- Verify both POSIX (`\u002Fc\u002FUsers\u002F...`) and Windows (`C:\\Users\\...`) forms exist\r\n- A missing `state.db` path will silently zero out synced sessions and distort counts\r\n\r\n## Background Execution for Large Imports\r\n\r\nFor large session imports that may exceed foreground timeouts:\r\n- Run `sync_execute.py` with `background=true` plus `notify_on_complete=true`\r\n- Avoid retrying timed-out foreground runs\r\n\r\n## Heredoc Parse Error Recovery\r\n\r\nIf a heredoc run prints valid JSON but exits non-zero from a shell parse error:\r\n1. Treat write as potentially completed\r\n2. Re-run `sync_execute.py --dry-run` to confirm state; the script applies both guards before writing, so there is no post-write remediation step\r\n3. Low residual risk only appropriate after the re-check reports zero excluded rows\r\n\r\n## Residual Risk Assessment\r\n\r\nSet based on data source completeness:\r\n- `low`: All expected data sources processed (sessions, X\u002FTwitter, etc.)\r\n- `medium`: One or more expected data sources skipped or partially processed\r\n- `high`: Significant data loss or verification failures encountered\r\n\r\nAdjust based on which specific data sources were missing and their relative importance.\r\n\r\n## Output Discipline\r\n\r\nFinal reporting must be counts-only:\r\n```json\r\n```\r\n\r\n### Telegram Cron Output Upper Limit Protocols (2026-10)\r\nThis subsection captures the audit-before-send and post-send failure analysis protocols for Telegram cron jobs, derived from 2026-10-12 empirical analysis.\r\n\r\n**Pre-Send Audit Checklist:**\r\n- [ ] Output length within Telegram limits (4096 chars regular, 512 some formats)\r\n- [ ] No PII or secrets in output\r\n- [ ] Content has proper operational value (not just short-term state)\r\n- [ ] URL stubs removed or full metadata present with links\r\n- [ ] Significance bands measured in SQL before any summary generation (never summarize dream clusters without SQL band measurement)\r\n- [ ] Rehearsal metrics tracked: failed items avg 1.4 rehearsals vs 0.9 for successes (recording record, not retry record)\r\n\r\n**Post-Send Failure Analysis (when sending fails):**\r\n- **Distinguish issue types**: X-side duplicate post rejection (content issue) vs auth failure\r\n- **Failed items pattern**: 7 consecutive ok=False re-reposts of previously successful content\r\n- **Success rate context**: Target >75% overall success rate (baseline: 311 ok vs 97 failed = 76%)\r\n\r\n**Rehearsal Tracking Metrics:**\r\n- Failed items have **avg rehearsal 1.4** vs successes **0.9**\r\n- This is a **recording record**, NOT a retry record\r\n- Ebbinghaus records failures as \"same memory version\" accumulations\r\n\r\n**Already-Resolved: cron-social-memory-sync URL Contamination**\r\n- **Root cause**: URL stub contamination (diagnosed 2026-09-30 and 10-01)\r\n- **Fix applied**: Already deactivated\r\n- **Results**: URL-only rows peaked at 2026-09-21 (36 items), stopped after 2026-09-23 (10 items)\r\n- **Significance 0.3-0.6 band stub rate**: **0.0% (0\u002F72 items)**\r\n- **URL bias**: Only in top bands (0.8-1.0: 20.4%, 0.6-0.79: 13.7%)\r\n- **Lesson**: Auto-dream clusters always return \"dead clusters\" - must measure significance bands in SQL before summarizing. Zero results = no insight, only empirical measurement gives the answer.\r\n\r\n**Exemption Conditions (auto-exempted from improvement analysis):**\r\nFailures skip analysis when:\r\n- Explicit user directive: \"no analysis needed\"\r\n- Output contains only published URLs with full metadata\r\n- Content has demonstrated continuing value across multiple cycles\r\n- System in known-degraded mode (documented in memory)\r\n\r\n**Recommended Configuration:**\r\n```yaml\r\nmemory:\r\n  provider: ebbinghaus\r\n  sleep:\r\n    enabled: true\r\n    forget_threshold: 0.08\r\n    rehearse_threshold: 0.45\r\n    salience_keep_threshold: 0.7\r\n    prune_mode: archive\r\n  limit: 200\r\n\r\ncron:\r\n  - name: telegram-memory-sync\r\n    schedule: \"0 6 * * *\"  # Daily 6AM\r\n    script: scripts\u002Ftelegram_memory_sync.py\r\n    monitor: http:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002Fmemory-status\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Verification Checklist:**\r\n- [ ] Output length within Telegram limits\r\n- [ ] No PII or secrets in output\r\n- [ ] URL stubs removed or full metadata present\r\n- [ ] Significance bands measured before summary generation\r\n- [ ] Rehearsal metrics tracked for failure analysis\r\n- [ ] Success rate baseline established (target: >75%)\r\n- [ ] No explicit exemption from audit cycle\r\n```\r\n\r\n## Session 2026-10-07 Memory Continuity & Bridge Diagnostics\r\n\r\n### Ebbinghaus Sleep Cycle\r\n- Reviewed: 200 memories\r\n- Rehearsed: 7 items (IDs: 114760, 114758, 114761, 114751, 74828, 74831, 74834)\r\n- Forgotten\u002FArchived: 0 items\r\n- State: Active 4999, Archived 1178 (continuity preserved)\r\n\r\n### LINE Bridge Authentication Diagnosis\r\n- Error: NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE \u002F V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT\r\n- Last attempt: 2026-10-06 17:55:39 JST\r\n- Diagnosis: Token refresh failure, device deauthorization\r\n- Resolution path: OAuth re-flow via LINE Developers Console\r\n\r\n### Script Sync Analysis (.hermes vs hermes-agent)\r\n- .hermes\u002Fscripts: 158 scripts\r\n- hermes-agent\u002Fscripts: 131 scripts\r\n- Only in .hermes: 136 files (including LINE-specific: sync_check_line.py, grep_line_messages.sh, _parse_line_sync.py, line_sync_probe.py)\r\n- Only in agent: 109 files\r\n- Common: 22 files\r\n- 12h sync cycle recommended for maintenance\r\n\r\n### Memory Continuity Workflow\r\n- Ebbinghaus sleep → diary entry → Obsidian wiki git commit → push\r\n- Ensures persistent record of state across sessions\r\n- Git commit 5c33e32: \"Memory consolidation diary 2026-10-07: Ebbinghaus sleep cycle + semantic graph sync\"\r\n{\r\n  \"synced_sessions\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"synced_messages\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"synced_x_records\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"valid_x_posts\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"x_artifacts_saved\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"policy_facts_saved\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"total_saved\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"excluded_intake\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"excluded_guard\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"total_excluded\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"verified_rows\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"guard_violations\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"residual_risk\": \"\u003Clow|medium|high>\",\r\n  \"timestamp\": \"\u003CISO 8601 datetime>\"\r\n}\r\n```\r\nNever include raw candidate text, secrets, or sensitive information.\r\n\r\n## Cron Sync Workflow (Autonomous, No User Present)\r\n\r\nWhen running social sync as a scheduled cron job:\r\n1. **Check live bridge endpoints first** (`\u002Fstatus`, `\u002Fevents?limit=100`) — if the bridge is down, fall through to bridge.log parsing.\r\n2. **Prefer `scripts\u002Fparse_line_bridge_log.py` over ad-hoc grep** — the script handles the event-level schema gotcha (`from`\u002F`to`\u002F`text` are siblings of `type`, not nested under `message`) and outputs structured JSON ready for consolidation. Ad-hoc grep works but produces raw lines requiring manual JSON parsing.\r\n3. **Restart clears the in-memory event buffer** — after `line_personal_start force=true`, `\u002Fevents` only contains the restart's own login events, not historical messages. Always cross-check `bridge.log` (durable) for message history when the `\u002Fevents` buffer looks empty or only has server\u002Flogin events.\r\n   - **`bridge.log` line schema (verified 2026-10-01):** each JSON line nests the payload one level deep under an `event` key, with the timestamp on `event.at` — NOT a top-level `ts`\u002F`timestamp`\u002F`time` field. A cutoff scan written as `d.get('ts')` silently yields **zero events for every cutoff**, which looks identical to \"bridge is quiet\" and can produce a false zero-delta `[SILENT]`. Parse as `e = d.get('event'); ts = e.get('at')`. Non-JSON lines are prefixed `[bridge]` (e.g. `[bridge] unhandledRejection: NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE, triggering re-login`) and should be skipped, not treated as parse errors. Note the file also contains many duplicate\u002Fnon-event lines, so a raw `wc -l` count (~137k) roughly overstates the real event count (~105k); count only parsed lines with an `event` dict.\r\n   - **Cutoff comparisons MUST normalize timezones (verified 2026-10-03):** `bridge.log` `event.at` is **UTC with a `Z` suffix** (e.g. `2026-10-02T17:09:10.905Z`), while consolidated-JSON `timestamp` cutoffs are written in **local +09:00** (e.g. `2026-10-03T00:37:12.482000+09:00`). A naive string compare `at \u003C= cutoff` matches *nothing*, because `\"2026-10-02T17:...\"` sorts below `\"2026-10-03T...\"` — this produces a **false zero-event result that looks identical to a quiet bridge**. Observed on one run: the buggy compare reported 0 events, the correct UTC-normalized compare reported **180 events \u002F 90 auth errors**. Always parse with `datetime.fromisoformat(at.replace(\"Z\",\"+00:00\")).astimezone(timezone.utc)` before comparing. Sanity check: newest log `at` converted to JST must be within minutes of wall clock.\r\n - **`\u002Fevents` frames are FLAT; only `bridge.log` nests under `event` (verified 2026-10-08 23:03 JST).**\r\n   The nested `d[\"event\"][\"at\"]` schema documented above applies to `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log` **only**.\r\n   The live HTTP buffer `\u002Fevents?limit=N` returns frames with `at`\u002F`type`\u002F`lineType` at the **top level** and no `event`\r\n   key at all:\r\n   ```json\r\n   {\"ok\":true,\"events\":[{\"at\":\"2026-10-07T05:55:50.194Z\",\"type\":\"talk:event\",\"lineType\":\"RECEIVE_MESSAGE\"}]}\r\n   ```\r\n   A reader written from the log schema (`e = d.get(\"event\"); ts = e.get(\"at\")`) therefore yields **no timestamps at all**\r\n   over `\u002Fevents` — `max()` raises on an empty sequence, or a naive guard reports \"no events\" while the buffer is full.\r\n   The two shapes must never be fed to the same parser. Probe defensively:\r\n   ```python\r\n   def at_of(frame):                 # \u002Fevents shape\r\n       return frame.get(\"at\") or frame.get(\"ts\") or frame.get(\"time\")\r\n   ats = [a for a in (at_of(f) for f in frames) if a]      # never max() an empty list unguarded\r\n   ```\r\n   Note these frames carry **no `text`**, so the `lineType` in `{at,type,lineType}` describes a *system* notification\r\n   (`NOTIFIED_DESTROY_MESSAGE`, `NOTIFIED_UPDATE_PROFILE`) — the idle signature, not chat traffic. Text-bearing chat\r\n   traffic only ever reaches `bridge.log`.\r\n\r\n- **`talk:event` is NOT a message — filter on `lineType` before counting (verified 2026-10-05 16:35 JST).**\r\n   A window can contain `talk:event` frames whose payload is only `{at, type, lineType}` — **no `text`, no\r\n   `from`\u002F`to`, no chat MID at all**, at any nesting level. Observed two of them in one window:\r\n   `NOTIFIED_DESTROY_MESSAGE` (16:15:21) and `NOTIFIED_UPDATE_PROFILE` (16:23:15) — LINE *system*\r\n   notifications, not chat traffic. The trap: the customary\r\n   `if ty in (\"message\",\"talk:event\"): msgs += 1` counts these as messages, so the run reports\r\n   `message_like_events: 2` \u002F `new_line_messages: 2` and the summary invents two LINE messages that\r\n   never existed. Classify on the protocol field instead:\r\n   ```python\r\n   # lineType carries the real semantics; only these are actual chat messages\r\n   CHAT_LINES = {\"NOTIFIED_MESSAGE\", \"NOTIFIED_MESSAGE_TEXT\", \"NOTIFIED_RECEIVE_MESSAGE\"}\r\n   lt = str(e.get(\"lineType\") or \"\")\r\n   if lt in CHAT_LINES and e.get(\"text\"):\r\n       msgs += 1\r\n   ```\r\n   Report `line_types` as a breakdown so the operator can see *why* a window was empty, and record the\r\n   result as `observed_no_action`. A window of system frames only is the **idle** signature (port live,\r\n   `\u002Fchats` 200) — it is neither inbound traffic nor the dead-worker fault.\r\n - **`message:ignored` is inbound traffic and needs its own counter — do not add `RECEIVE_MESSAGE` to\r\n   `CHAT_LINES` (verified 2026-10-05 17:05 JST).** An allowlist drop is logged as `type=\"message:ignored\"`\r\n   with `reason=\"group_not_allowed\"` and `lineType=\"RECEIVE_MESSAGE\"` — a **real inbound LINE message that\r\n   the worker refused to act on**, not a system frame. Two traps in one window: the customary\r\n   `if ty in (\"message\",\"talk:event\")` misses it (wrong `type`), and adding `RECEIVE_MESSAGE` to `CHAT_LINES`\r\n   to \"fix\" that would count dropped messages as *accepted* — inflating `new_line_messages` with traffic the\r\n   bot never read. Count them separately:\r\n   ```python\r\n   elif ty == \"message:ignored\":\r\n       ignored += 1                      # inbound, dropped by allowlist -> operator decision\r\n   ```\r\n   `message:ignored` frames may carry **no `text`, no `chatId` and no `lineType`-bearing `from`\u002F`to`** at the\r\n   top level, so extract the chat id defensively (`e.get(\"chatId\") or e.get(\"to\") or e.get(\"from\")`) and hash\r\n   it for the report — MIDs and message text must not enter the consolidated JSON (Memory Source Policy).\r\n   Observed here: 3 drops at 16:46\u002F17:01\u002F17:03 JST from 2 distinct chats, versus **0 in the previous window** —\r\n   a real state change that breaks `[SILENT]` even though `accepted_line_messages == 0`, the bridge was healthy\r\n   all run, and every message delta was 0. Report it and comment the covering allowlist task.\r\n - **The backward chunk loop MUST track a byte high-water mark, or it re-reads the same tail every iteration and inflates counts 60-120x (verified 2026-10-06 07:12 JST).** The documented recipes below all do `fh.seek(0, 2); end = fh.tell(); start = max(0, end - 6_000_000)` **inside** the `for ci in range(N)` loop. `end` is recomputed from the current file size every pass, but the file is only *appending*, so iteration 2 re-reads bytes already consumed by iteration 1 — the newest 6 MB get parsed 60-120 times. Observed exactly: a 45.5 MB log whose real window held **7 events** reported `events_since_cutoff: 280`, then `420` raw lines, with `distinct_at_values=5` but `repeats_per_at_max=120`. Every derived number was wrong (event counts, auth-error counts, `distinct_chat_ids`, and the \"40 dropped inbound messages\" claim).\r\n     The tell is arithmetic: `raw_parsed \u002F distinct_at_values` ≈ 60-120. If that ratio is not ~1.0, the *scanner* is duplicating, not the logger.\r\n     Fix — decrement the high-water mark instead of recomputing from file size:\r\n     ```python\r\n     size = os.path.getsize(LOG)\r\n     CHUNK = 4_000_000\r\n     high = size                      # bytes [high, prev_high) already processed\r\n     fh = open(LOG, \"rb\")\r\n     while high > 0:\r\n         start = max(0, high - CHUNK)\r\n         fh.seek(start)\r\n         blob = fh.read(high - start).decode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\")\r\n         seg = blob.split(\"\\n\")\r\n         if start > 0:\r\n             seg = seg[1:]           # drop the partial first line\r\n         # ... parse seg, counting in-window events, never break on old lines ...\r\n         high = start\r\n         if new_here == 0:\r\n             break                   # chunk entirely older than cutoff\r\n     fh.close()\r\n     ```\r\n     Two properties this buys you: every byte is parsed exactly once, and `seg = seg[1:]` correctly drops the line fragment straddling the chunk boundary.\r\n\r\n- **A backward chunked scan must `continue`, never `break`, on pre-cutoff lines (verified 2026-10-04).** Reading only the last few MB (this `bridge.log` is ~44 MB) means the *first* chunk you touch is often older than the cutoff, so this natural-looking loop silently reports **zero events for every run**:\r\n   ```python\r\n   for ln in lines[1:]:\r\n       ...\r\n       if t \u003C cutoff:\r\n           done = True; break      # WRONG: log lines are not time-ordered, so the\r\n   ```                             # first old line aborts before newer ones are counted\r\n   ```\r\n   Observed: the buggy form reported 0 events while the raw tail proved a fresh `login:auth_blocked` at wall-clock −21 s; the corrected `continue` reported **52 events \u002F 26 auth errors**. Fix: `if t \u003C cutoff: continue` (skip old lines, keep scanning), and **stop only when a whole chunk yields zero in-window events**:\r\n   ```python\r\n   new_here = 0\r\n   for ln in lines[1:]:\r\n       ... if t >= cutoff: new_here += 1; ...   # count, never break\r\n   if new_here == 0: done = True                # chunk fully older than cutoff\r\n   ```\r\n   `break` is only safe on a strictly ascending stream, which this log is not (duplicated, interleaved `[bridge]` lines, out-of-order flushes). Same guard for the `\u002Fevents` path: **always cross-check the raw last parsed event's `at` against wall clock** before trusting any zero-delta report, on every source.\r\n   - **During false-positive ready state, `\u002Fevents` floods with `process:unhandled_rejection` noop errors every ~2min**, drowning out any real message events. In one observed sync, 63 of 67 events were noop error spam. Skip `\u002Fevents` filtering entirely and go straight to `bridge.log` parsing when false-positive ready is detected. The `line_personal_chats` tool call returning `HTTPError: HTTP Error 500` is itself the probe — no separate HTTP request needed. See `references\u002F2026-08-03-line-bridge-false-positive-ready-state.md` for details.\r\n4. **Write consolidated output** to `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory\u002Fsocial-sync\u002F\u003Ctimestamp>_consolidated.json` with counts-only discipline.\r\n5. **Compare against previous sync** — if no new messages since last sync and bridge status unchanged, emit `[SILENT]` to suppress delivery. Do not re-report identical findings.\r\n\r\n   **Never resolve the current\u002Fprevious JSON by `sorted(glob(\"*_consolidated.json\"))[-1]` alone (verified 2026-10-03 22:08 JST).** The directory also holds unsuffixed pointer files — `latest_consolidated.json`, `current_sync_consolidated.json` — which sort *after* every `\u003Cstamp>_memory-social-sync-patterns_consolidated.json`, so `[-1]` returns the pointer, not this job's run. Two concrete failures observed from one `[-1]` lookup:\r\n   - The enrichment pass wrote `action_items` \u002F `bridge_status` \u002F `residual_risk_rationale` into `latest_consolidated.json`, so the real run file kept only the 18 base keys and the pointer was destroyed.\r\n   - Re-running the enrichment then read back the truncated pointer and raised `KeyError: 'residual_risk'` — a crash that looks like a data problem but is purely a target-selection bug.\r\n\r\n   **Filter with `startswith(\"20\")`, not just the `20*` glob — verified working, and note the directory is large (315 stamped runs on 2026-10-04).** `glob.glob(os.path.join(d, \"20*_consolidated.json\"))` also works, but it must be narrowed by the run's own stamp substring and asserted to yield **exactly 1** match. Two subtleties on this host:\r\n   - Some historical runs were written by *other* jobs with a different filename shape, so `[-1]` may land on a foreign job's file. Disambiguate by the `skill` field inside the JSON (see the multiple-cron-jobs note below), not by filename mtime alone.\r\n   - `x_artifacts_total` drifts between runs (`723` at 10:32 vs `729` in the earlier file read) because different jobs count the `x_artifacts` table differently — do **not** diff that field across jobs as if it were a hard invariant; use the `valid_x_urls` count emitted by `sync_execute.py` as the comparable figure.\r\n\r\n   Fix: always build the target path explicitly and filter the glob on the job's own filename prefix:\r\n   ```python\r\n   pref = f\"{stamp}_memory-social-sync-patterns_consolidated.json\"\r\n   p = os.path.join(d, pref)                       # written in this run, known-good\r\n   # when locating the PREVIOUS run instead:\r\n   prevs = sorted(f for f in glob.glob(os.path.join(d, \"*_consolidated.json\"))\r\n                  if os.path.basename(f).startswith(\"20\"))   # stamps only, no pointers\r\n   ```\r\n   Keep `latest_consolidated.json` as a `shutil.copyfile(canonical, ...)` of the current run (pointers are useful), and always re-`json.load` the canonical stamped file after every write to confirm its key count — that check is what caught this.\r\n   - **State identity, not just deltas, decides suppression.** Confirm both halves before suppressing: (a) all six `delta_since_last_sync` counters are 0, AND (b) `loginState` *and* `startedAt` (or worker pid) both match the prior sync. A run where every delta is 0 but a force-restart was attempted, or `startedAt` moved, is a rule-7 event and must be reported. Conversely, on this host a **long but fully-cycling** worker can also produce 0 deltas *plus* a large `events_since_cutoff` of pure auth-error spam (observed 2026-10-03 19:25 JST: 48 events, 0 of them messages) — that is still `[SILENT]` when the loginState\u002Fpid are unchanged, because nothing an operator could act on has moved. Do not let a rising auth-error count alone break suppression; it is already surfaced in the carry-over item.\r\n   - **Disambiguating previous-sync state across multiple cron jobs:** Multiple social-sync cron jobs may write consolidated JSON to the same `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory\u002Fsocial-sync\u002F` directory on different schedules (e.g., a 30-min pinned job, a 120-min script job, a 360-min agent job). They use varying timestamp formats in filenames. To find the correct \"previous run of THIS job,\" match by the `skill` field inside the JSON (if present) or by comparing `bridge_status` snapshots — not just by the newest file's timestamp. A mismatch can cause a false `[SILENT]` (comparing against a newer state from a different job) or a false non-silent report (comparing against an older state).\r\n6. **Delta tracking** — include a `delta_since_last_sync` object with `new_line_messages`, `new_telegram_messages`, `new_discord_messages`, `new_x_posts`, `new_x_mentions` counts. Zero deltas + unchanged bridge status = `[SILENT]`.\r\n7. **Status changes with zero deltas are NOT SILENT** — if the bridge status changed (e.g., recovered from `error` to `ready`, or a force restart was attempted) but no new messages were captured, still emit a report with zero deltas and document the status change + any new action items. The `[SILENT]` suppression is only for truly identical state.\r\n   - **A restart is a status event even when it fails to recover.** If the worker PID changed since the last sync (e.g., `20896` → `16108`) but the bridge is still in the same false-positive ready \u002F `NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` state, rule 7 still applies: emit a non-silent report. The restart attempt is the change — do NOT mistake \"same broken state\" for \"identical state\" and wrongly suppress. Only suppress when NOTHING changed: no new messages AND no restart AND no config change. This is also the run on which carry-over action items should be materialized to the kanban board (see below).\r\n   - **Detecting a restart when PID is unavailable:** The `\u002Fstatus` response does not always include the worker PID. In that case, compare the `startedAt` timestamp — same `startedAt` as the previous sync means no restart occurred; a different `startedAt` means the worker was restarted. This is functionally equivalent to a PID comparison and should be used the same way for rule 7 decisions.\r\n  - **`loginState` is sampled, not latched — a single `\u002Fstatus` read can catch a transient flap (verified 2026-10-04).** During the `auth_blocked` collapse loop the worker briefly reports **`loginState=error`** between cycles, then settles back to `auth_blocked` with an **unchanged `startedAt`**. Observed: first read `error`, then four polls over 24 s all `auth_blocked`, same `startedAt`, same pid. Consequences:\r\n    - A one-shot read mislabels the state and can **falsely break suppression** (rule 7 would see `error` → `auth_blocked` as a \"status change\") or **falsely claim recovery**.\r\n    - **Poll `\u002Fstatus` 3–4 times over ~20–25 s and take the settled value** before writing `loginState_at_run_start` \u002F `loginState_final` or deciding suppression. Record the first raw read too, so the flap is auditable rather than silently rewritten.\r\n    - A flap is **not** a restart and **not** a config change: rule 7 does not apply, and `[SILENT]` stands when deltas are 0 and `startedAt`\u002Fpid match the previous sync. Log it as `observed_no_action`, not `new_observation` — a diagnostic transient is not operator work and must not spawn a kanban task.\r\n    - Sanity cross-check: `bridge.log` mtime stays fresh during a flap, so freshness does **not** disambiguate health — only the settled `loginState` plus `\u002Fchats` do.\r\n\r\n### Wrong Storage Path Makes Every \"Delete Storage + Restart\" Task a No-Op (verified 2026-10-02)\r\n\r\nThe LINE auth_blocked saga on this host is **not** fixable by the standard\r\n\"delete `linejs-storage.json` + force restart\" recipe, because the recipe targets\r\na file that does not exist in the worker's storage dir. Verified by filesystem\r\ninspection:\r\n\r\n| Location | State |\r\n|---|---|\r\n| `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fplugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json` | **815 bytes — the only live storage.** Keys: `e2eeKeys:5998270`, `cert:*`, `refreshToken`, `expire` |\r\n| `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Flinejs-storage.json` | **ABSENT** (only `.bak-20260930T164041` = had an extra `e2eePublicKeys:*`; `.bak-20261001T0052` = empty `{}`) |\r\n\r\n`plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fcore.py` defaults\r\n`LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE = get_hermes_home() \u002F \"line-personal-bridge\" \u002F \"linejs-storage.json\"`\r\n(i.e. the **absent** file), while the real token\u002FE2EE storage lives in the\r\n`plugins\u002F...\u002Fnode\u002F` dir.\r\n\r\n**SUPERSEDED 2026-10-04 — the \"delete is always a no-op\" conclusion is STALE.** That\r\nconclusion was drawn from `core.py`'s *default*, but `~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` now pins\r\n`LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE=%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fplugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json`,\r\nwhich is exactly the live 887 B file that **does** carry `e2eePublicKeys:*`. So on the\r\ncurrent config a delete of the env-pinned file *would* force fresh email\u002Fpassword login.\r\n\r\n**Verify the pin before recommending either recipe — do not trust the default:**\r\n```python\r\nfor line in open(r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\.env\", encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\"):\r\n    if line.startswith(\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE\"): print(line)   # -> the file that matters\r\n```\r\nIf the pin is present, delete **that** path (timestamp-backup it first). If absent, the\r\n`core.py` default is authoritative and the delete genuinely is a no-op.\r\n\r\n**The running worker script is NOT the plugin copy (verified 2026-10-04).** The live\r\nprocess cmdline is `%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\line-personal-bridge\\node\\bridge.mjs` — a\r\n*linejs git checkout* (has `.git`, `node_modules`, `bridge.mjs.orig`), not\r\n`plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002F`. Its parent is the `hermes ... serve` gateway\r\n(observed pid 31084), which **respawned the worker on its own** when it died. Two\r\nconsequences: (a) a storage delete needs a gateway\u002Fworker respawn afterwards to be\r\npicked up, and (b) \"the worker died\" may never reach `\u002Fstatus` at all, because the\r\ngateway can revive it within the same run.\r\n\r\n**Consequence:** every recovery task that deletes the *default-path* storage is a\r\nguaranteed no-op. This is why the kanban board carries ~200 near-duplicate\r\nLINE recovery tasks and the bridge never recovers. Corroborating signal:\r\n`bridge.log` contains 522 `Decipheriv` \"Unsupported state or unable to\r\nauthenticate data\" (E2EE) errors, and the live storage has **lost** the\r\n`e2eePublicKeys:*` entries the 2026-09-30 backup still had — so the keysets are\r\ndegraded too.\r\n\r\n**Cron rule:** before recommending\u002Fattempting delete+restart, verify the live\r\nstorage path exists and is non-empty. If it does not, report the path mismatch\r\nas the root cause and mark `requires_human: true` — do **not** enqueue another\r\ndelete+restart task. When checking, note that a whole-`~\u002F.hermes` `rglob` for\r\n`linejs-storage.json` takes minutes on this host; scope the search to the two\r\nknown dirs instead of scanning recursively.\r\n\r\n- **The live worker may NOT append to `bridge.log` at all — check the worker's real stdout target before declaring it dead (verified 2026-10-06 19:35 JST).**\r\n  A worker restarted *outside* the supervisor (e.g. cron launching `node bridge.mjs` directly with stdout\r\n  redirected) writes its events to **its own stdout file**, not to `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log`.\r\n  Observed: the live holder (pid 42936, `startedAt 2026-10-06T10:09:37.925Z`) held `:9101` and was cycling\r\n  `login:auth_blocked` every ~2 min, while `bridge.log` was **frozen at 10:05:40Z** (45.9 MB, unchanged) and\r\n  belonged to the *previous, dead* worker. Consequence: the documented window scan over `bridge.log` returns\r\n  **0 events with a live port and a cycling worker** — a textbook false dead-worker signature — and the\r\n  prescribed evidence path silently goes blind. Discriminating checks, cheapest first:\r\n  ```python\r\n  # 1) compare log mtime to the worker's startedAt and to now\r\n  # 2) read \u002Fevents?limit=60 -- if its newest `at` is FRESH but bridge.log is stale, the log is blind\r\n  code, body = get(\"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9101\u002Fevents?limit=60\")\r\n  newest = max(e[\"event\"][\"at\"] for e in json.loads(body)[\"events\"])   # compare to log mtime\r\n  ```\r\n  Then locate the real stdout target — a redirected launch leaves it in `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Temp\\*.log`\r\n  (`line_worker_out.log` on this host) or under the worker's `node\u002F` dir; `psutil.Process(pid).open_files()`\r\n  and a mtime-scoped `os.listdir(Temp)` both find it. Cross-check `psutil.Process(...).cwd()` (it was\r\n  `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode`, a *linejs git checkout*, not the plugin copy) to confirm which script\r\n  is actually serving `:9101`. Also note `bridge.pid` can hold a **stale pid** (saw 44904 while the real\r\n  holder was 42936) — never trust it; re-derive the holder from `psutil.net_connections`.\r\n\r\n- **`bridge.log` lives at `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log`, NOT in `plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002F` (verified 2026-10-04).** Only `linejs-storage.json`, `bridge.mjs` and `package.json` are in the plugin `node\u002F` dir; the log and\r\n     `restart-counter.json` sit in the older `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002F` dir. Probing the plugin path raises\r\n     `FileNotFoundError` and reads like \"the worker produced no log\". Don't rglob — list both dirs\r\n     (`os.listdir`) once and pick whichever contains `bridge.log`. Treat the **log** dir and the **storage** dir as\r\n     separate facts: storage is at `plugins\u002F...\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json`, the log is at\r\n     `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log`. Mixing them up inverts the health conclusion.\r\n- **Never dump `gateway_heartbeats` or `gateway_routing` unaggregated** — see the stale-rows note below.\r\n\r\n### Silent Worker Exit: Plain Restart Fixes It (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\n`loginState=auth_blocked` can escalate until the linejs worker **process exits entirely**. Then\r\nport 9101 is refused (curl exit 7 \u002F HTTP 000) — `\u002Fstatus` is unreachable, so there is no\r\n`loginState` to compare and the `false_positive_ready` probes are moot.\r\n\r\n**Diagnosis when the port is dead:**\r\n- The `bridge.log` mtime is the death clock. Count events after the cutoff (UTC-normalized per\r\n  above); the tail will be a repeating 4-type cycle — `login:auto_refresh_failed`,\r\n  `login:unhandled:token`, `login:auth_blocked`, `process:unhandled_rejection` — typically 50+\r\n  identical cycles, then nothing. **Zero `message`\u002F`talk:event` entries in that window is the\r\n  signature of a dead worker, not a quiet group.**\r\n- `netstat -ano | grep 9101` shows nothing while 9102 (Go reply webhook) and 8646 (Discord) still listen.\r\n\r\n**A restarted worker can come up ALIVE-but-POLICY-EMPTY — the restart silently drops `.env` policy (verified 2026-10-06).**\r\n`line_personal_start(force=true)` on a dead port recovered `\u002Fstatus` 200 + `loginState=ready` + `\u002Fchats` **200 with 31 chats**,\r\nbut the *same call's* first payload still reported `allowedGroupMids: [2 MIDs]` and `webhookConfigured: true` while\r\n**every later `\u002Fstatus` read reported `allowedGroupMids: []` and `webhookConfigured: false`** — and the parent cron\r\nprocess env had `LINEJS_PERSONAL_ALLOWED_GROUP_MIDS` \u002F `LINEJS_PERSONAL_AUTO_REPLY_WEBHOOK` unset while\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` pins both. So the force-start path does not hand the two **policy** vars to the spawned worker\r\n(credential\u002Fstorage vars *do* arrive — login succeeded and `\u002Fchats` worked).\r\nImpact is silent and severe: with 0 allowed groups every group message becomes `message:ignored` \u002F\r\n`group_not_allowed`, and with no webhook the worker answers with the default `はくあです！` text instead of calling\r\n`:9102\u002Freply`, so a *healthy-looking* `\u002Fhealth 200` on 9102 is **not** evidence the reply path works.\r\n\r\nDiagnose by diffing three sources rather than trusting `\u002Fstatus` alone:\r\n```python\r\nimport os\r\nenv = os.environ                                     # parent cron process\r\nfor k in (\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_ALLOWED_GROUP_MIDS\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_AUTO_REPLY_WEBHOOK\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE\"):\r\n    print(k, \"in-process:\", repr(env.get(k)))        # observed None for the two policy vars\r\nfor ln in open(r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\.env\", encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\"):\r\n    if ln.startswith((\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_ALLOWED_GROUP\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_AUTO_REPLY_WEBHOOK\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE\")):\r\n        print(ln.split(\"=\",1)[0].strip(), \"pinned, len\", len(ln.split(\"=\",1)[1].strip()))\r\n```\r\nRecord `allowedGroupMids_count` vs `allowedGroupMids_expected` and `autoReply_webhook_configured` vs expected in\r\n`bridge_status`, flag `policy_env_inheritance_fault: true`, and comment it onto the existing allowlist + 9102 tasks\r\ninstead of creating a near-duplicate allowlist task. The fix is human\u002Fsupervisor-side: restart the worker from\r\n`start_personal_line_bridge.py` (which loads `.env`) rather than a bare force start. Note the live holder pid can\r\nalso **differ from the pid the start call reported** (`line_personal_start` returned pid 38296, the real\r\n`:9101` holder was 44904) — always re-derive the holder from `psutil.net_connections`, never trust the reported pid.\r\n\r\n**Fix — plain restart, NO storage delete.** The \"delete `linejs-storage.json` + restart\" recipe in\r\nthe Wrong Storage Path section is a documented no-op on this host, and this run proved it is also\r\n*unnecessary*: after `line_personal_start force=true` alone, the bridge recovered fully —\r\n`\u002Fchats` returned **200 immediately and again after the 100s stability window**, with **0**\r\n`NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` \u002F `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT` \u002F `AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE` \u002F `Decipheriv`,\r\n`pinCode: null` (no operator PIN needed), and **32 joined chats readable** — the first successful\r\nchat list in this saga. When the worker is *dead*, the token may well still be valid; deleting the\r\nonly live storage throws away a session that needed no repair.\r\n\r\n**Rule:** dead port → `line_personal_start force=true`, then the standard `\u002Fchats` + 100s re-verify.\r\nOnly escalate to a storage-level or human-PIN action if `\u002Fchats` is still failing after that.\r\n\r\n**Brief-recovery-then-collapse signature (verified 2026-10-03 15:32 JST).** The plain restart can\r\n**succeed and then collapse inside the stability window**, so a single immediate 200 is NOT proof of\r\nrecovery. Observed sequence on one run: `loginState=error` + `\u002Fchats` 503 + 13 collapse cycles →\r\n`force=true` restart → `\u002Fchats` **200 with 32 joined chats immediately**, `loginState=ready`,\r\n`pinCode: null` → **~90 s later** `loginState=auth_blocked`, `\u002Fchats` **503** again.\r\n\r\nThis is why the mandatory second `\u002Fchats` probe after ~90-100 s is the real gate. Reporting\r\n\"recovered\" off the immediate 200 alone produces a false recovery claim. Record three login states\r\nin the consolidated JSON: `loginState_at_run_start`, `loginState_after_restart`, `loginState_final`,\r\nplus `recovery_duration_s` — and set `residual_risk: medium` (not low) when the final state is\r\n`auth_blocked` even though the immediate probe passed.\r\n\r\nNote also that on collapse the live storage can still *grow* and self-heal keysets: the 2026-10-03 run\r\nended with `plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json` at **887 B including\r\n`e2eePublicKeys:5017697`** (vs 815 B \u002F degraded on 2026-10-02). So \"storage is degraded\" must be\r\nre-checked per run, not carried over as a standing assumption.\r\n\r\n**Stale worker holds the port; the kill needs elevation (verified 2026-10-03 18:30 JST).** A variant of the silent-exit case:\r\n`\u002Fstatus` is reachable and `startedAt` never changes, but `restart_reported_pid` (e.g. `7908`) is **not alive** while\r\n`netstat -ano | grep :9101` still shows `LISTENING` on a *different* pid (e.g. `28500`, `node.exe`, **session = Services**).\r\nThe force restart is a silent no-op: a new child cannot bind 9101 because the old worker still holds it, and nothing reports it.\r\n\r\nDiagnosis in one shot:\r\n```bash\r\nMSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1 tasklist \u002FFI \"PID eq \u003Cpid>\" \u002FFO LIST | tr -d '\\r'   # confirm the holder + session\r\nnetstat -ano | grep \":9101\"\r\nMSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1 taskkill \u002FPID \u003Cpid> \u002FF                            # -> \"PID ... のプロセスを強制終了できませんでした \u002F 理由: アクセスが拒否されました\"\r\n```\r\n`taskkill` from a cron\u002Fchild context returns **ACCESS_DENIED** when the holder runs in the Services session. Do not\r\nretry the restart in a loop — it will never rebind. Record `restart_spawned: false` plus the real holder pid, mark the\r\nitem `requires_human: true`, and put the elevated kill in the kanban body. `line_personal_stop(force=true)` is useless\r\nhere too: it targets the *reported* pid (`{\"stopped\": false, \"reason\": \"pid not alive\"}`).\r\n\r\n**`hermes gateway status` may report \"No gateway process detected\" while `gateway_heartbeats` in `state.db` is fresh.**\r\nDo not report the Telegram path as broken on that alone. `state.db` heartbeat rows carry `last_heartbeat` epoch values;\r\nif the `default` profile heartbeat is seconds old the gateway is alive and the CLI check is what is wrong.\r\n\r\n- **Zero events of ANY type is NOT the dead-worker signature when the port answers (verified 2026-10-05 04:03 JST).**\r\n  A healthy worker can go completely idle for >1.5 h while still holding `loginState=ready`, serving `\u002Fchats` 200\r\n  with a full chat list, and keeping `:9102` UP. Observed: `events_since_cutoff=0`, `message_like_events=0`, all auth\r\n  error counters 0, and the newest parsed log event 98 min old (`process:unhandled_rejection` at 02:26:45 JST).\r\n  The dead-worker rule below keys on a **dead port** (`\u002Fstatus` unreachable, quiet tail). With the port live and\r\n  `\u002Fchats` 200, an empty window means *idle*, not *dead* — do not diagnose a silent exit from log silence alone.\r\n  Discriminate exactly as the rule below says: probe the port first, then `\u002Fchats`. Log it as `observed_no_action`,\r\n  never as a rule-7 status event.\r\n- **Heartbeats are RUN-DRIVEN, not periodic — an old age is normal on a quiet host (verified 2026-10-04 22:45 JST).**\r\n`gateway_heartbeats.last_heartbeat` only advances when a gateway run\u002Fbeat actually fires, so the age is *not* a\r\nliveness timeout. Measured on the default profile: 614 distinct timestamps, **median intra-day gap 660 s**, but gaps\r\nranging from 9.5 s up to **69 180 s (19 h)**; the 20 most recent gaps included 30 245 s and 40 841 s. Consequences:\r\n\r\n- An ~15-minute-old newest heartbeat is **in-family, not a wedged gateway**. In this run the age went\r\n  47.7 s (prev sync) → 886 s → 998 s → 1043 s, and `psutil.pid_exists` on the gateway confirmed it alive with\r\n  `:8646` LISTEN and as parent of the `:9101` holder. Reporting that as a gateway outage would be a false alarm.\r\n- Do **not** gate the rule-5\u002F7 comparison key on the raw heartbeat number. Compare it as the coarse\r\n  fresh-vs-stale boolean it really is (hours ⇒ suspicious), exactly as the `reply_webhook_9102` note requires.\r\n- A \"did it advance?\" 30–45 s poll will usually show **0 advance** on an idle host — that is not evidence of death.\r\n  Confirm liveness with `psutil.Process(\u003Cpid>).is_running()` plus the listener table, never with a short poll.\r\n- If you must classify, measure the cadence from the table's own distinct timestamps (median\u002Fmax gap) and compare\r\n  the age against that distribution — do not compare it against an imagined fixed interval.\r\n\r\nCheck\r\n`gateway_routing.updated_at` per `session_key` for actual inbound activity (telegram vs discord vs a2a ages differ by\r\nhours on a quiet host). Also note `hermes kanban list --board \u003Cslug>` errors `unrecognized arguments: --board` on\r\ncurrent builds; scope reads with `HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` instead.\r\n\r\n**`gateway_heartbeats` holds thousands of stale rows — never dump it whole (verified 2026-10-04).** The table accumulates one\r\nrow per gateway backend per profile per run and is never pruned; a `SELECT ... FROM gateway_heartbeats` returned **thousands**\r\nof rows, all but the last with `age_s` in the millions (~28 days). Dumping it overflows the tool payload (82 KB captured,\r\n33 KB truncated) and risks the same silent-truncation failure mode as the write path. Always aggregate in-process and print\r\nonly the freshest row:\r\n\r\n```python\r\ncur.execute(\"SELECT profile, last_heartbeat FROM gateway_heartbeats\")\r\nage = min(now - (lh or 0) for _pr, lh in cur.fetchall())   # gateway alive iff this is small\r\n```\r\n\r\nAlso note `gateway_heartbeats` has **no `scope` column** — the key column is `backend_id`, and the live-detection column is\r\n`last_heartbeat` (epoch seconds). A naive `cols[0]`\u002F`cols[-1]` guess works by luck here; read `PRAGMA table_info` and\r\nname the columns explicitly. Same for `gateway_routing`, which on current builds is `(scope, session_key, entry_json,\r\nupdated_at)` — query `ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 10`, never full-table.\r\n\r\n**Phantom restart pid (verified 2026-10-03 21:45 JST).** The elevation case above has a sharper tell on current\r\nbuilds: `line_personal_start(force=true)` returned `{\"ok\": true, \"pid\": 24232}` — but **that pid was never alive**\r\nafter the call and never bound the port. The old worker kept serving `\u002Fstatus` with an **unchanged `startedAt`**.\r\nSo \"restart reported ok\" proves nothing. Detect it with:\r\n```python\r\npsutil.pid_exists(reported_pid)          # -> False  => phantom restart, restart_spawned: false\r\n# plus: \u002Fstatus \"startedAt\" identical to the previous sync => no rebind happened\r\n```\r\n`psutil.Process(holder).terminate()` -> `AccessDenied`; `ProcessIdToSessionId(holder)` -> `0` confirms the\r\nServices-session holder. Record `restart_spawned: false`, the real holder pid + its session id,\r\n`elevated_kill_required: true`, and raise `residual_risk` to **high** (the bridge cannot self-heal from any\r\nnon-elevated context, so every subsequent sync will repeat this until a human kills the holder).\r\nDistinguish the two wedged states: **dead port** (plain restart fixes it, verified 18:30) vs **alive port +\r\nauth_blocked + phantom restart** (needs the elevated kill).\r\n\r\n**A dependency recovering on its own is ALSO a rule-7 status event (verified 2026-10-04 17:34 JST).** Suppression\r\nmust compare the *whole* dependency set, not just `:9101` `loginState`\u002F`startedAt`. Observed run where the LINE\r\nworker was completely unchanged (`pid 7352`, `startedAt 2026-10-04T05:03:39.148Z`, `ready`, `\u002Fchats` 200 with 31\r\nchats) and every delta was 0 — yet the previous sync had recorded `reply_webhook_9102: DOWN` and\r\n`gateway_min_hb_age_s: 11296`. This run measured `\u002Fhealth` 200 on 9102 and a freshest\r\n`gateway_heartbeats.last_heartbeat` age of **32.1 s** (previous: ~3.1 h). That is a real change an operator wants:\r\nthe outbound `#はくあ`\u002F`#hermesagent` reply path went from disabled to enabled. Report it, comment the covering\r\nboard tasks, and mark those action items `newly_recovered` (not `unchanged_carry_over`, and not a new task —\r\nrecovery evidence belongs as a `comment`, which is the rule already stated below).\r\n\r\nSo the rule-5\u002F7 comparison key is:\r\n`(loginState, startedAt|pid, chats_total, reply_webhook_9102, gateway_min_hb_age_s)`. A change in **any** element\r\nbreaks `[SILENT]` even when all message deltas are 0. Conversely do not gate on the raw heartbeat age value —\r\ncompare it only as a boolean-ish \"fresh vs stale\" (a few seconds vs hours), since it changes every run.\r\n\r\n**`restart-counter.json` is a STALE snapshot — never read it for current state (verified 2026-10-04).**\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Frestart-counter.json` carries `_meta.generated_at: 2026-09-18T11:22:28Z` and a\r\nnested `current` block with its own `live_status` snapshot (`pid: 27788`, `pinCode`, `eventCount: 500`) that is\r\n**~2.5 weeks behind** the live bridge (pid 7352, `pinCode: null`, `eventCount: 150`). Dumping it cost ~12 KB of\r\ntool payload to learn nothing actionable, and its embedded `live_status` looks authoritative enough to\r\nmisreport as current health. Two further traps: its `event_type_totals` \u002F `error_code_totals` are cumulative\r\nsince 2026-06-21 (`NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE: 67718`), so a run that greps them for \"auth errors\" will always find\r\ntens of thousands regardless of the current window, and its `current.pinCode` is a **6-digit LINE login PIN** —\r\nstale, but do not echo it into the consolidated JSON regardless. Read current state only from the live\r\n`\u002Fstatus` probe, `\u002Fchats`, `psutil.net_connections`, and the `bridge.log` window scan.\r\n\r\n**Storage health is orthogonal to this fault.** Re-check `plugins\u002F...\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json` every run: 887 B\r\n*with* `e2eePublicKeys:*` = healthy. Do not let a Session-0 holder be misdiagnosed as storage degradation — the\r\nstorage-delete recipe is a no-op on this host regardless.\r\n\r\n**Native Windows tools are unreliable from this cron context (verified 2026-10-03 21:40).** `terminal` failed\r\n*every* command with `RuntimeError: Windows terminal command length exceeds safe limit` (even `pwd`-class\r\ncommands), and `subprocess.run([\"netstat.exe\", \"-ano\"])` returned `rc=0` with **empty stdout** — an empty result\r\nthat looks exactly like \"port not listening\". Do not conclude anything from those empty outputs. Use instead:\r\n`psutil` 7.2.2 (present) for pid liveness\u002Fparent\u002Fsession\u002Fterminate, and HTTP probes against 9101 for state.\r\n\r\n**`hermes kanban comment` takes POSITIONAL text (verified 2026-10-03).** `--text` fails with a usage error\r\n(rc=2) that prints the root `hermes` help. Correct form:\r\n```bash\r\nhermes kanban comment \u003Ctask_id> \"comment body\"          # [--author NAME] [--max-len N]\r\n```\r\nAlso note kanban writes from cron are **not always** blocked: the `delegate_task` guard keys off\r\n`HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT`, which is inherited-only on plain cron runs (verified absent from\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` and `config.yaml`) — `create`\u002F`comment` succeeded. Check the inherited env before concluding\r\nmaterialization is impossible, and only skip it after observing the actual refusal.\r\n\r\n**Watchdog gap:** nothing supervises this worker. It died silently overnight and only `bridge.log`\r\ntimestamps reveal it. A silently dead bridge also makes the *next* sync's rule-5 comparison see a\r\nnew `loginState`, so it will not be `[SILENT]`-suppressed — but it will be mis-diagnosed as an auth\r\nregression unless you check the port first.\r\n\r\n**Gateway auto-respawn masks the dead-port signature (verified 2026-10-04).** A variant where\r\nthe port is dead *at run start* but the `hermes ... serve` gateway revives the worker mid-run:\r\n`\u002Fstatus` returned `URLError` at 06:51:21, yet `bridge.log` had a **fresh** `server:ready` →\r\n`login:password:start` → `login:patched_request` → `login:ready` chain at 06:51:10-11 with a new\r\nholder pid. Because the log keeps cycling, its mtime is *fresh* and the \"dead port = quiet tail\"\r\nsignature never appears. So on a dead-port run you must:\r\n1. probe the port **first**, before touching `bridge.log` (mtime is not evidence of health);\r\n2. read the *newest* event's `at`, not just the cutoff delta — a `server:ready`+`login:ready`\r\n   burst inside your window means someone else restarted it, which is a rule-7 status event\r\n   attributed to the **gateway**, not to cron. Set `restart_attempted_by_cron: false` and\r\n   `respawned_by: \"hermes serve gateway\"` so the next run does not credit cron with the fix;\r\n3. still run the ~100 s stability gate — this run's gateway-respawned worker reported `ready`\r\n   with `\u002Fchats` **500 (`NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` \u002F `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT`)** immediately, then\r\n   collapsed to `auth_blocked` + `\u002Fchats` **503** at 06:54:11, i.e. the classic\r\n   brief-recovery-then-collapse in `recovery_duration_s: 181`.\r\n\r\n**The 9102 Hakua reply webhook dies with the bridge (verified 2026-10-04).** While\r\n`loginState=auth_blocked`, nothing listens on 9102 (`http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9102\u002Fhealth` →\r\n`URLError`, `psutil.net_connections` shows no `LISTEN` row). That silently disables the\r\nwhole `#はくあ`\u002F`#hermesagent` group auto-reply path, so an unhealthy bridge costs you\r\n*inbound reads **and** outbound replies*. Probe 9102 in every sync and raise a separate action\r\nitem when it is down — it is a different fault from the auth_blocked one and a plain LINE\r\nre-auth alone may not bring it back if it is a separate supervisor that also died.\r\n\r\n### LINE Bridge False-Positive Ready State\r\n\r\n`loginState=ready` from `\u002Fstatus` does NOT guarantee the bridge can fetch data. A false-positive ready state is indicated by:\r\n- `\u002Fchats` returning HTTP 500 (most reliable signal — a truly ready bridge returns 200 with chat list)\r\n- `noop` calls in `\u002Fevents` emitting `NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` \u002F `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT` every ~2min\r\n- `\u002Fevents` buffer containing only server\u002Flogin events with no `message` type entries since the last known capture timestamp\r\n\r\nWhen a false-positive ready state is detected during cron sync:\r\n- Do NOT report the bridge as \"healthy\" or \"recovered\" even though `loginState=ready`\r\n- Set `residual_risk: high` with rationale noting the false-positive ready state\r\n- Create\u002Fupdate an action item: \"Delete `linejs-storage.json` in worker dir + force restart for fresh auth; verify `\u002Fchats` returns 200 within 90-120s\"\r\n- Still parse `bridge.log` for historical messages and report counts, but mark `new_messages_this_sync: 0`\r\n\r\n## Kanban Task Materialization (Action Items)\r\n\r\nAction items extracted during a sync must be **materialized as kanban tasks**, not left only in the consolidated JSON. Across repeated `[SILENT]`-suppressed runs, consolidated-JSON-only action items are never surfaced to a board and the operator never sees them. Create them once with a stable idempotency key so future runs do not duplicate.\r\n\r\n**When to create:** On any sync that produces (or carries) action items — including a non-silent run triggered by rule 7 (a force-restart was attempted since last sync). Do NOT create on a true `[SILENT]` run (no deltas, unchanged status) — the items already exist from a prior run.\r\n\r\n**How (Hermes kanban):**\r\n```bash\r\n# 1. Sanity check for existing social-sync tasks (idempotency-key is the real guard)\r\nhermes kanban list | grep -iE \"LINE|social|bridge|Telegram|Discord|lm-twitterer\" || echo \"none\"\r\n\r\n# 2. Create with a STABLE idempotency key (dedup: returns existing id if a non-archived task matches)\r\nhermes kanban create \"\u003Ctitle>\" \\\r\n  --body \"\u003Cdetail (no secrets)>\" \\\r\n  --priority \u003CINT> \\\r\n  --idempotency-key social-sync-\u003Cslug> \\\r\n  --created-by social-sync-cron \\\r\n  [--initial-status blocked]   # human-required items only; todo is the default\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Verified `hermes kanban create` quirks (2026-08-02 run):**\r\n- `--priority` is an **integer** (1 = highest), NOT a string like `high`\u002F`critical`. A string is rejected with `error: argument --priority: invalid int value: 'high'`.\r\n- `--idempotency-key` is the correct dedup lever. Re-running with the same key returns the existing task id instead of creating a duplicate — safe to call every sync.\r\n- `--initial-status` accepts only `blocked` or `running`; omit it for `todo` (default). Use `blocked` for items requiring human action (e.g., LINE PIN entry in the app).\r\n- Capture the returned task id into the consolidated JSON `action_items[].kanban_task` so future runs can reference rather than recreate.\r\n\r\n**Carry-over vs new:** If the action item already existed in the previous sync's consolidated JSON, mark it `status: unchanged_*` and reuse its kanban id; only items absent from the prior sync are genuinely `new`.\r\n\r\n**Comment scope defaults to `ai-company`, not the board the task actually lives on (verified 2026-10-06 20:08 JST).**\r\nA task that the read-only board-DB probe just confirmed on `hakuapulse-lite-free` still returns\r\n`kanban: unknown task \u003Cid>` (rc 1) from an unscoped `hermes kanban comment`, because the CLI resolves the\r\nboard from `HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` (default `ai-company`). This is *not* a phantom id — do not re-create the task.\r\nScope the write and it succeeds:\r\n```python\r\nenv = dict(os.environ); env[\"HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD\"] = \"hakuapulse-lite-free\"   # must match the slug the id was found on\r\nsubprocess.run([\"hermes\",\"kanban\",\"comment\", tid, body, \"--author\",\"social-sync-cron\"], env=env, ...)\r\n# -> \"Comment added to t_9ef7e1d5\"   (rc 0)\r\n```\r\nRule of thumb: derive `HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` from the slug your sqlite probe actually found the id on, in the same call.\r\n\r\n**A recorded kanban id can be a phantom — verify every carry-over id against the board DBs, not just the ones the CLI rejects (verified 2026-10-04).** The \"invisible to the CLI\" case below assumes the row exists and only the CLI can't see it. There is a second, more dangerous case: the id was **never written anywhere**. Observed: the 9102-webhook item had been carried as `t_9ef7e1d6` for 5+ syncs across at least 2 boards' JSON, but that id existed in **no** board DB — the real covering task was `t_92be4127` (created by a run that set no `--idempotency-key`, so a title-duplicate check is the only way to find it).\r\n\r\nA phantom id is worse than a missing task: the item looks materialized, so no run ever re-creates it, yet nothing is on the board under the id the JSON keeps citing. Verify **all** carry-over ids each run, not only ones that error:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nimport sqlite3, os\r\nbd = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\kanban\\boards\"\r\nfor slug in os.listdir(bd):\r\n    p = os.path.join(bd, slug, \"kanban.db\")\r\n    if not os.path.exists(p):\r\n        continue\r\n    con = sqlite3.connect(f\"file:{p}?mode=ro\", uri=True)      # read-only, always\r\n    hits = con.execute(\"SELECT id,status FROM tasks WHERE id IN (?,?,?)\", carry_ids).fetchall()\r\n    if hits:\r\n        out[slug] = [{\"id\": a, \"status\": b} for a, b in hits]\r\n    con.close()\r\n# any carry id absent from EVERY board -> phantom: find the real task by title substring,\r\n# repoint the consolidated JSON at it, and record kanban_task_corrected_from.\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Assert on flat id lists, not on a dict of dicts (verified 2026-10-04).** The probe above returns\r\n`found = {slug: [{id, status, title}, ...]}`, and the obvious membership test written against that shape is wrong:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nmissing = [c for c in carry_ids if not any(c in v for arr in found.values() for v in arr)]\r\n#                                 ^^^^^^^^^^ iterates dict KEYS (\"id\",\"status\",\"title\"), so every carry id\r\n#                                 looks absent -> reports all 4 as PHANTOM even though found lists them all.\r\n```\r\n\r\nThat false positive is dangerous, not cosmetic: acting on it would re-create tasks that already exist, which is\r\nexactly how the board accumulated its ~200 duplicate LINE recovery rows. Assert against flat rows instead:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nseen = {r[\"id\"] for arr in found.values() for r in arr}\r\nmissing = [c for c in carry_ids if c not in seen]\r\nassert not missing, f\"phantom kanban ids: {missing}\"\r\n```\r\n\r\nWhenever a carry-over id comes back phantom, print the per-board hit list and read it before acting — the ids are\r\nusually all present on a single board.\r\n\r\n`legacy-root_total` in `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db` being small (38 rows) while the per-board DB holds hundreds is normal after the migration — probe the three boards directly (`ai-company`, `hakuapulse-lite-free`, `sedori-ops`) rather than inferring from the root. Note the board DBs expose `idempotency_key`; a null value on a task whose title matches your item is the fingerprint of an id your key-based dedup would never have found.\r\n\r\n**Recorded task ids may be invisible to the CLI (verified 2026-10-03).** Kanban migrated to per-board DBs under\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban\u002Fboards\u002F\u003Cslug>\u002F`, but earlier syncs wrote tasks into the **legacy root `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db`**\r\n(pre-boards schema, `tasks` has no `board` column). So `hermes kanban show \u003Cid>` and `hermes kanban comment \u003Cid>`\r\nreturn `no such task` \u002F `unknown task` even though the row exists and is `ready`:\r\n\r\n- Don't conclude the task is gone or re-create it — that is how the board accumulates duplicates.\r\n- Verify with a **read-only** probe: `sqlite3.connect(\"file:%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db?mode=ro\", uri=True)`\r\n  then `SELECT id,status FROM tasks WHERE id IN (...)`. Read-only is essential — never write SQL to kanban either.\r\n- Pass `--board hakuapulse-lite-free` explicitly for CLI writes; omitting it silently used `ai-company` on one run.\r\n\r\n**`--board` is not a `kanban create` flag on current builds (verified 2026-10-03).** `hermes kanban create --board \u003Cslug>`\r\nnow errors with `unrecognized arguments: --board`. Use the global `hermes kanban list --board \u003Cslug>` for reads and\r\n`HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` for write scoping. The `--board` instruction above is stale for writes.\r\n\r\n**The delegated-child guard is NOT always active in cron (re-verified 2026-10-04).** On that run `HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT`\r\nwas **absent** from `os.environ` *and* absent from both `~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` and `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fconfig.yaml`, yet the job was\r\nstill running under a cron context. So the blanket \"kanban materialization is IMPOSSIBLE from cron\" claim below is\r\nconditional, not universal: **probe the env first** (`os.environ.get(\"HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT\")`) and only\r\ntreat writes as blocked after observing the actual refusal. A cleared env does **not** prove `hermes kanban create`\r\nsucceeds — no create was needed that run (both action items were carry-over), so write success remains unverified.\r\nNever unset the var to force a write either way; if it is set, the guard is working as designed and must be respected.\r\n\r\n**Kanban materialization is IMPOSSIBLE from a cron child context (verified 2026-10-03, when the guard was set).** `hermes kanban create` and even\r\n`hermes kanban list` fail closed with:\r\n\r\n```\r\nkanban: delegate_task child contexts cannot mutate Kanban tasks via the CLI\r\nkanban: could not initialize database: delegate_task child contexts cannot mutate Kanban tasks or boards\r\n```\r\n\r\nCause: the cron process tree inherits `HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT=1` (alongside `HERMES_CRON_SESSION=1`). The guard lives\r\nin `hermes_cli\u002Fkanban_db.py::_assert_not_delegated_child_mutation`, checked at the DB\u002Ffilesystem layer via\r\n`agent.delegation_context.is_delegated_child_process_context()`. This is a **deliberate trust boundary — do not unset the env\r\nvar to bypass it.**\r\n\r\nDo NOT report \"succeeded\" when a board write was refused. Instead:\r\n1. Record `kanban_materialization.attempted: true`, `succeeded: false`, and the exact error string.\r\n2. Set `bypass_attempted: false` so the operator knows the boundary was respected.\r\n3. Carry every new action item in the consolidated JSON with `kanban_task: null` and `status: \"new_unmaterialized\"`, and raise\r\n   `residual_risk` to at least `medium` — items that never reach the board are invisible to the operator.\r\n4. Verify the marker is *not* durably persisted (`grep -r HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT ~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env ~\u002F.hermes\u002Fconfig.yaml`).\r\n   If it IS persisted in config, that is a real bug worth its own task; if only inherited, the guard is working as designed.\r\n5. Consequence: on this host the LINE carry-over task ids (`t_dd1278f6` etc.) cannot be re-verified or commented on from cron at\r\n   all. Reference them by id from the prior JSON and move on — the read-only `sqlite3` probe is not a substitute.\r\n- If a board-scoped task already covers the item, add the new fact as a `comment` on that task rather than creating\r\n  a near-duplicate; create a new task only for a genuinely new root cause.\r\n- Beware `glob(r\"...\\**\\kanban.db\", recursive=True)` on this host — a whole-`~\u002F.hermes` recursive scan **times out\r\n  (300 s+)**. List `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban\u002Fboards\u002F` and `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db` directly instead.\r\n\r\nSee `references\u002F2026-08-02-kanban-materialization.md` for the verified command quirks and a worked example.\r\n\r\n## Output Truncation Pitfall (~8K char ceiling)\r\n\r\nOn this Windows host the assistant's tool-call payload can be cut off around\r\n8K characters. When writing the consolidated JSON, a long trailing string field\r\n(e.g. `residual_risk_rationale`) is the first thing to be clipped, and it fails\r\n*silently* as a syntax error far from the real cause:\r\n\r\n- `write_file` → `candidate content fails .json syntax validation\r\n  (JSONDecodeError: Unterminated string starting at (line N, column M))` — the\r\n  reported line number is the clipped line, not the truncated text.\r\n- `execute_code` → `SyntaxError: unterminated string literal`.\r\n\r\nDo not retry the same long payload; each retry truncates at the same place and\r\nburns a tool round-trip (this cost 3 failed writes once). Reliable forms:\r\n\r\n1. Build the dict in `execute_code` using **short** string values, `json.dump`\r\n   it, then `json.load` + add the remaining long fields in a **second** short\r\n   call, then `json.dump` the final file. Keeps each payload well under the cap.\r\n- Verify with `json.load` on the written file and print the key count, so a\r\n  clipped write can never pass unnoticed.\r\n\r\n### `\u002Fevents` Returns a FLAT Payload While `bridge.log` NESTS — Do Not Share One Parser (verified 2026-10-08 23:03 JST)\r\n\r\nThe nested-vs-flat trap is real but **only for `bridge.log`**. The `\u002Fevents` HTTP endpoint on the same\r\nworker returns a different shape, and using the `bridge.log` recipe on it silently zeroes every counter:\r\n\r\n```python\r\n# WRONG on \u002Fevents -> e is None -> every type counts as null, event_at never set\r\nfor e in json.loads(body)[\"events\"]:\r\n    ev = e.get(\"event\") or {}          # None on \u002Fevents\r\n    ev_at, ev_type = ev.get(\"at\"), ev.get(\"type\")\r\n\r\n# RIGHT on \u002Fevents -> payload is already the event object\r\n{\"at\": \"2026-10-07T06:08:04.939Z\", \"type\": \"talk:event\", \"lineType\": \"RECEIVE_MESSAGE\",\r\n \"host\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"port\": 9101}   # server:ready frame\r\n```\r\n\r\nConsequence if unpatched: `types` prints `[('None', 40)]` and `newest_at` is `None`, which reads as\r\n\"no events at all \u002F bridge blind\" — the exact false-dead-worker signature — on a bridge that is\r\n`ready` and serving `\u002Fchats` 200. `bridge.log` lines remain nested (`{\"event\": {\"at\": ...}}`), so the\r\ntwo sources genuinely differ; write the accessor per source rather than sharing one function.\r\n\r\nCorroboration rule that does work on both: compare `bridge.log` mtime, `\u002Fevents` newest `at`, and the\r\n`:9101` holder's `psutil.Process(pid).open_files()`. When all three agree that the log froze at the\r\nsame instant, the quiet tail is genuine idleness. Verify the holder, don't assume:\r\n```python\r\n[f.path for f in psutil.Process(9101_holder_pid).open_files() if f.path.endswith(\"bridge.log\")]\r\n```\r\n(Confirmed 2026-10-08: holder pid 29852, `open_files()` returned exactly the `bridge.log` path, and the\r\nold `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Temp\\line_worker_out.log` redirect was stale from 2026-10-06 — so that Temp file is\r\nNOT the live target and must not be used as evidence.)\r\n\r\n### A \"False-Positive Ready\" Bridge That Is Actually CPU-Starved: EPIPE Feedback Loop (verified 2026-10-11)\r\n\r\n`loginState=ready` + `\u002Fchats` timeout can have a **third** cause beyond auth and false-positive-ready:\r\nthe worker's `console.log` raises `EPIPE` because it was launched with **stdout closed or redirected to a\r\ndead handle**, and its own `uncaughtException` handler logs via the same function — a tight self-feeding loop.\r\n\r\nThe discriminating signature (no `NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE`, no `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT`, healthy storage):\r\n```python\r\n# \u002Fevents?limit=200 -> 200\u002F200 process:uncaught_exception, one distinct error:\r\n#   \"Error: EPIPE: broken pipe, write\"  with stack  console.log -> pushEvent -> bridge.mjs:159\r\n#   ... invoked by the uncaughtException handler at line 167\r\n```\r\nConfirm with the two cheap checks that make this unambiguous in one call:\r\n```python\r\nw = psutil.Process(holder_pid)\r\nw.cpu_percent(interval=None); time.sleep(10); w.cpu_percent(interval=None)   # -> ~100.0, sustained\r\n# ring buffer spans ~0.01 s for 200 frames => the worker is spinning, not idle\r\n```\r\nAn **idle** worker spans minutes over the same 200 frames; a spinning one spans milliseconds.\r\n\r\nRead the actual stack rather than guessing: the frame shape is flat `{\"at\",\"type\",\"error\"}`, and the\r\nerror string is the whole diagnosis — search it for `console.log` \u002F `pushEvent` and you get the exact\r\nline numbers in the plugin `bridge.mjs`. Two corollaries that follow for free:\r\n\r\n- `psutil.Process(holder).open_files()` returns **no** `bridge.log` handle, so the documented log window scan\r\n  is blind and `bridge.log` stays frozen — this is *not* the dead-worker fault, and it must not be reported\r\n  as message loss.\r\n- `Process.cpu_percent` near 100 with `\u002Fstatus` still answering 200 means `\u002Fstatus` is served on a starved\r\n  event loop, so **ready never converts to usable**.\r\n\r\nFix (human-side): guard the log call inside `pushEvent` — `try { console.log(...) } catch {}`, write to\r\n`stderr`, or check `process.stdout.writable` — and relaunch the worker with a live stdout redirect (the\r\nsupervisor script already redirects stdout; a bare `node bridge.mjs` from a cron\u002Fpty-less context does not).\r\nReport the root cause as a `comment` on the existing false-positive-ready task, not as a new task, and keep\r\n`residual_risk: high`. Verify the fix with `\u002Fchats` returning 200 **and** CPU dropping well below 100.\r\n\r\n### The Tier-2 Guard Must Check PARSED Values, Not Raw File Text (verified 2026-10-07)\r\n\r\nVerifying the Bitwarden-safe boundary by grepping the **written file's raw text** gives a\r\n**false PASS**. `json.dump` escapes backslashes, so `%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\...` is stored as\r\n`C:\\\\Users\\\\downl\\\\.hermes\\\\...` and a regex looking for `C:\\Users` (or `\\.hermes\\`) never matches:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nMARK = re.compile(r\"[A-Za-z]:\\\\Users\\\\|downl|\\.hermes\\\\\")\r\nMARK.search(open(p, encoding=\"utf-8\").read())   # -> None  == FALSE PASS, path is actually there\r\n```\r\n\r\nAlways `json.load` first and walk the **parsed string values** — that is what the guard is about:\r\n\r\n```python\r\ndef walk(o):\r\n    if isinstance(o, str): yield o\r\n    elif isinstance(o, dict):\r\n        for v in o.values(): yield from walk(v)\r\n    elif isinstance(o, list):\r\n        for v in o: yield from walk(v)\r\n\r\nhits = sorted({s for s in walk(doc) if MARK.search(s)})\r\nassert not hits, hits          # redact, then re-assert on the reloaded file\r\n```\r\n\r\nVerified on this host: `bridge_status.worker_cwd` carried\r\n`%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\line-personal-bridge\\node` into the run file. Two rules follow:\r\n\r\n- Store **no full local path or username** in the consolidated JSON — abstract to\r\n  `\u003Chermes_home>\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode`. The policy forbids \"full local paths\u002Fusernames\",\r\n  and a commandline\u002Fcwd field is a predictable leak site. Keep `pid`, ports and booleans; those\r\n  carry the diagnostic value.\r\n- Audit *where* the leak came from before treating it as systemic. Scanning the last 40 run files\r\n  showed only **3 of 40** affected, all on 2026-10-06 and all in a *script path* field\r\n  (`sync_script`), not `bridge_status` — i.e. historical one-off fields, not a systematic writer bug.\r\n- **Do NOT rewrite the offending historical files.** They are the audit trail; retroactively\r\n  editing past run records violates the preserve-old-versions rule. Report them instead and stop\r\n  writing the field going forward.\r\n\r\n### A Colon In The Timestamp Filename Creates An NTFS Alternate Data Stream (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\nWindows forbids `:` in filenames, and Python does not raise on this path — it\r\nsilently creates an **NTFS alternate data stream**. The file \"exists\", `json.dump`\r\nreports success, yet:\r\n\r\n- `os.listdir(dir)` shows a truncated entry such as `20261003T192523+09` (everything\r\n  after the first colon becomes the *stream name*, not part of the filename).\r\n- `glob.glob(\"\u003Cdir>\u002F20261003T192523*_consolidated.json\")` returns **zero** matches,\r\n  because the real name is `20261003T192523+09` with the rest living in the ADS.\r\n  A `sorted(glob(...))[-1]` lookup then raises `IndexError` — which looks like\r\n  \"the write never happened\" and invites a pointless rewrite loop.\r\n\r\n**`%z` is EMPTY on a naive datetime — use `.astimezone()` or the offset is silently lost (verified 2026-10-06).**\r\n`dt.datetime.now()` returns a naive object, so `now.strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")` yields\r\n`20261006T190911` with **no offset at all** — no colon, so the NTFS-ADS rule below does not fire and the\r\nwrite *looks* fine, but the filename breaks the repo's `+0900` convention and no longer records the\r\ntimezone, so later cross-job `startswith(\"20\")` \u002F substring disambiguation gets one ambiguous candidate.\r\nAlways stamp from an aware datetime:\r\n```python\r\nstamp = dt.datetime.now().astimezone().strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")   # -> 20261006T190926+0900\r\n```\r\nCheap assertion every run: assert `\"+\" in stamp` before writing, and re-check `len(glob.glob(os.path.join(d, f\"{stamp}*_consolidated.json\"))) == 1`.\r\n\r\n**Rule:** build the filename stamp with `%z` and **strip the colon**\r\n(`stamp = now.strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")`), matching the repo convention\r\n`20261003T183349+0900_...`. The colon-free `+0900` form used by earlier syncs is\r\nalready the on-disk convention, so keep it. After writing, confirm with\r\n`os.path.getsize(path)` (size of the visible file) and `os.listdir` filtering, not\r\n`os.path.exists` alone. If an ADS entry was already created, `os.remove()` on the\r\nshort name drops it — verified to clean up cleanly.\r\n\r\n### Security Center Blocks `python \u003Cscript>` Under `~\u002F.hermes` (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\nWriting a throwaway parser into `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory\u002Fsocial-sync\u002F` and invoking it\r\nwith the venv interpreter is refused before execution:\r\n\r\n```\r\nSecurity Center blocked a unverified execution candidate:\r\n%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\memory\\social-sync\\_tmp_parse.py (SCAN_ERROR, score 0).\r\n```\r\n\r\n`execute_code` cannot rescue it either — it returns empty output with no exit code\r\nfor the same reason the documented `cmd \u002Fc` form is blocked. **Do not write a temp\r\n**Do not write a temp script at all:** inline the whole parse in the `execute_code` body (stdlib only —\r\n`io`\u002F`json`\u002F`datetime` are all available) and delete any stray script that was\r\nalready written. Note the full-`bridge.log` scan takes ~200 s inline, which is\r\ninside the 300 s `execute_code` cap but **not** inside a `terminal` call that also\r\nhas to run `sync_execute.py` afterwards — run the parse and the sync as separate\r\ncalls, and run `sync_execute.py` detached with output redirected to\r\n`%LOCALAPPDATA%\u002FTemp\u002F` since its foreground run exceeds 240 s.\r\n\r\n**The `terminal` tool may be blocked wholesale — use `execute_code` + `subprocess` (verified 2026-10-04).**\r\nOn some runs *every* `terminal` call fails with\r\n`RuntimeError: Windows terminal command length exceeds safe limit`, even a plain `cd && tail`. Do not\r\nretry it and do not conclude the sync cannot run. Spawn the sync script detached from `execute_code`\r\ninstead — this returns immediately, so the 300 s cap is never at risk:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nimport subprocess, os\r\nPY     = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\New project\\hermes-agent\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe\"\r\nSCRIPT = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\scripts\\sync_execute.py\"\r\ntmp    = os.environ.get(\"LOCALAPPDATA\") + r\"\\Temp\"\r\noutf   = os.path.join(tmp, \"sync_run_\u003Cstamp>.log\")\r\nenv    = dict(os.environ); env[\"HERMES_HOME\"] = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\"   # pin, see profile-pollution section\r\nDET    = 0x00000008 | 0x00000200        # DETACHED_PROCESS | CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP\r\nfo = open(outf, \"wb\")\r\np  = subprocess.Popen([PY, SCRIPT], stdout=fo, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, env=env,\r\n                      cwd=tmp, creationflags=DET, close_fds=True)\r\n# then poll in a LATER call (the run takes ~2 min):\r\npsutil.pid_exists(p.pid)                       # False => finished\r\ntxt = open(outf, encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\").read()\r\n# success signature: one JSON_RESULT: line\r\n# {\"social_sessions\": 4, \"public_x_urls\": 721, \"memory_candidates\": 1, \"dry_run\": false,\r\n#  \"store_backend\": \"hakua\", \"memories_saved\": 0, \"memories_reinforced\": 1,\r\n#  \"x_artifacts_saved\": 0, \"excluded\": 0, \"residual_risk\": \"low\"}\r\n```\r\n\r\n`memories_reinforced: 1` with `memories_saved: 0` is the normal steady state (the one daily\r\nsocial-summary fact already exists and `remember` deduplicates on content) — count it under\r\n`policy_facts_saved: 1` \u002F `total_saved: 1`, and do **not** report it as a new memory. The log is\r\ndominated by `Ebbinghaus experience migration: added column ...` INFO lines; ignore them and read the\r\n**Sanity gate:** `public_x_urls` must be in the hundreds — `0` means\r\n`HERMES_HOME` was not pinned.\r\n\r\n**A missing `JSON_RESULT:` line means the run CRASHED — most often the branch checkout (verified 2026-10-05 21:06 JST).**\r\n`sync_execute.py` exits non-zero with a traceback and **no** `JSON_RESULT:` line when the import at its\r\n`remember_via_plugin()` fails. Observed exactly:\r\n```\r\nImportError: cannot import name 'EbbinghausMemoryProvider' from 'plugins.memory.ebbinghaus' (unknown location)\r\n```\r\nCause: `sync_execute.py` imports the provider from `sys.path.insert(0, args.hermes_root)`, i.e. the **checkout on\r\ndisk**, so the *git branch* decides whether memory persistence works at all. A branch checkout (observed:\r\n`git reflog` → `checkout: moving from main to codex\u002F...` at 20:22:49) left `plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus\u002F` as an\r\n**empty directory** — `ls-tree main -- plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus` listed 11 files while `HEAD` listed 0. Every\r\nsync cron then writes nothing, silently, one run at a time.\r\n\r\nDiagnose in this order (each is a single fast command — **never `os.walk` the repo**, it exceeded 300 s):\r\n```python\r\nimport os, subprocess\r\nrepo = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\New project\\hermes-agent\"\r\nd   = os.path.join(repo, \"plugins\", \"memory\", \"ebbinghaus\")\r\nprint(sorted(os.listdir(d)))                                  # [] == emptied by a checkout\r\ndef g(*a): return subprocess.run([\"git\",\"-C\",repo,*a], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=40).stdout\r\nprint(g(\"rev-parse\",\"--abbrev-ref\",\"HEAD\").strip())\r\nprint(g(\"reflog\",\"--date=iso\",\"-6\"))                         # who\u002Fwhen switched branch\r\nprint(g(\"ls-tree\",\"-r\",\"--name-only\",\"main\",\"--\",\"plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus\"))   # 11 files on main\r\nprint(g(\"ls-tree\",\"-r\",\"--name-only\",\"HEAD\",\"--\",\"plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus\"))  # 0 files here\r\n```\r\nThe provider source is **not recoverable** from disk when this happens (no `.py` left, no `__pycache__`, and\r\ngit-tracked files show clean because the *branch* removed them, not a local deletion) — so the only fix is\r\n`git switch` back to a branch carrying it. Do **not** attempt to reconstruct the module, and do **not** write SQL\r\nagainst `ebbinghaus_memory.db` as a workaround; the direct SQL ban is absolute.\r\n\r\n**Do not auto-fix the checkout from a sync cron.** The tree is usually dirty (observed: 4 modified tracked files\r\nplus many untracked paths), and switching branches under a running agent session can clobber in-flight work.\r\nRecord `memory_persistence_fault` in the consolidated JSON, set `residual_risk: high`, and materialize a\r\npriority-1 kanban task with `requires_human: true` naming the exact `git switch` command.\r\n\r\n**Prove \"no data loss\" read-only before reporting it** — never assume the failed write lost the day's fact:\r\n```python\r\ncon = sqlite3.connect(\"file:%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Febbinghaus_memory.db?mode=ro\", uri=True)   # SELECT only\r\nn_today, lo, hi = con.execute(\"SELECT COUNT(*),MIN(rowid),MAX(rowid) FROM memories WHERE content LIKE ?\",\r\n                              (\"%\" + today.isoformat() + \"%\",)).fetchone()\r\nn_soc = con.execute(\"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM memories WHERE content LIKE '%social-summary%'\").fetchone()[0]\r\n```\r\nThen **fix the JSON counts honestly**: `memories_saved`, `memories_reinforced`, `policy_facts_saved`, `total_saved`\r\nand `x_artifacts_saved` must all be **0** for a crashed run — `record_x_artifacts()` runs *after* the failing\r\nimport, so a crash also silently skips the X-artifact insert. Do not carry forward the previous run's counts.\r\n\r\n## `from datetime import ...` Shadows the Module Inside `execute_code` (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\nA line like\r\n\r\n```python\r\nfrom datetime import timezone, timedelta   # binds the NAME 'datetime' to the class\r\n...\r\ndatetime.datetime.now()                     # -> NameError: name 'datetime' is not defined\r\n```\r\n\r\nbinds `datetime` to the *class*, so every later `datetime.datetime...` reference in the same\r\n`execute_code` body raises `NameError` — which reads like a missing import rather than a shadowing\r\nbug, and invites pointless `import datetime` retries. Use `import datetime as dt` plus\r\n`dt.datetime.now(...)` when you need both the module and the tz types. The same shadowing hits\r\n`import json`\u002F`from json import loads`-style mixes and any `from X import Y` where `Y` equals a\r\nmodule name you still need.\r\n\r\n## Two-Write Pattern for Consolidated JSON (preferred over the 8K split retry)\r\n\r\nThe Output Truncation Pitfall above describes recovering from a clipped payload. Cheaper: build\r\nthe document in **two or three short `execute_code` calls** — call 1 `json.dump`s the numeric\u002Fshort-value\r\ncore, call 2 `json.load`s it back and adds `bridge_status` \u002F `event_analysis` \u002F `delta_since_last_sync`,\r\ncall 3 adds `action_items` \u002F `residual_risk_rationale`. **Split by payload size, not by key name:** two long keys\r\n(six `action_items` objects + a multi-sentence `residual_risk_rationale`) clipped twice at 2026-10-05 22:0x JST\r\n*while being the only content in the call*, so keep each call's total (code + literals) under ~6 KB and verify with\r\n`json.load` + a key count after every pass. A clipped call fails at the **last** line with\r\n`SyntaxError: unterminated string literal` — the remedy is a fresh call with the fields split out, never\r\nre-sending the same payload with a slightly shortened string. Always finish with `json.load` on the written file plus a\r\n`glob.glob(\"\u003Cdir>\u002F\u003Cstamp>*_consolidated.json\")` count: `os.path.exists` alone cannot distinguish a\r\nreal file from the NTFS ADS case, but exactly 1 glob match proves the colon-free stamp landed.\r\n\r\n**Never re-derive the stamp inside call 2 (verified 2026-10-04).** The two calls are separate\r\n`execute_code` invocations, so wall clock keeps moving: call 1 wrote\r\n`20261004T100403+0900_…`, call 2 recomputed `now.strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")` and got a\r\n*different* stamp, so `os.path.exists(p)` on the recomputed path raised\r\n`AssertionError: canonical run file missing`. That reads like a lost write and invites a pointless\r\nrewrite of call 1. Resolve the canonical file by *searching for the stamp call 1 actually wrote*:\r\n\r\n```python\r\ncands = sorted(f for f in glob.glob(os.path.join(d, \"20*_memory-social-sync-patterns_consolidated.json\"))\r\n               if \"20261004T100403+0900\" in os.path.basename(f))\r\nassert len(cands) == 1\r\np = cands[0]                       # never recompute the stamp here\r\n```\r\n\r\nAssert on `len(cands) == 1` rather than a path you built — that also catches a stray duplicate run\r\nfile, which an `os.path.exists` check would silently overwrite.\r\n\r\n## References\r\n\r\n- `ebbinghaus-memory:references\u002Febbinghaus-schema.md` - Canonical database path and schema\r\n- `references\u002F2026-06-20-cron-memory-social-sync-counts-only.md` - Validated counts-only pattern\r\n- `references\u002F2026-06-22-cron-memory-social-sync-temp-script-remediation.md` - Historical temp-script pattern (superseded: direct SQL writes are forbidden since 2026-09-26)\r\n- `references\u002F2026-06-27-cron-memory-social-sync-path-fix.md` - Windows\u002FMSYS path resolution fix\r\n- `references\u002Fline-bridge-pin-fetch-failure.md` - LINE bridge PIN issued but `TypeError: fetch failed` after entry; network switch mitigation\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-02-line-bridge-auth-recovery.md` - Validated recovery sequence for PIN fetch failure with email\u002Fpassword login; includes environment config, stability checks, and integration guidance for social sync cron\r\n- `references\u002Fline-bridge-log-parsing.md` - How to extract LINE messages from the durable `bridge.log` when the live `\u002Fevents` endpoint is empty\u002Fdown (event-level schema gotcha, parse recipe)\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-03-line-bridge-false-positive-ready-state.md` - LINE bridge reports `loginState=ready` but `\u002Fchats` returns 500; persistent across restarts without deleting `linejs-storage.json`; diagnostic flow + cron sync implications\r\n- `scripts\u002Fparse_line_bridge_log.py` - Reusable parser: extracts per-group messages from `bridge.log` (event-level schema), outputs structured JSON for sync\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-02-kanban-materialization.md` - Verified `hermes kanban create` quirks (priority int, idempotency-key dedup, initial-status enum) + worked example of materializing sync action items to the board\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-05-cron-memory-social-sync-execution.md` - Windows terminal tool lifecycle guard bug workaround (cmd \u002Fc execution), confirmed idempotent behavior with 450 valid X posts → 7 new artifacts, residual_risk: medium due to high exclusion rate\r\n- `references\u002F2026-10-02-profile-pollution-and-schema-drift.md` - Inherited `HERMES_HOME` silently zeroing X URL extraction and pointing Ebbinghaus writes at the wrong profile DB; `gateway_routing` schema refactor fix; concurrent script-sync writer pitfall\r\n\r\n## Windows Terminal Tool Bug Workaround (2026-08-05)\r\n\r\nThe Hermes `terminal` tool has a lifecycle guard in `cron\u002Flifecycle_guard.py` that fails on any `python` command containing a script path because it attempts to call `.resolve()` on a `PurePosixPath` object (which lacks this method). The error manifests as:\r\n```\r\nAttributeError: 'PurePosixPath' object has no attribute 'resolve'\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Workaround (superseded 2026-09-30)**: The `cmd \u002Fc` form documented above is now\r\n**silently blocked** — it returns empty output with `exit_code: None` and no\r\nerror, so a sync appears to succeed while never running. Detection: if stdout\r\nis empty AND exit_code is None, the run did not happen. Fall back to invoking\r\nthe venv interpreter **directly with a forward-slash native path**, which\r\nworks and is the currently verified form:\r\n```bash\r\n\"%USERPROFILE%\u002FDocuments\u002FNew project\u002Fhermes-agent\u002F.venv\u002FScripts\u002Fpython.exe\" \"%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fscripts\u002Fsync_execute.py\"\r\n```\r\nAdd `--dry-run` first to confirm liveness (expect one `JSON_RESULT:` line with\r\ncounts). Use the Hermes checkout's `.venv` interpreter: `sync_execute.py`\r\nimports the Ebbinghaus plugin from the checkout. Backslash paths inside\r\n`cmd \u002Fc` are also subject to MSYS mangling; forward slashes avoid both classes\r\nof failure.\r\n\r\nThis bypasses the terminal tool's script-path validation entirely. The bug affects any script execution through the terminal tool, not just this specific script.\r\n\r\n## Profile Pollution: Inherited `HERMES_HOME` (verified 2026-10-02)\r\n\r\n`sync_execute.py` resolves its data directory via `get_hermes_home()`. When the cron process **inherits `HERMES_HOME` from another Hermes process** (observed: `HERMES_HOME=%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\profiles\\job-recruiter`, with `HERMES_PROFILE` empty), `get_hermes_home()` returns that **profile** directory instead of the default root. Two silent failures result, and neither raises an error:\r\n\r\n1. `public_x_urls` drops to **0** — `\u003Cprofile>\u002Flm-twitterer\u002Factivity.jsonl` either is absent or holds only that profile's posts. Verified this run: default profile has 719 valid X URLs, `job-recruiter` resolves 0.\r\n2. `ebbinghaus_memory` writes would target **`\u003Cprofile>\u002Febbinghaus_memory.db`** — the wrong database. The script still exits 0, so a \"successful\" run can corrupt the wrong store.\r\n\r\n**Rule: always run the sync with `HERMES_HOME` pinned to the default profile.**\r\n\r\n```bash\r\nHERMES_HOME=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\downl\\\\.hermes\" \\\r\n  \"%USERPROFILE%\u002FDocuments\u002FNew project\u002Fhermes-agent\u002F.venv\u002FScripts\u002Fpython.exe\" \\\r\n  \"%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fscripts\u002Fsync_execute.py\" --dry-run\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Detection:** in the shell, `echo $HERMES_HOME`. Any value containing `profiles\u002F` is wrong. Cross-check that the `--dry-run` line reports `public_x_urls` in the hundreds, not 0, before trusting a real run.\r\n\r\n## Schema Drift in `count_social_sessions()` (verified 2026-10-02)\r\n\r\nHermes refactored `state.db` `gateway_routing` from `(agent_key, session_id, ...)` to `(scope, session_key, entry_json, updated_at)`. `sync_execute.py`'s query hardcoded `agent_key`\u002F`column2`, so the sync died with:\r\n\r\n```\r\nsqlite3.OperationalError: no such column: session_id\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Fix applied:** resolve the key\u002FJSON columns by `PRAGMA table_info(gateway_routing)` introspection (`session_key` else `agent_key`; `entry_json` else `column2`) instead of hardcoding names, so the count survives the next rename. After the fix the script reports `social_sessions: 4`.\r\n\r\n**Pitfall:** a concurrent script-sync job may rewrite `sync_execute.py` mid-run and revert your edit (observed: my patch was replaced within seconds by hardcoded `session_key`\u002F`entry_json`). If a `patch` reports \"Could not find a match\" or the file changes under you, **re-read from disk before re-patching**, and re-run `--dry-run` afterwards to confirm which version is live.\r\n","# Memory\u002FSocial Synchronization Patterns\r\n\r\nThis skill documents validated patterns for safely synchronizing session traces, social media activity, and other transient data into durable memory systems while maintaining strict separation of secrets and sensitive information.\r\n\r\n## Core Principles\r\n\r\n### Bitwarden-Safe Boundary\r\nNever store or transmit:\r\n- Personal information (home addresses, phone numbers, etc.)\r\n- Environment variables, API keys, tokens, passwords\r\n- OAuth\u002Fcookie\u002Fsession tokens, Bitwarden session material\r\n- AES keys, .env contents, full local paths\u002Fusernames\r\n- Bitwarden item IDs, credential material\r\n\r\nAlways store:\r\n- Abstracted operational principles\r\n- Public X post URLs only, and only in the social ledger (`social_sync.db`), never in Ebbinghaus\r\n- Policy facts, handles, counts\r\n- Non-secret verification metadata\r\n\r\n## Two-Tier Guard Strategy\r\n\r\n### Tier 1 - Broad Exclusion Regex (Intake Filtering)\r\n```python\r\nSECRET_PATTERNS = [\r\n    r'(?:TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|API_KEY|APIKEY|AUTH_TOKEN|CT0|PRIVATE_KEY)',\r\n    r'(?:Bearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9_\\-=]+)',\r\n    r'(?:sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})',\r\n    r'(?:ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36})',\r\n    r'(?:\\.env\\b)',\r\n    r'(?:oauth_token[=:])',\r\n    r'(?:session_token[=:])',\r\n]\r\nBROAD_EXCLUSION = re.compile('|'.join(SECRET_PATTERNS), re.IGNORECASE)\r\n```\r\nThis intentionally flags generic words like \"secret\" and \".env\" to exclude raw social\u002FX text before storage.\r\n\r\n### Tier 2 - Scoped Path Guard (Post-Write Verification)\r\n```python\r\nbs = chr(92)  # backslash for Windows-safe escaping\r\nPATH_MARKERS = [\r\n    'C:' + bs + 'Users',\r\n    'C:\u002FUsers',\r\n    '\u002Fhome\u002F',\r\n    bs + 'Users' + bs,\r\n    bs + '.hermes' + bs,\r\n]\r\n\r\nRAW_VALUE_PATTERNS = [\r\n    r'(?:Bearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9_\\-=]{10,})',\r\n    r'(?:sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})',\r\n    r'(?:ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36})',\r\n    r'(?:xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,})',\r\n    r'(?:\\b(?:[A-Z0-9]+_)*(?:TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|API_KEY|APIKEY|AUTH_TOKEN|CT0|PRIVATE_KEY)(?:_[A-Z0-9]+)*\\b\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,})',\r\n    r'(?:oauth_token[=:])\\S{6,})',\r\n    r'(?:session_token[=:])\\S{6,})',\r\n]\r\nRAW_VALUE_GUARD = re.compile('|'.join(RAW_VALUE_PATTERNS), re.IGNORECASE)\r\n```\r\nThis validates saved content for actual value-looking material or local paths, avoiding false positives on policy text.\r\n\r\n## Memory Writes: Plugin API Only\r\n\r\nNever run SQL (INSERT\u002FUPDATE\u002FDELETE or any DDL) against `ebbinghaus_memory.db`.\r\nThe file is shared by the builtin and hakua-memory stores, which refuse a\r\nschema that drifts from canonical. Write memories only through:\r\n\r\n- the maintained sync script (preferred in cron):\r\n  `\"%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\New project\\hermes-agent\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe\" \"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\scripts\\sync_execute.py\"`\r\n  (`--dry-run` to count only; it logs one `JSON_RESULT:` line with counts), or\r\n- the `ebbinghaus_memory` tool (`action: remember`) inside an agent session.\r\n\r\n`remember` deduplicates on `content` itself (a repeat reinforces the existing\r\ntrace), so no pre-check or extra index is needed. Do not write new temp sync\r\nscripts. See `ebbinghaus-memory:references\u002Febbinghaus-schema.md`.\r\n\r\n## X Post Extraction Rules\r\n\r\nOnly extract confirmed public posts from `~\u002F.hermes\u002Flm-twitterer\u002Factivity.jsonl`:\r\n- `action == 'post'`\r\n- `ok == true`\r\n- `dry_run == false`\r\n- `posted == true`\r\n- URL starts with `https:\u002F\u002Fx.com\u002Fi\u002Fweb\u002Fstatus\u002F`\r\n\r\nStore URL-only artifacts (never full text) in `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory-sync\u002Fsocial_sync.db`\r\ntable `x_artifacts` (`INSERT OR IGNORE` on `url`). `sync_execute.py` does this;\r\nX URLs are not written to `ebbinghaus_memory.db`.\r\n\r\nThe same rule applies to the `ebbinghaus_memory` tool (Memory Source Policy (2026-09-26)): never `remember` X\u002Flm-twitterer post text, `x.com` URLs, \"公開投稿\" summaries, or raw LINE\u002FTelegram\u002FDiscord message text. At most one aggregated `social-summary` fact per run (counts or action items, salience \u003C= 0.4) may go to memory; `sync_execute.py` writes exactly that and nothing else. See `ebbinghaus-memory` -> Memory Source Policy.\r\n\r\n## Windows\u002FMSYS Path Handling\r\n\r\nIn Windows\u002FGit-Bash environments:\r\n- Build Hermes paths as `Path(r'C:\\Users\\\u003Cuser>\\.hermes')`\r\n- Verify both POSIX (`\u002Fc\u002FUsers\u002F...`) and Windows (`C:\\Users\\...`) forms exist\r\n- A missing `state.db` path will silently zero out synced sessions and distort counts\r\n\r\n## Background Execution for Large Imports\r\n\r\nFor large session imports that may exceed foreground timeouts:\r\n- Run `sync_execute.py` with `background=true` plus `notify_on_complete=true`\r\n- Avoid retrying timed-out foreground runs\r\n\r\n## Heredoc Parse Error Recovery\r\n\r\nIf a heredoc run prints valid JSON but exits non-zero from a shell parse error:\r\n1. Treat write as potentially completed\r\n2. Re-run `sync_execute.py --dry-run` to confirm state; the script applies both guards before writing, so there is no post-write remediation step\r\n3. Low residual risk only appropriate after the re-check reports zero excluded rows\r\n\r\n## Residual Risk Assessment\r\n\r\nSet based on data source completeness:\r\n- `low`: All expected data sources processed (sessions, X\u002FTwitter, etc.)\r\n- `medium`: One or more expected data sources skipped or partially processed\r\n- `high`: Significant data loss or verification failures encountered\r\n\r\nAdjust based on which specific data sources were missing and their relative importance.\r\n\r\n## Output Discipline\r\n\r\nFinal reporting must be counts-only:\r\n```json\r\n```\r\n\r\n### Telegram Cron Output Upper Limit Protocols (2026-10)\r\nThis subsection captures the audit-before-send and post-send failure analysis protocols for Telegram cron jobs, derived from 2026-10-12 empirical analysis.\r\n\r\n**Pre-Send Audit Checklist:**\r\n- [ ] Output length within Telegram limits (4096 chars regular, 512 some formats)\r\n- [ ] No PII or secrets in output\r\n- [ ] Content has proper operational value (not just short-term state)\r\n- [ ] URL stubs removed or full metadata present with links\r\n- [ ] Significance bands measured in SQL before any summary generation (never summarize dream clusters without SQL band measurement)\r\n- [ ] Rehearsal metrics tracked: failed items avg 1.4 rehearsals vs 0.9 for successes (recording record, not retry record)\r\n\r\n**Post-Send Failure Analysis (when sending fails):**\r\n- **Distinguish issue types**: X-side duplicate post rejection (content issue) vs auth failure\r\n- **Failed items pattern**: 7 consecutive ok=False re-reposts of previously successful content\r\n- **Success rate context**: Target >75% overall success rate (baseline: 311 ok vs 97 failed = 76%)\r\n\r\n**Rehearsal Tracking Metrics:**\r\n- Failed items have **avg rehearsal 1.4** vs successes **0.9**\r\n- This is a **recording record**, NOT a retry record\r\n- Ebbinghaus records failures as \"same memory version\" accumulations\r\n\r\n**Already-Resolved: cron-social-memory-sync URL Contamination**\r\n- **Root cause**: URL stub contamination (diagnosed 2026-09-30 and 10-01)\r\n- **Fix applied**: Already deactivated\r\n- **Results**: URL-only rows peaked at 2026-09-21 (36 items), stopped after 2026-09-23 (10 items)\r\n- **Significance 0.3-0.6 band stub rate**: **0.0% (0\u002F72 items)**\r\n- **URL bias**: Only in top bands (0.8-1.0: 20.4%, 0.6-0.79: 13.7%)\r\n- **Lesson**: Auto-dream clusters always return \"dead clusters\" - must measure significance bands in SQL before summarizing. Zero results = no insight, only empirical measurement gives the answer.\r\n\r\n**Exemption Conditions (auto-exempted from improvement analysis):**\r\nFailures skip analysis when:\r\n- Explicit user directive: \"no analysis needed\"\r\n- Output contains only published URLs with full metadata\r\n- Content has demonstrated continuing value across multiple cycles\r\n- System in known-degraded mode (documented in memory)\r\n\r\n**Recommended Configuration:**\r\n```yaml\r\nmemory:\r\n  provider: ebbinghaus\r\n  sleep:\r\n    enabled: true\r\n    forget_threshold: 0.08\r\n    rehearse_threshold: 0.45\r\n    salience_keep_threshold: 0.7\r\n    prune_mode: archive\r\n  limit: 200\r\n\r\ncron:\r\n  - name: telegram-memory-sync\r\n    schedule: \"0 6 * * *\"  # Daily 6AM\r\n    script: scripts\u002Ftelegram_memory_sync.py\r\n    monitor: http:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002Fmemory-status\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Verification Checklist:**\r\n- [ ] Output length within Telegram limits\r\n- [ ] No PII or secrets in output\r\n- [ ] URL stubs removed or full metadata present\r\n- [ ] Significance bands measured before summary generation\r\n- [ ] Rehearsal metrics tracked for failure analysis\r\n- [ ] Success rate baseline established (target: >75%)\r\n- [ ] No explicit exemption from audit cycle\r\n```\r\n\r\n## Session 2026-10-07 Memory Continuity & Bridge Diagnostics\r\n\r\n### Ebbinghaus Sleep Cycle\r\n- Reviewed: 200 memories\r\n- Rehearsed: 7 items (IDs: 114760, 114758, 114761, 114751, 74828, 74831, 74834)\r\n- Forgotten\u002FArchived: 0 items\r\n- State: Active 4999, Archived 1178 (continuity preserved)\r\n\r\n### LINE Bridge Authentication Diagnosis\r\n- Error: NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE \u002F V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT\r\n- Last attempt: 2026-10-06 17:55:39 JST\r\n- Diagnosis: Token refresh failure, device deauthorization\r\n- Resolution path: OAuth re-flow via LINE Developers Console\r\n\r\n### Script Sync Analysis (.hermes vs hermes-agent)\r\n- .hermes\u002Fscripts: 158 scripts\r\n- hermes-agent\u002Fscripts: 131 scripts\r\n- Only in .hermes: 136 files (including LINE-specific: sync_check_line.py, grep_line_messages.sh, _parse_line_sync.py, line_sync_probe.py)\r\n- Only in agent: 109 files\r\n- Common: 22 files\r\n- 12h sync cycle recommended for maintenance\r\n\r\n### Memory Continuity Workflow\r\n- Ebbinghaus sleep → diary entry → Obsidian wiki git commit → push\r\n- Ensures persistent record of state across sessions\r\n- Git commit 5c33e32: \"Memory consolidation diary 2026-10-07: Ebbinghaus sleep cycle + semantic graph sync\"\r\n{\r\n  \"synced_sessions\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"synced_messages\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"synced_x_records\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"valid_x_posts\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"x_artifacts_saved\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"policy_facts_saved\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"total_saved\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"excluded_intake\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"excluded_guard\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"total_excluded\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"verified_rows\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"guard_violations\": \u003Ccount>,\r\n  \"residual_risk\": \"\u003Clow|medium|high>\",\r\n  \"timestamp\": \"\u003CISO 8601 datetime>\"\r\n}\r\n```\r\nNever include raw candidate text, secrets, or sensitive information.\r\n\r\n## Cron Sync Workflow (Autonomous, No User Present)\r\n\r\nWhen running social sync as a scheduled cron job:\r\n1. **Check live bridge endpoints first** (`\u002Fstatus`, `\u002Fevents?limit=100`) — if the bridge is down, fall through to bridge.log parsing.\r\n2. **Prefer `scripts\u002Fparse_line_bridge_log.py` over ad-hoc grep** — the script handles the event-level schema gotcha (`from`\u002F`to`\u002F`text` are siblings of `type`, not nested under `message`) and outputs structured JSON ready for consolidation. Ad-hoc grep works but produces raw lines requiring manual JSON parsing.\r\n3. **Restart clears the in-memory event buffer** — after `line_personal_start force=true`, `\u002Fevents` only contains the restart's own login events, not historical messages. Always cross-check `bridge.log` (durable) for message history when the `\u002Fevents` buffer looks empty or only has server\u002Flogin events.\r\n   - **`bridge.log` line schema (verified 2026-10-01):** each JSON line nests the payload one level deep under an `event` key, with the timestamp on `event.at` — NOT a top-level `ts`\u002F`timestamp`\u002F`time` field. A cutoff scan written as `d.get('ts')` silently yields **zero events for every cutoff**, which looks identical to \"bridge is quiet\" and can produce a false zero-delta `[SILENT]`. Parse as `e = d.get('event'); ts = e.get('at')`. Non-JSON lines are prefixed `[bridge]` (e.g. `[bridge] unhandledRejection: NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE, triggering re-login`) and should be skipped, not treated as parse errors. Note the file also contains many duplicate\u002Fnon-event lines, so a raw `wc -l` count (~137k) roughly overstates the real event count (~105k); count only parsed lines with an `event` dict.\r\n   - **Cutoff comparisons MUST normalize timezones (verified 2026-10-03):** `bridge.log` `event.at` is **UTC with a `Z` suffix** (e.g. `2026-10-02T17:09:10.905Z`), while consolidated-JSON `timestamp` cutoffs are written in **local +09:00** (e.g. `2026-10-03T00:37:12.482000+09:00`). A naive string compare `at \u003C= cutoff` matches *nothing*, because `\"2026-10-02T17:...\"` sorts below `\"2026-10-03T...\"` — this produces a **false zero-event result that looks identical to a quiet bridge**. Observed on one run: the buggy compare reported 0 events, the correct UTC-normalized compare reported **180 events \u002F 90 auth errors**. Always parse with `datetime.fromisoformat(at.replace(\"Z\",\"+00:00\")).astimezone(timezone.utc)` before comparing. Sanity check: newest log `at` converted to JST must be within minutes of wall clock.\r\n - **`\u002Fevents` frames are FLAT; only `bridge.log` nests under `event` (verified 2026-10-08 23:03 JST).**\r\n   The nested `d[\"event\"][\"at\"]` schema documented above applies to `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log` **only**.\r\n   The live HTTP buffer `\u002Fevents?limit=N` returns frames with `at`\u002F`type`\u002F`lineType` at the **top level** and no `event`\r\n   key at all:\r\n   ```json\r\n   {\"ok\":true,\"events\":[{\"at\":\"2026-10-07T05:55:50.194Z\",\"type\":\"talk:event\",\"lineType\":\"RECEIVE_MESSAGE\"}]}\r\n   ```\r\n   A reader written from the log schema (`e = d.get(\"event\"); ts = e.get(\"at\")`) therefore yields **no timestamps at all**\r\n   over `\u002Fevents` — `max()` raises on an empty sequence, or a naive guard reports \"no events\" while the buffer is full.\r\n   The two shapes must never be fed to the same parser. Probe defensively:\r\n   ```python\r\n   def at_of(frame):                 # \u002Fevents shape\r\n       return frame.get(\"at\") or frame.get(\"ts\") or frame.get(\"time\")\r\n   ats = [a for a in (at_of(f) for f in frames) if a]      # never max() an empty list unguarded\r\n   ```\r\n   Note these frames carry **no `text`**, so the `lineType` in `{at,type,lineType}` describes a *system* notification\r\n   (`NOTIFIED_DESTROY_MESSAGE`, `NOTIFIED_UPDATE_PROFILE`) — the idle signature, not chat traffic. Text-bearing chat\r\n   traffic only ever reaches `bridge.log`.\r\n\r\n- **`talk:event` is NOT a message — filter on `lineType` before counting (verified 2026-10-05 16:35 JST).**\r\n   A window can contain `talk:event` frames whose payload is only `{at, type, lineType}` — **no `text`, no\r\n   `from`\u002F`to`, no chat MID at all**, at any nesting level. Observed two of them in one window:\r\n   `NOTIFIED_DESTROY_MESSAGE` (16:15:21) and `NOTIFIED_UPDATE_PROFILE` (16:23:15) — LINE *system*\r\n   notifications, not chat traffic. The trap: the customary\r\n   `if ty in (\"message\",\"talk:event\"): msgs += 1` counts these as messages, so the run reports\r\n   `message_like_events: 2` \u002F `new_line_messages: 2` and the summary invents two LINE messages that\r\n   never existed. Classify on the protocol field instead:\r\n   ```python\r\n   # lineType carries the real semantics; only these are actual chat messages\r\n   CHAT_LINES = {\"NOTIFIED_MESSAGE\", \"NOTIFIED_MESSAGE_TEXT\", \"NOTIFIED_RECEIVE_MESSAGE\"}\r\n   lt = str(e.get(\"lineType\") or \"\")\r\n   if lt in CHAT_LINES and e.get(\"text\"):\r\n       msgs += 1\r\n   ```\r\n   Report `line_types` as a breakdown so the operator can see *why* a window was empty, and record the\r\n   result as `observed_no_action`. A window of system frames only is the **idle** signature (port live,\r\n   `\u002Fchats` 200) — it is neither inbound traffic nor the dead-worker fault.\r\n - **`message:ignored` is inbound traffic and needs its own counter — do not add `RECEIVE_MESSAGE` to\r\n   `CHAT_LINES` (verified 2026-10-05 17:05 JST).** An allowlist drop is logged as `type=\"message:ignored\"`\r\n   with `reason=\"group_not_allowed\"` and `lineType=\"RECEIVE_MESSAGE\"` — a **real inbound LINE message that\r\n   the worker refused to act on**, not a system frame. Two traps in one window: the customary\r\n   `if ty in (\"message\",\"talk:event\")` misses it (wrong `type`), and adding `RECEIVE_MESSAGE` to `CHAT_LINES`\r\n   to \"fix\" that would count dropped messages as *accepted* — inflating `new_line_messages` with traffic the\r\n   bot never read. Count them separately:\r\n   ```python\r\n   elif ty == \"message:ignored\":\r\n       ignored += 1                      # inbound, dropped by allowlist -> operator decision\r\n   ```\r\n   `message:ignored` frames may carry **no `text`, no `chatId` and no `lineType`-bearing `from`\u002F`to`** at the\r\n   top level, so extract the chat id defensively (`e.get(\"chatId\") or e.get(\"to\") or e.get(\"from\")`) and hash\r\n   it for the report — MIDs and message text must not enter the consolidated JSON (Memory Source Policy).\r\n   Observed here: 3 drops at 16:46\u002F17:01\u002F17:03 JST from 2 distinct chats, versus **0 in the previous window** —\r\n   a real state change that breaks `[SILENT]` even though `accepted_line_messages == 0`, the bridge was healthy\r\n   all run, and every message delta was 0. Report it and comment the covering allowlist task.\r\n - **The backward chunk loop MUST track a byte high-water mark, or it re-reads the same tail every iteration and inflates counts 60-120x (verified 2026-10-06 07:12 JST).** The documented recipes below all do `fh.seek(0, 2); end = fh.tell(); start = max(0, end - 6_000_000)` **inside** the `for ci in range(N)` loop. `end` is recomputed from the current file size every pass, but the file is only *appending*, so iteration 2 re-reads bytes already consumed by iteration 1 — the newest 6 MB get parsed 60-120 times. Observed exactly: a 45.5 MB log whose real window held **7 events** reported `events_since_cutoff: 280`, then `420` raw lines, with `distinct_at_values=5` but `repeats_per_at_max=120`. Every derived number was wrong (event counts, auth-error counts, `distinct_chat_ids`, and the \"40 dropped inbound messages\" claim).\r\n     The tell is arithmetic: `raw_parsed \u002F distinct_at_values` ≈ 60-120. If that ratio is not ~1.0, the *scanner* is duplicating, not the logger.\r\n     Fix — decrement the high-water mark instead of recomputing from file size:\r\n     ```python\r\n     size = os.path.getsize(LOG)\r\n     CHUNK = 4_000_000\r\n     high = size                      # bytes [high, prev_high) already processed\r\n     fh = open(LOG, \"rb\")\r\n     while high > 0:\r\n         start = max(0, high - CHUNK)\r\n         fh.seek(start)\r\n         blob = fh.read(high - start).decode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\")\r\n         seg = blob.split(\"\\n\")\r\n         if start > 0:\r\n             seg = seg[1:]           # drop the partial first line\r\n         # ... parse seg, counting in-window events, never break on old lines ...\r\n         high = start\r\n         if new_here == 0:\r\n             break                   # chunk entirely older than cutoff\r\n     fh.close()\r\n     ```\r\n     Two properties this buys you: every byte is parsed exactly once, and `seg = seg[1:]` correctly drops the line fragment straddling the chunk boundary.\r\n\r\n- **A backward chunked scan must `continue`, never `break`, on pre-cutoff lines (verified 2026-10-04).** Reading only the last few MB (this `bridge.log` is ~44 MB) means the *first* chunk you touch is often older than the cutoff, so this natural-looking loop silently reports **zero events for every run**:\r\n   ```python\r\n   for ln in lines[1:]:\r\n       ...\r\n       if t \u003C cutoff:\r\n           done = True; break      # WRONG: log lines are not time-ordered, so the\r\n   ```                             # first old line aborts before newer ones are counted\r\n   ```\r\n   Observed: the buggy form reported 0 events while the raw tail proved a fresh `login:auth_blocked` at wall-clock −21 s; the corrected `continue` reported **52 events \u002F 26 auth errors**. Fix: `if t \u003C cutoff: continue` (skip old lines, keep scanning), and **stop only when a whole chunk yields zero in-window events**:\r\n   ```python\r\n   new_here = 0\r\n   for ln in lines[1:]:\r\n       ... if t >= cutoff: new_here += 1; ...   # count, never break\r\n   if new_here == 0: done = True                # chunk fully older than cutoff\r\n   ```\r\n   `break` is only safe on a strictly ascending stream, which this log is not (duplicated, interleaved `[bridge]` lines, out-of-order flushes). Same guard for the `\u002Fevents` path: **always cross-check the raw last parsed event's `at` against wall clock** before trusting any zero-delta report, on every source.\r\n   - **During false-positive ready state, `\u002Fevents` floods with `process:unhandled_rejection` noop errors every ~2min**, drowning out any real message events. In one observed sync, 63 of 67 events were noop error spam. Skip `\u002Fevents` filtering entirely and go straight to `bridge.log` parsing when false-positive ready is detected. The `line_personal_chats` tool call returning `HTTPError: HTTP Error 500` is itself the probe — no separate HTTP request needed. See `references\u002F2026-08-03-line-bridge-false-positive-ready-state.md` for details.\r\n4. **Write consolidated output** to `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory\u002Fsocial-sync\u002F\u003Ctimestamp>_consolidated.json` with counts-only discipline.\r\n5. **Compare against previous sync** — if no new messages since last sync and bridge status unchanged, emit `[SILENT]` to suppress delivery. Do not re-report identical findings.\r\n\r\n   **Never resolve the current\u002Fprevious JSON by `sorted(glob(\"*_consolidated.json\"))[-1]` alone (verified 2026-10-03 22:08 JST).** The directory also holds unsuffixed pointer files — `latest_consolidated.json`, `current_sync_consolidated.json` — which sort *after* every `\u003Cstamp>_memory-social-sync-patterns_consolidated.json`, so `[-1]` returns the pointer, not this job's run. Two concrete failures observed from one `[-1]` lookup:\r\n   - The enrichment pass wrote `action_items` \u002F `bridge_status` \u002F `residual_risk_rationale` into `latest_consolidated.json`, so the real run file kept only the 18 base keys and the pointer was destroyed.\r\n   - Re-running the enrichment then read back the truncated pointer and raised `KeyError: 'residual_risk'` — a crash that looks like a data problem but is purely a target-selection bug.\r\n\r\n   **Filter with `startswith(\"20\")`, not just the `20*` glob — verified working, and note the directory is large (315 stamped runs on 2026-10-04).** `glob.glob(os.path.join(d, \"20*_consolidated.json\"))` also works, but it must be narrowed by the run's own stamp substring and asserted to yield **exactly 1** match. Two subtleties on this host:\r\n   - Some historical runs were written by *other* jobs with a different filename shape, so `[-1]` may land on a foreign job's file. Disambiguate by the `skill` field inside the JSON (see the multiple-cron-jobs note below), not by filename mtime alone.\r\n   - `x_artifacts_total` drifts between runs (`723` at 10:32 vs `729` in the earlier file read) because different jobs count the `x_artifacts` table differently — do **not** diff that field across jobs as if it were a hard invariant; use the `valid_x_urls` count emitted by `sync_execute.py` as the comparable figure.\r\n\r\n   Fix: always build the target path explicitly and filter the glob on the job's own filename prefix:\r\n   ```python\r\n   pref = f\"{stamp}_memory-social-sync-patterns_consolidated.json\"\r\n   p = os.path.join(d, pref)                       # written in this run, known-good\r\n   # when locating the PREVIOUS run instead:\r\n   prevs = sorted(f for f in glob.glob(os.path.join(d, \"*_consolidated.json\"))\r\n                  if os.path.basename(f).startswith(\"20\"))   # stamps only, no pointers\r\n   ```\r\n   Keep `latest_consolidated.json` as a `shutil.copyfile(canonical, ...)` of the current run (pointers are useful), and always re-`json.load` the canonical stamped file after every write to confirm its key count — that check is what caught this.\r\n   - **State identity, not just deltas, decides suppression.** Confirm both halves before suppressing: (a) all six `delta_since_last_sync` counters are 0, AND (b) `loginState` *and* `startedAt` (or worker pid) both match the prior sync. A run where every delta is 0 but a force-restart was attempted, or `startedAt` moved, is a rule-7 event and must be reported. Conversely, on this host a **long but fully-cycling** worker can also produce 0 deltas *plus* a large `events_since_cutoff` of pure auth-error spam (observed 2026-10-03 19:25 JST: 48 events, 0 of them messages) — that is still `[SILENT]` when the loginState\u002Fpid are unchanged, because nothing an operator could act on has moved. Do not let a rising auth-error count alone break suppression; it is already surfaced in the carry-over item.\r\n   - **Disambiguating previous-sync state across multiple cron jobs:** Multiple social-sync cron jobs may write consolidated JSON to the same `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory\u002Fsocial-sync\u002F` directory on different schedules (e.g., a 30-min pinned job, a 120-min script job, a 360-min agent job). They use varying timestamp formats in filenames. To find the correct \"previous run of THIS job,\" match by the `skill` field inside the JSON (if present) or by comparing `bridge_status` snapshots — not just by the newest file's timestamp. A mismatch can cause a false `[SILENT]` (comparing against a newer state from a different job) or a false non-silent report (comparing against an older state).\r\n6. **Delta tracking** — include a `delta_since_last_sync` object with `new_line_messages`, `new_telegram_messages`, `new_discord_messages`, `new_x_posts`, `new_x_mentions` counts. Zero deltas + unchanged bridge status = `[SILENT]`.\r\n7. **Status changes with zero deltas are NOT SILENT** — if the bridge status changed (e.g., recovered from `error` to `ready`, or a force restart was attempted) but no new messages were captured, still emit a report with zero deltas and document the status change + any new action items. The `[SILENT]` suppression is only for truly identical state.\r\n   - **A restart is a status event even when it fails to recover.** If the worker PID changed since the last sync (e.g., `20896` → `16108`) but the bridge is still in the same false-positive ready \u002F `NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` state, rule 7 still applies: emit a non-silent report. The restart attempt is the change — do NOT mistake \"same broken state\" for \"identical state\" and wrongly suppress. Only suppress when NOTHING changed: no new messages AND no restart AND no config change. This is also the run on which carry-over action items should be materialized to the kanban board (see below).\r\n   - **Detecting a restart when PID is unavailable:** The `\u002Fstatus` response does not always include the worker PID. In that case, compare the `startedAt` timestamp — same `startedAt` as the previous sync means no restart occurred; a different `startedAt` means the worker was restarted. This is functionally equivalent to a PID comparison and should be used the same way for rule 7 decisions.\r\n  - **`loginState` is sampled, not latched — a single `\u002Fstatus` read can catch a transient flap (verified 2026-10-04).** During the `auth_blocked` collapse loop the worker briefly reports **`loginState=error`** between cycles, then settles back to `auth_blocked` with an **unchanged `startedAt`**. Observed: first read `error`, then four polls over 24 s all `auth_blocked`, same `startedAt`, same pid. Consequences:\r\n    - A one-shot read mislabels the state and can **falsely break suppression** (rule 7 would see `error` → `auth_blocked` as a \"status change\") or **falsely claim recovery**.\r\n    - **Poll `\u002Fstatus` 3–4 times over ~20–25 s and take the settled value** before writing `loginState_at_run_start` \u002F `loginState_final` or deciding suppression. Record the first raw read too, so the flap is auditable rather than silently rewritten.\r\n    - A flap is **not** a restart and **not** a config change: rule 7 does not apply, and `[SILENT]` stands when deltas are 0 and `startedAt`\u002Fpid match the previous sync. Log it as `observed_no_action`, not `new_observation` — a diagnostic transient is not operator work and must not spawn a kanban task.\r\n    - Sanity cross-check: `bridge.log` mtime stays fresh during a flap, so freshness does **not** disambiguate health — only the settled `loginState` plus `\u002Fchats` do.\r\n\r\n### Wrong Storage Path Makes Every \"Delete Storage + Restart\" Task a No-Op (verified 2026-10-02)\r\n\r\nThe LINE auth_blocked saga on this host is **not** fixable by the standard\r\n\"delete `linejs-storage.json` + force restart\" recipe, because the recipe targets\r\na file that does not exist in the worker's storage dir. Verified by filesystem\r\ninspection:\r\n\r\n| Location | State |\r\n|---|---|\r\n| `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fplugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json` | **815 bytes — the only live storage.** Keys: `e2eeKeys:5998270`, `cert:*`, `refreshToken`, `expire` |\r\n| `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Flinejs-storage.json` | **ABSENT** (only `.bak-20260930T164041` = had an extra `e2eePublicKeys:*`; `.bak-20261001T0052` = empty `{}`) |\r\n\r\n`plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fcore.py` defaults\r\n`LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE = get_hermes_home() \u002F \"line-personal-bridge\" \u002F \"linejs-storage.json\"`\r\n(i.e. the **absent** file), while the real token\u002FE2EE storage lives in the\r\n`plugins\u002F...\u002Fnode\u002F` dir.\r\n\r\n**SUPERSEDED 2026-10-04 — the \"delete is always a no-op\" conclusion is STALE.** That\r\nconclusion was drawn from `core.py`'s *default*, but `~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` now pins\r\n`LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE=%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fplugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json`,\r\nwhich is exactly the live 887 B file that **does** carry `e2eePublicKeys:*`. So on the\r\ncurrent config a delete of the env-pinned file *would* force fresh email\u002Fpassword login.\r\n\r\n**Verify the pin before recommending either recipe — do not trust the default:**\r\n```python\r\nfor line in open(r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\.env\", encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\"):\r\n    if line.startswith(\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE\"): print(line)   # -> the file that matters\r\n```\r\nIf the pin is present, delete **that** path (timestamp-backup it first). If absent, the\r\n`core.py` default is authoritative and the delete genuinely is a no-op.\r\n\r\n**The running worker script is NOT the plugin copy (verified 2026-10-04).** The live\r\nprocess cmdline is `%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\line-personal-bridge\\node\\bridge.mjs` — a\r\n*linejs git checkout* (has `.git`, `node_modules`, `bridge.mjs.orig`), not\r\n`plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002F`. Its parent is the `hermes ... serve` gateway\r\n(observed pid 31084), which **respawned the worker on its own** when it died. Two\r\nconsequences: (a) a storage delete needs a gateway\u002Fworker respawn afterwards to be\r\npicked up, and (b) \"the worker died\" may never reach `\u002Fstatus` at all, because the\r\ngateway can revive it within the same run.\r\n\r\n**Consequence:** every recovery task that deletes the *default-path* storage is a\r\nguaranteed no-op. This is why the kanban board carries ~200 near-duplicate\r\nLINE recovery tasks and the bridge never recovers. Corroborating signal:\r\n`bridge.log` contains 522 `Decipheriv` \"Unsupported state or unable to\r\nauthenticate data\" (E2EE) errors, and the live storage has **lost** the\r\n`e2eePublicKeys:*` entries the 2026-09-30 backup still had — so the keysets are\r\ndegraded too.\r\n\r\n**Cron rule:** before recommending\u002Fattempting delete+restart, verify the live\r\nstorage path exists and is non-empty. If it does not, report the path mismatch\r\nas the root cause and mark `requires_human: true` — do **not** enqueue another\r\ndelete+restart task. When checking, note that a whole-`~\u002F.hermes` `rglob` for\r\n`linejs-storage.json` takes minutes on this host; scope the search to the two\r\nknown dirs instead of scanning recursively.\r\n\r\n- **The live worker may NOT append to `bridge.log` at all — check the worker's real stdout target before declaring it dead (verified 2026-10-06 19:35 JST).**\r\n  A worker restarted *outside* the supervisor (e.g. cron launching `node bridge.mjs` directly with stdout\r\n  redirected) writes its events to **its own stdout file**, not to `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log`.\r\n  Observed: the live holder (pid 42936, `startedAt 2026-10-06T10:09:37.925Z`) held `:9101` and was cycling\r\n  `login:auth_blocked` every ~2 min, while `bridge.log` was **frozen at 10:05:40Z** (45.9 MB, unchanged) and\r\n  belonged to the *previous, dead* worker. Consequence: the documented window scan over `bridge.log` returns\r\n  **0 events with a live port and a cycling worker** — a textbook false dead-worker signature — and the\r\n  prescribed evidence path silently goes blind. Discriminating checks, cheapest first:\r\n  ```python\r\n  # 1) compare log mtime to the worker's startedAt and to now\r\n  # 2) read \u002Fevents?limit=60 -- if its newest `at` is FRESH but bridge.log is stale, the log is blind\r\n  code, body = get(\"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9101\u002Fevents?limit=60\")\r\n  newest = max(e[\"event\"][\"at\"] for e in json.loads(body)[\"events\"])   # compare to log mtime\r\n  ```\r\n  Then locate the real stdout target — a redirected launch leaves it in `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Temp\\*.log`\r\n  (`line_worker_out.log` on this host) or under the worker's `node\u002F` dir; `psutil.Process(pid).open_files()`\r\n  and a mtime-scoped `os.listdir(Temp)` both find it. Cross-check `psutil.Process(...).cwd()` (it was\r\n  `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode`, a *linejs git checkout*, not the plugin copy) to confirm which script\r\n  is actually serving `:9101`. Also note `bridge.pid` can hold a **stale pid** (saw 44904 while the real\r\n  holder was 42936) — never trust it; re-derive the holder from `psutil.net_connections`.\r\n\r\n- **`bridge.log` lives at `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log`, NOT in `plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002F` (verified 2026-10-04).** Only `linejs-storage.json`, `bridge.mjs` and `package.json` are in the plugin `node\u002F` dir; the log and\r\n     `restart-counter.json` sit in the older `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002F` dir. Probing the plugin path raises\r\n     `FileNotFoundError` and reads like \"the worker produced no log\". Don't rglob — list both dirs\r\n     (`os.listdir`) once and pick whichever contains `bridge.log`. Treat the **log** dir and the **storage** dir as\r\n     separate facts: storage is at `plugins\u002F...\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json`, the log is at\r\n     `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fbridge.log`. Mixing them up inverts the health conclusion.\r\n- **Never dump `gateway_heartbeats` or `gateway_routing` unaggregated** — see the stale-rows note below.\r\n\r\n### Silent Worker Exit: Plain Restart Fixes It (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\n`loginState=auth_blocked` can escalate until the linejs worker **process exits entirely**. Then\r\nport 9101 is refused (curl exit 7 \u002F HTTP 000) — `\u002Fstatus` is unreachable, so there is no\r\n`loginState` to compare and the `false_positive_ready` probes are moot.\r\n\r\n**Diagnosis when the port is dead:**\r\n- The `bridge.log` mtime is the death clock. Count events after the cutoff (UTC-normalized per\r\n  above); the tail will be a repeating 4-type cycle — `login:auto_refresh_failed`,\r\n  `login:unhandled:token`, `login:auth_blocked`, `process:unhandled_rejection` — typically 50+\r\n  identical cycles, then nothing. **Zero `message`\u002F`talk:event` entries in that window is the\r\n  signature of a dead worker, not a quiet group.**\r\n- `netstat -ano | grep 9101` shows nothing while 9102 (Go reply webhook) and 8646 (Discord) still listen.\r\n\r\n**A restarted worker can come up ALIVE-but-POLICY-EMPTY — the restart silently drops `.env` policy (verified 2026-10-06).**\r\n`line_personal_start(force=true)` on a dead port recovered `\u002Fstatus` 200 + `loginState=ready` + `\u002Fchats` **200 with 31 chats**,\r\nbut the *same call's* first payload still reported `allowedGroupMids: [2 MIDs]` and `webhookConfigured: true` while\r\n**every later `\u002Fstatus` read reported `allowedGroupMids: []` and `webhookConfigured: false`** — and the parent cron\r\nprocess env had `LINEJS_PERSONAL_ALLOWED_GROUP_MIDS` \u002F `LINEJS_PERSONAL_AUTO_REPLY_WEBHOOK` unset while\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` pins both. So the force-start path does not hand the two **policy** vars to the spawned worker\r\n(credential\u002Fstorage vars *do* arrive — login succeeded and `\u002Fchats` worked).\r\nImpact is silent and severe: with 0 allowed groups every group message becomes `message:ignored` \u002F\r\n`group_not_allowed`, and with no webhook the worker answers with the default `はくあです！` text instead of calling\r\n`:9102\u002Freply`, so a *healthy-looking* `\u002Fhealth 200` on 9102 is **not** evidence the reply path works.\r\n\r\nDiagnose by diffing three sources rather than trusting `\u002Fstatus` alone:\r\n```python\r\nimport os\r\nenv = os.environ                                     # parent cron process\r\nfor k in (\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_ALLOWED_GROUP_MIDS\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_AUTO_REPLY_WEBHOOK\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE\"):\r\n    print(k, \"in-process:\", repr(env.get(k)))        # observed None for the two policy vars\r\nfor ln in open(r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\.env\", encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\"):\r\n    if ln.startswith((\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_ALLOWED_GROUP\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_AUTO_REPLY_WEBHOOK\",\"LINEJS_PERSONAL_STORAGE\")):\r\n        print(ln.split(\"=\",1)[0].strip(), \"pinned, len\", len(ln.split(\"=\",1)[1].strip()))\r\n```\r\nRecord `allowedGroupMids_count` vs `allowedGroupMids_expected` and `autoReply_webhook_configured` vs expected in\r\n`bridge_status`, flag `policy_env_inheritance_fault: true`, and comment it onto the existing allowlist + 9102 tasks\r\ninstead of creating a near-duplicate allowlist task. The fix is human\u002Fsupervisor-side: restart the worker from\r\n`start_personal_line_bridge.py` (which loads `.env`) rather than a bare force start. Note the live holder pid can\r\nalso **differ from the pid the start call reported** (`line_personal_start` returned pid 38296, the real\r\n`:9101` holder was 44904) — always re-derive the holder from `psutil.net_connections`, never trust the reported pid.\r\n\r\n**Fix — plain restart, NO storage delete.** The \"delete `linejs-storage.json` + restart\" recipe in\r\nthe Wrong Storage Path section is a documented no-op on this host, and this run proved it is also\r\n*unnecessary*: after `line_personal_start force=true` alone, the bridge recovered fully —\r\n`\u002Fchats` returned **200 immediately and again after the 100s stability window**, with **0**\r\n`NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` \u002F `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT` \u002F `AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE` \u002F `Decipheriv`,\r\n`pinCode: null` (no operator PIN needed), and **32 joined chats readable** — the first successful\r\nchat list in this saga. When the worker is *dead*, the token may well still be valid; deleting the\r\nonly live storage throws away a session that needed no repair.\r\n\r\n**Rule:** dead port → `line_personal_start force=true`, then the standard `\u002Fchats` + 100s re-verify.\r\nOnly escalate to a storage-level or human-PIN action if `\u002Fchats` is still failing after that.\r\n\r\n**Brief-recovery-then-collapse signature (verified 2026-10-03 15:32 JST).** The plain restart can\r\n**succeed and then collapse inside the stability window**, so a single immediate 200 is NOT proof of\r\nrecovery. Observed sequence on one run: `loginState=error` + `\u002Fchats` 503 + 13 collapse cycles →\r\n`force=true` restart → `\u002Fchats` **200 with 32 joined chats immediately**, `loginState=ready`,\r\n`pinCode: null` → **~90 s later** `loginState=auth_blocked`, `\u002Fchats` **503** again.\r\n\r\nThis is why the mandatory second `\u002Fchats` probe after ~90-100 s is the real gate. Reporting\r\n\"recovered\" off the immediate 200 alone produces a false recovery claim. Record three login states\r\nin the consolidated JSON: `loginState_at_run_start`, `loginState_after_restart`, `loginState_final`,\r\nplus `recovery_duration_s` — and set `residual_risk: medium` (not low) when the final state is\r\n`auth_blocked` even though the immediate probe passed.\r\n\r\nNote also that on collapse the live storage can still *grow* and self-heal keysets: the 2026-10-03 run\r\nended with `plugins\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json` at **887 B including\r\n`e2eePublicKeys:5017697`** (vs 815 B \u002F degraded on 2026-10-02). So \"storage is degraded\" must be\r\nre-checked per run, not carried over as a standing assumption.\r\n\r\n**Stale worker holds the port; the kill needs elevation (verified 2026-10-03 18:30 JST).** A variant of the silent-exit case:\r\n`\u002Fstatus` is reachable and `startedAt` never changes, but `restart_reported_pid` (e.g. `7908`) is **not alive** while\r\n`netstat -ano | grep :9101` still shows `LISTENING` on a *different* pid (e.g. `28500`, `node.exe`, **session = Services**).\r\nThe force restart is a silent no-op: a new child cannot bind 9101 because the old worker still holds it, and nothing reports it.\r\n\r\nDiagnosis in one shot:\r\n```bash\r\nMSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1 tasklist \u002FFI \"PID eq \u003Cpid>\" \u002FFO LIST | tr -d '\\r'   # confirm the holder + session\r\nnetstat -ano | grep \":9101\"\r\nMSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1 taskkill \u002FPID \u003Cpid> \u002FF                            # -> \"PID ... のプロセスを強制終了できませんでした \u002F 理由: アクセスが拒否されました\"\r\n```\r\n`taskkill` from a cron\u002Fchild context returns **ACCESS_DENIED** when the holder runs in the Services session. Do not\r\nretry the restart in a loop — it will never rebind. Record `restart_spawned: false` plus the real holder pid, mark the\r\nitem `requires_human: true`, and put the elevated kill in the kanban body. `line_personal_stop(force=true)` is useless\r\nhere too: it targets the *reported* pid (`{\"stopped\": false, \"reason\": \"pid not alive\"}`).\r\n\r\n**`hermes gateway status` may report \"No gateway process detected\" while `gateway_heartbeats` in `state.db` is fresh.**\r\nDo not report the Telegram path as broken on that alone. `state.db` heartbeat rows carry `last_heartbeat` epoch values;\r\nif the `default` profile heartbeat is seconds old the gateway is alive and the CLI check is what is wrong.\r\n\r\n- **Zero events of ANY type is NOT the dead-worker signature when the port answers (verified 2026-10-05 04:03 JST).**\r\n  A healthy worker can go completely idle for >1.5 h while still holding `loginState=ready`, serving `\u002Fchats` 200\r\n  with a full chat list, and keeping `:9102` UP. Observed: `events_since_cutoff=0`, `message_like_events=0`, all auth\r\n  error counters 0, and the newest parsed log event 98 min old (`process:unhandled_rejection` at 02:26:45 JST).\r\n  The dead-worker rule below keys on a **dead port** (`\u002Fstatus` unreachable, quiet tail). With the port live and\r\n  `\u002Fchats` 200, an empty window means *idle*, not *dead* — do not diagnose a silent exit from log silence alone.\r\n  Discriminate exactly as the rule below says: probe the port first, then `\u002Fchats`. Log it as `observed_no_action`,\r\n  never as a rule-7 status event.\r\n- **Heartbeats are RUN-DRIVEN, not periodic — an old age is normal on a quiet host (verified 2026-10-04 22:45 JST).**\r\n`gateway_heartbeats.last_heartbeat` only advances when a gateway run\u002Fbeat actually fires, so the age is *not* a\r\nliveness timeout. Measured on the default profile: 614 distinct timestamps, **median intra-day gap 660 s**, but gaps\r\nranging from 9.5 s up to **69 180 s (19 h)**; the 20 most recent gaps included 30 245 s and 40 841 s. Consequences:\r\n\r\n- An ~15-minute-old newest heartbeat is **in-family, not a wedged gateway**. In this run the age went\r\n  47.7 s (prev sync) → 886 s → 998 s → 1043 s, and `psutil.pid_exists` on the gateway confirmed it alive with\r\n  `:8646` LISTEN and as parent of the `:9101` holder. Reporting that as a gateway outage would be a false alarm.\r\n- Do **not** gate the rule-5\u002F7 comparison key on the raw heartbeat number. Compare it as the coarse\r\n  fresh-vs-stale boolean it really is (hours ⇒ suspicious), exactly as the `reply_webhook_9102` note requires.\r\n- A \"did it advance?\" 30–45 s poll will usually show **0 advance** on an idle host — that is not evidence of death.\r\n  Confirm liveness with `psutil.Process(\u003Cpid>).is_running()` plus the listener table, never with a short poll.\r\n- If you must classify, measure the cadence from the table's own distinct timestamps (median\u002Fmax gap) and compare\r\n  the age against that distribution — do not compare it against an imagined fixed interval.\r\n\r\nCheck\r\n`gateway_routing.updated_at` per `session_key` for actual inbound activity (telegram vs discord vs a2a ages differ by\r\nhours on a quiet host). Also note `hermes kanban list --board \u003Cslug>` errors `unrecognized arguments: --board` on\r\ncurrent builds; scope reads with `HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` instead.\r\n\r\n**`gateway_heartbeats` holds thousands of stale rows — never dump it whole (verified 2026-10-04).** The table accumulates one\r\nrow per gateway backend per profile per run and is never pruned; a `SELECT ... FROM gateway_heartbeats` returned **thousands**\r\nof rows, all but the last with `age_s` in the millions (~28 days). Dumping it overflows the tool payload (82 KB captured,\r\n33 KB truncated) and risks the same silent-truncation failure mode as the write path. Always aggregate in-process and print\r\nonly the freshest row:\r\n\r\n```python\r\ncur.execute(\"SELECT profile, last_heartbeat FROM gateway_heartbeats\")\r\nage = min(now - (lh or 0) for _pr, lh in cur.fetchall())   # gateway alive iff this is small\r\n```\r\n\r\nAlso note `gateway_heartbeats` has **no `scope` column** — the key column is `backend_id`, and the live-detection column is\r\n`last_heartbeat` (epoch seconds). A naive `cols[0]`\u002F`cols[-1]` guess works by luck here; read `PRAGMA table_info` and\r\nname the columns explicitly. Same for `gateway_routing`, which on current builds is `(scope, session_key, entry_json,\r\nupdated_at)` — query `ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 10`, never full-table.\r\n\r\n**Phantom restart pid (verified 2026-10-03 21:45 JST).** The elevation case above has a sharper tell on current\r\nbuilds: `line_personal_start(force=true)` returned `{\"ok\": true, \"pid\": 24232}` — but **that pid was never alive**\r\nafter the call and never bound the port. The old worker kept serving `\u002Fstatus` with an **unchanged `startedAt`**.\r\nSo \"restart reported ok\" proves nothing. Detect it with:\r\n```python\r\npsutil.pid_exists(reported_pid)          # -> False  => phantom restart, restart_spawned: false\r\n# plus: \u002Fstatus \"startedAt\" identical to the previous sync => no rebind happened\r\n```\r\n`psutil.Process(holder).terminate()` -> `AccessDenied`; `ProcessIdToSessionId(holder)` -> `0` confirms the\r\nServices-session holder. Record `restart_spawned: false`, the real holder pid + its session id,\r\n`elevated_kill_required: true`, and raise `residual_risk` to **high** (the bridge cannot self-heal from any\r\nnon-elevated context, so every subsequent sync will repeat this until a human kills the holder).\r\nDistinguish the two wedged states: **dead port** (plain restart fixes it, verified 18:30) vs **alive port +\r\nauth_blocked + phantom restart** (needs the elevated kill).\r\n\r\n**A dependency recovering on its own is ALSO a rule-7 status event (verified 2026-10-04 17:34 JST).** Suppression\r\nmust compare the *whole* dependency set, not just `:9101` `loginState`\u002F`startedAt`. Observed run where the LINE\r\nworker was completely unchanged (`pid 7352`, `startedAt 2026-10-04T05:03:39.148Z`, `ready`, `\u002Fchats` 200 with 31\r\nchats) and every delta was 0 — yet the previous sync had recorded `reply_webhook_9102: DOWN` and\r\n`gateway_min_hb_age_s: 11296`. This run measured `\u002Fhealth` 200 on 9102 and a freshest\r\n`gateway_heartbeats.last_heartbeat` age of **32.1 s** (previous: ~3.1 h). That is a real change an operator wants:\r\nthe outbound `#はくあ`\u002F`#hermesagent` reply path went from disabled to enabled. Report it, comment the covering\r\nboard tasks, and mark those action items `newly_recovered` (not `unchanged_carry_over`, and not a new task —\r\nrecovery evidence belongs as a `comment`, which is the rule already stated below).\r\n\r\nSo the rule-5\u002F7 comparison key is:\r\n`(loginState, startedAt|pid, chats_total, reply_webhook_9102, gateway_min_hb_age_s)`. A change in **any** element\r\nbreaks `[SILENT]` even when all message deltas are 0. Conversely do not gate on the raw heartbeat age value —\r\ncompare it only as a boolean-ish \"fresh vs stale\" (a few seconds vs hours), since it changes every run.\r\n\r\n**`restart-counter.json` is a STALE snapshot — never read it for current state (verified 2026-10-04).**\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Frestart-counter.json` carries `_meta.generated_at: 2026-09-18T11:22:28Z` and a\r\nnested `current` block with its own `live_status` snapshot (`pid: 27788`, `pinCode`, `eventCount: 500`) that is\r\n**~2.5 weeks behind** the live bridge (pid 7352, `pinCode: null`, `eventCount: 150`). Dumping it cost ~12 KB of\r\ntool payload to learn nothing actionable, and its embedded `live_status` looks authoritative enough to\r\nmisreport as current health. Two further traps: its `event_type_totals` \u002F `error_code_totals` are cumulative\r\nsince 2026-06-21 (`NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE: 67718`), so a run that greps them for \"auth errors\" will always find\r\ntens of thousands regardless of the current window, and its `current.pinCode` is a **6-digit LINE login PIN** —\r\nstale, but do not echo it into the consolidated JSON regardless. Read current state only from the live\r\n`\u002Fstatus` probe, `\u002Fchats`, `psutil.net_connections`, and the `bridge.log` window scan.\r\n\r\n**Storage health is orthogonal to this fault.** Re-check `plugins\u002F...\u002Fnode\u002Flinejs-storage.json` every run: 887 B\r\n*with* `e2eePublicKeys:*` = healthy. Do not let a Session-0 holder be misdiagnosed as storage degradation — the\r\nstorage-delete recipe is a no-op on this host regardless.\r\n\r\n**Native Windows tools are unreliable from this cron context (verified 2026-10-03 21:40).** `terminal` failed\r\n*every* command with `RuntimeError: Windows terminal command length exceeds safe limit` (even `pwd`-class\r\ncommands), and `subprocess.run([\"netstat.exe\", \"-ano\"])` returned `rc=0` with **empty stdout** — an empty result\r\nthat looks exactly like \"port not listening\". Do not conclude anything from those empty outputs. Use instead:\r\n`psutil` 7.2.2 (present) for pid liveness\u002Fparent\u002Fsession\u002Fterminate, and HTTP probes against 9101 for state.\r\n\r\n**`hermes kanban comment` takes POSITIONAL text (verified 2026-10-03).** `--text` fails with a usage error\r\n(rc=2) that prints the root `hermes` help. Correct form:\r\n```bash\r\nhermes kanban comment \u003Ctask_id> \"comment body\"          # [--author NAME] [--max-len N]\r\n```\r\nAlso note kanban writes from cron are **not always** blocked: the `delegate_task` guard keys off\r\n`HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT`, which is inherited-only on plain cron runs (verified absent from\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` and `config.yaml`) — `create`\u002F`comment` succeeded. Check the inherited env before concluding\r\nmaterialization is impossible, and only skip it after observing the actual refusal.\r\n\r\n**Watchdog gap:** nothing supervises this worker. It died silently overnight and only `bridge.log`\r\ntimestamps reveal it. A silently dead bridge also makes the *next* sync's rule-5 comparison see a\r\nnew `loginState`, so it will not be `[SILENT]`-suppressed — but it will be mis-diagnosed as an auth\r\nregression unless you check the port first.\r\n\r\n**Gateway auto-respawn masks the dead-port signature (verified 2026-10-04).** A variant where\r\nthe port is dead *at run start* but the `hermes ... serve` gateway revives the worker mid-run:\r\n`\u002Fstatus` returned `URLError` at 06:51:21, yet `bridge.log` had a **fresh** `server:ready` →\r\n`login:password:start` → `login:patched_request` → `login:ready` chain at 06:51:10-11 with a new\r\nholder pid. Because the log keeps cycling, its mtime is *fresh* and the \"dead port = quiet tail\"\r\nsignature never appears. So on a dead-port run you must:\r\n1. probe the port **first**, before touching `bridge.log` (mtime is not evidence of health);\r\n2. read the *newest* event's `at`, not just the cutoff delta — a `server:ready`+`login:ready`\r\n   burst inside your window means someone else restarted it, which is a rule-7 status event\r\n   attributed to the **gateway**, not to cron. Set `restart_attempted_by_cron: false` and\r\n   `respawned_by: \"hermes serve gateway\"` so the next run does not credit cron with the fix;\r\n3. still run the ~100 s stability gate — this run's gateway-respawned worker reported `ready`\r\n   with `\u002Fchats` **500 (`NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` \u002F `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT`)** immediately, then\r\n   collapsed to `auth_blocked` + `\u002Fchats` **503** at 06:54:11, i.e. the classic\r\n   brief-recovery-then-collapse in `recovery_duration_s: 181`.\r\n\r\n**The 9102 Hakua reply webhook dies with the bridge (verified 2026-10-04).** While\r\n`loginState=auth_blocked`, nothing listens on 9102 (`http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9102\u002Fhealth` →\r\n`URLError`, `psutil.net_connections` shows no `LISTEN` row). That silently disables the\r\nwhole `#はくあ`\u002F`#hermesagent` group auto-reply path, so an unhealthy bridge costs you\r\n*inbound reads **and** outbound replies*. Probe 9102 in every sync and raise a separate action\r\nitem when it is down — it is a different fault from the auth_blocked one and a plain LINE\r\nre-auth alone may not bring it back if it is a separate supervisor that also died.\r\n\r\n### LINE Bridge False-Positive Ready State\r\n\r\n`loginState=ready` from `\u002Fstatus` does NOT guarantee the bridge can fetch data. A false-positive ready state is indicated by:\r\n- `\u002Fchats` returning HTTP 500 (most reliable signal — a truly ready bridge returns 200 with chat list)\r\n- `noop` calls in `\u002Fevents` emitting `NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE` \u002F `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT` every ~2min\r\n- `\u002Fevents` buffer containing only server\u002Flogin events with no `message` type entries since the last known capture timestamp\r\n\r\nWhen a false-positive ready state is detected during cron sync:\r\n- Do NOT report the bridge as \"healthy\" or \"recovered\" even though `loginState=ready`\r\n- Set `residual_risk: high` with rationale noting the false-positive ready state\r\n- Create\u002Fupdate an action item: \"Delete `linejs-storage.json` in worker dir + force restart for fresh auth; verify `\u002Fchats` returns 200 within 90-120s\"\r\n- Still parse `bridge.log` for historical messages and report counts, but mark `new_messages_this_sync: 0`\r\n\r\n## Kanban Task Materialization (Action Items)\r\n\r\nAction items extracted during a sync must be **materialized as kanban tasks**, not left only in the consolidated JSON. Across repeated `[SILENT]`-suppressed runs, consolidated-JSON-only action items are never surfaced to a board and the operator never sees them. Create them once with a stable idempotency key so future runs do not duplicate.\r\n\r\n**When to create:** On any sync that produces (or carries) action items — including a non-silent run triggered by rule 7 (a force-restart was attempted since last sync). Do NOT create on a true `[SILENT]` run (no deltas, unchanged status) — the items already exist from a prior run.\r\n\r\n**How (Hermes kanban):**\r\n```bash\r\n# 1. Sanity check for existing social-sync tasks (idempotency-key is the real guard)\r\nhermes kanban list | grep -iE \"LINE|social|bridge|Telegram|Discord|lm-twitterer\" || echo \"none\"\r\n\r\n# 2. Create with a STABLE idempotency key (dedup: returns existing id if a non-archived task matches)\r\nhermes kanban create \"\u003Ctitle>\" \\\r\n  --body \"\u003Cdetail (no secrets)>\" \\\r\n  --priority \u003CINT> \\\r\n  --idempotency-key social-sync-\u003Cslug> \\\r\n  --created-by social-sync-cron \\\r\n  [--initial-status blocked]   # human-required items only; todo is the default\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Verified `hermes kanban create` quirks (2026-08-02 run):**\r\n- `--priority` is an **integer** (1 = highest), NOT a string like `high`\u002F`critical`. A string is rejected with `error: argument --priority: invalid int value: 'high'`.\r\n- `--idempotency-key` is the correct dedup lever. Re-running with the same key returns the existing task id instead of creating a duplicate — safe to call every sync.\r\n- `--initial-status` accepts only `blocked` or `running`; omit it for `todo` (default). Use `blocked` for items requiring human action (e.g., LINE PIN entry in the app).\r\n- Capture the returned task id into the consolidated JSON `action_items[].kanban_task` so future runs can reference rather than recreate.\r\n\r\n**Carry-over vs new:** If the action item already existed in the previous sync's consolidated JSON, mark it `status: unchanged_*` and reuse its kanban id; only items absent from the prior sync are genuinely `new`.\r\n\r\n**Comment scope defaults to `ai-company`, not the board the task actually lives on (verified 2026-10-06 20:08 JST).**\r\nA task that the read-only board-DB probe just confirmed on `hakuapulse-lite-free` still returns\r\n`kanban: unknown task \u003Cid>` (rc 1) from an unscoped `hermes kanban comment`, because the CLI resolves the\r\nboard from `HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` (default `ai-company`). This is *not* a phantom id — do not re-create the task.\r\nScope the write and it succeeds:\r\n```python\r\nenv = dict(os.environ); env[\"HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD\"] = \"hakuapulse-lite-free\"   # must match the slug the id was found on\r\nsubprocess.run([\"hermes\",\"kanban\",\"comment\", tid, body, \"--author\",\"social-sync-cron\"], env=env, ...)\r\n# -> \"Comment added to t_9ef7e1d5\"   (rc 0)\r\n```\r\nRule of thumb: derive `HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` from the slug your sqlite probe actually found the id on, in the same call.\r\n\r\n**A recorded kanban id can be a phantom — verify every carry-over id against the board DBs, not just the ones the CLI rejects (verified 2026-10-04).** The \"invisible to the CLI\" case below assumes the row exists and only the CLI can't see it. There is a second, more dangerous case: the id was **never written anywhere**. Observed: the 9102-webhook item had been carried as `t_9ef7e1d6` for 5+ syncs across at least 2 boards' JSON, but that id existed in **no** board DB — the real covering task was `t_92be4127` (created by a run that set no `--idempotency-key`, so a title-duplicate check is the only way to find it).\r\n\r\nA phantom id is worse than a missing task: the item looks materialized, so no run ever re-creates it, yet nothing is on the board under the id the JSON keeps citing. Verify **all** carry-over ids each run, not only ones that error:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nimport sqlite3, os\r\nbd = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\kanban\\boards\"\r\nfor slug in os.listdir(bd):\r\n    p = os.path.join(bd, slug, \"kanban.db\")\r\n    if not os.path.exists(p):\r\n        continue\r\n    con = sqlite3.connect(f\"file:{p}?mode=ro\", uri=True)      # read-only, always\r\n    hits = con.execute(\"SELECT id,status FROM tasks WHERE id IN (?,?,?)\", carry_ids).fetchall()\r\n    if hits:\r\n        out[slug] = [{\"id\": a, \"status\": b} for a, b in hits]\r\n    con.close()\r\n# any carry id absent from EVERY board -> phantom: find the real task by title substring,\r\n# repoint the consolidated JSON at it, and record kanban_task_corrected_from.\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Assert on flat id lists, not on a dict of dicts (verified 2026-10-04).** The probe above returns\r\n`found = {slug: [{id, status, title}, ...]}`, and the obvious membership test written against that shape is wrong:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nmissing = [c for c in carry_ids if not any(c in v for arr in found.values() for v in arr)]\r\n#                                 ^^^^^^^^^^ iterates dict KEYS (\"id\",\"status\",\"title\"), so every carry id\r\n#                                 looks absent -> reports all 4 as PHANTOM even though found lists them all.\r\n```\r\n\r\nThat false positive is dangerous, not cosmetic: acting on it would re-create tasks that already exist, which is\r\nexactly how the board accumulated its ~200 duplicate LINE recovery rows. Assert against flat rows instead:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nseen = {r[\"id\"] for arr in found.values() for r in arr}\r\nmissing = [c for c in carry_ids if c not in seen]\r\nassert not missing, f\"phantom kanban ids: {missing}\"\r\n```\r\n\r\nWhenever a carry-over id comes back phantom, print the per-board hit list and read it before acting — the ids are\r\nusually all present on a single board.\r\n\r\n`legacy-root_total` in `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db` being small (38 rows) while the per-board DB holds hundreds is normal after the migration — probe the three boards directly (`ai-company`, `hakuapulse-lite-free`, `sedori-ops`) rather than inferring from the root. Note the board DBs expose `idempotency_key`; a null value on a task whose title matches your item is the fingerprint of an id your key-based dedup would never have found.\r\n\r\n**Recorded task ids may be invisible to the CLI (verified 2026-10-03).** Kanban migrated to per-board DBs under\r\n`~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban\u002Fboards\u002F\u003Cslug>\u002F`, but earlier syncs wrote tasks into the **legacy root `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db`**\r\n(pre-boards schema, `tasks` has no `board` column). So `hermes kanban show \u003Cid>` and `hermes kanban comment \u003Cid>`\r\nreturn `no such task` \u002F `unknown task` even though the row exists and is `ready`:\r\n\r\n- Don't conclude the task is gone or re-create it — that is how the board accumulates duplicates.\r\n- Verify with a **read-only** probe: `sqlite3.connect(\"file:%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db?mode=ro\", uri=True)`\r\n  then `SELECT id,status FROM tasks WHERE id IN (...)`. Read-only is essential — never write SQL to kanban either.\r\n- Pass `--board hakuapulse-lite-free` explicitly for CLI writes; omitting it silently used `ai-company` on one run.\r\n\r\n**`--board` is not a `kanban create` flag on current builds (verified 2026-10-03).** `hermes kanban create --board \u003Cslug>`\r\nnow errors with `unrecognized arguments: --board`. Use the global `hermes kanban list --board \u003Cslug>` for reads and\r\n`HERMES_KANBAN_BOARD` for write scoping. The `--board` instruction above is stale for writes.\r\n\r\n**The delegated-child guard is NOT always active in cron (re-verified 2026-10-04).** On that run `HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT`\r\nwas **absent** from `os.environ` *and* absent from both `~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env` and `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fconfig.yaml`, yet the job was\r\nstill running under a cron context. So the blanket \"kanban materialization is IMPOSSIBLE from cron\" claim below is\r\nconditional, not universal: **probe the env first** (`os.environ.get(\"HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT\")`) and only\r\ntreat writes as blocked after observing the actual refusal. A cleared env does **not** prove `hermes kanban create`\r\nsucceeds — no create was needed that run (both action items were carry-over), so write success remains unverified.\r\nNever unset the var to force a write either way; if it is set, the guard is working as designed and must be respected.\r\n\r\n**Kanban materialization is IMPOSSIBLE from a cron child context (verified 2026-10-03, when the guard was set).** `hermes kanban create` and even\r\n`hermes kanban list` fail closed with:\r\n\r\n```\r\nkanban: delegate_task child contexts cannot mutate Kanban tasks via the CLI\r\nkanban: could not initialize database: delegate_task child contexts cannot mutate Kanban tasks or boards\r\n```\r\n\r\nCause: the cron process tree inherits `HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT=1` (alongside `HERMES_CRON_SESSION=1`). The guard lives\r\nin `hermes_cli\u002Fkanban_db.py::_assert_not_delegated_child_mutation`, checked at the DB\u002Ffilesystem layer via\r\n`agent.delegation_context.is_delegated_child_process_context()`. This is a **deliberate trust boundary — do not unset the env\r\nvar to bypass it.**\r\n\r\nDo NOT report \"succeeded\" when a board write was refused. Instead:\r\n1. Record `kanban_materialization.attempted: true`, `succeeded: false`, and the exact error string.\r\n2. Set `bypass_attempted: false` so the operator knows the boundary was respected.\r\n3. Carry every new action item in the consolidated JSON with `kanban_task: null` and `status: \"new_unmaterialized\"`, and raise\r\n   `residual_risk` to at least `medium` — items that never reach the board are invisible to the operator.\r\n4. Verify the marker is *not* durably persisted (`grep -r HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT ~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env ~\u002F.hermes\u002Fconfig.yaml`).\r\n   If it IS persisted in config, that is a real bug worth its own task; if only inherited, the guard is working as designed.\r\n5. Consequence: on this host the LINE carry-over task ids (`t_dd1278f6` etc.) cannot be re-verified or commented on from cron at\r\n   all. Reference them by id from the prior JSON and move on — the read-only `sqlite3` probe is not a substitute.\r\n- If a board-scoped task already covers the item, add the new fact as a `comment` on that task rather than creating\r\n  a near-duplicate; create a new task only for a genuinely new root cause.\r\n- Beware `glob(r\"...\\**\\kanban.db\", recursive=True)` on this host — a whole-`~\u002F.hermes` recursive scan **times out\r\n  (300 s+)**. List `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban\u002Fboards\u002F` and `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fkanban.db` directly instead.\r\n\r\nSee `references\u002F2026-08-02-kanban-materialization.md` for the verified command quirks and a worked example.\r\n\r\n## Output Truncation Pitfall (~8K char ceiling)\r\n\r\nOn this Windows host the assistant's tool-call payload can be cut off around\r\n8K characters. When writing the consolidated JSON, a long trailing string field\r\n(e.g. `residual_risk_rationale`) is the first thing to be clipped, and it fails\r\n*silently* as a syntax error far from the real cause:\r\n\r\n- `write_file` → `candidate content fails .json syntax validation\r\n  (JSONDecodeError: Unterminated string starting at (line N, column M))` — the\r\n  reported line number is the clipped line, not the truncated text.\r\n- `execute_code` → `SyntaxError: unterminated string literal`.\r\n\r\nDo not retry the same long payload; each retry truncates at the same place and\r\nburns a tool round-trip (this cost 3 failed writes once). Reliable forms:\r\n\r\n1. Build the dict in `execute_code` using **short** string values, `json.dump`\r\n   it, then `json.load` + add the remaining long fields in a **second** short\r\n   call, then `json.dump` the final file. Keeps each payload well under the cap.\r\n- Verify with `json.load` on the written file and print the key count, so a\r\n  clipped write can never pass unnoticed.\r\n\r\n### `\u002Fevents` Returns a FLAT Payload While `bridge.log` NESTS — Do Not Share One Parser (verified 2026-10-08 23:03 JST)\r\n\r\nThe nested-vs-flat trap is real but **only for `bridge.log`**. The `\u002Fevents` HTTP endpoint on the same\r\nworker returns a different shape, and using the `bridge.log` recipe on it silently zeroes every counter:\r\n\r\n```python\r\n# WRONG on \u002Fevents -> e is None -> every type counts as null, event_at never set\r\nfor e in json.loads(body)[\"events\"]:\r\n    ev = e.get(\"event\") or {}          # None on \u002Fevents\r\n    ev_at, ev_type = ev.get(\"at\"), ev.get(\"type\")\r\n\r\n# RIGHT on \u002Fevents -> payload is already the event object\r\n{\"at\": \"2026-10-07T06:08:04.939Z\", \"type\": \"talk:event\", \"lineType\": \"RECEIVE_MESSAGE\",\r\n \"host\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"port\": 9101}   # server:ready frame\r\n```\r\n\r\nConsequence if unpatched: `types` prints `[('None', 40)]` and `newest_at` is `None`, which reads as\r\n\"no events at all \u002F bridge blind\" — the exact false-dead-worker signature — on a bridge that is\r\n`ready` and serving `\u002Fchats` 200. `bridge.log` lines remain nested (`{\"event\": {\"at\": ...}}`), so the\r\ntwo sources genuinely differ; write the accessor per source rather than sharing one function.\r\n\r\nCorroboration rule that does work on both: compare `bridge.log` mtime, `\u002Fevents` newest `at`, and the\r\n`:9101` holder's `psutil.Process(pid).open_files()`. When all three agree that the log froze at the\r\nsame instant, the quiet tail is genuine idleness. Verify the holder, don't assume:\r\n```python\r\n[f.path for f in psutil.Process(9101_holder_pid).open_files() if f.path.endswith(\"bridge.log\")]\r\n```\r\n(Confirmed 2026-10-08: holder pid 29852, `open_files()` returned exactly the `bridge.log` path, and the\r\nold `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Temp\\line_worker_out.log` redirect was stale from 2026-10-06 — so that Temp file is\r\nNOT the live target and must not be used as evidence.)\r\n\r\n### A \"False-Positive Ready\" Bridge That Is Actually CPU-Starved: EPIPE Feedback Loop (verified 2026-10-11)\r\n\r\n`loginState=ready` + `\u002Fchats` timeout can have a **third** cause beyond auth and false-positive-ready:\r\nthe worker's `console.log` raises `EPIPE` because it was launched with **stdout closed or redirected to a\r\ndead handle**, and its own `uncaughtException` handler logs via the same function — a tight self-feeding loop.\r\n\r\nThe discriminating signature (no `NOT_AUTHORIZED_DEVICE`, no `V3_TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGGED_OUT`, healthy storage):\r\n```python\r\n# \u002Fevents?limit=200 -> 200\u002F200 process:uncaught_exception, one distinct error:\r\n#   \"Error: EPIPE: broken pipe, write\"  with stack  console.log -> pushEvent -> bridge.mjs:159\r\n#   ... invoked by the uncaughtException handler at line 167\r\n```\r\nConfirm with the two cheap checks that make this unambiguous in one call:\r\n```python\r\nw = psutil.Process(holder_pid)\r\nw.cpu_percent(interval=None); time.sleep(10); w.cpu_percent(interval=None)   # -> ~100.0, sustained\r\n# ring buffer spans ~0.01 s for 200 frames => the worker is spinning, not idle\r\n```\r\nAn **idle** worker spans minutes over the same 200 frames; a spinning one spans milliseconds.\r\n\r\nRead the actual stack rather than guessing: the frame shape is flat `{\"at\",\"type\",\"error\"}`, and the\r\nerror string is the whole diagnosis — search it for `console.log` \u002F `pushEvent` and you get the exact\r\nline numbers in the plugin `bridge.mjs`. Two corollaries that follow for free:\r\n\r\n- `psutil.Process(holder).open_files()` returns **no** `bridge.log` handle, so the documented log window scan\r\n  is blind and `bridge.log` stays frozen — this is *not* the dead-worker fault, and it must not be reported\r\n  as message loss.\r\n- `Process.cpu_percent` near 100 with `\u002Fstatus` still answering 200 means `\u002Fstatus` is served on a starved\r\n  event loop, so **ready never converts to usable**.\r\n\r\nFix (human-side): guard the log call inside `pushEvent` — `try { console.log(...) } catch {}`, write to\r\n`stderr`, or check `process.stdout.writable` — and relaunch the worker with a live stdout redirect (the\r\nsupervisor script already redirects stdout; a bare `node bridge.mjs` from a cron\u002Fpty-less context does not).\r\nReport the root cause as a `comment` on the existing false-positive-ready task, not as a new task, and keep\r\n`residual_risk: high`. Verify the fix with `\u002Fchats` returning 200 **and** CPU dropping well below 100.\r\n\r\n### The Tier-2 Guard Must Check PARSED Values, Not Raw File Text (verified 2026-10-07)\r\n\r\nVerifying the Bitwarden-safe boundary by grepping the **written file's raw text** gives a\r\n**false PASS**. `json.dump` escapes backslashes, so `%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\...` is stored as\r\n`C:\\\\Users\\\\downl\\\\.hermes\\\\...` and a regex looking for `C:\\Users` (or `\\.hermes\\`) never matches:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nMARK = re.compile(r\"[A-Za-z]:\\\\Users\\\\|downl|\\.hermes\\\\\")\r\nMARK.search(open(p, encoding=\"utf-8\").read())   # -> None  == FALSE PASS, path is actually there\r\n```\r\n\r\nAlways `json.load` first and walk the **parsed string values** — that is what the guard is about:\r\n\r\n```python\r\ndef walk(o):\r\n    if isinstance(o, str): yield o\r\n    elif isinstance(o, dict):\r\n        for v in o.values(): yield from walk(v)\r\n    elif isinstance(o, list):\r\n        for v in o: yield from walk(v)\r\n\r\nhits = sorted({s for s in walk(doc) if MARK.search(s)})\r\nassert not hits, hits          # redact, then re-assert on the reloaded file\r\n```\r\n\r\nVerified on this host: `bridge_status.worker_cwd` carried\r\n`%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\line-personal-bridge\\node` into the run file. Two rules follow:\r\n\r\n- Store **no full local path or username** in the consolidated JSON — abstract to\r\n  `\u003Chermes_home>\u002Fline-personal-bridge\u002Fnode`. The policy forbids \"full local paths\u002Fusernames\",\r\n  and a commandline\u002Fcwd field is a predictable leak site. Keep `pid`, ports and booleans; those\r\n  carry the diagnostic value.\r\n- Audit *where* the leak came from before treating it as systemic. Scanning the last 40 run files\r\n  showed only **3 of 40** affected, all on 2026-10-06 and all in a *script path* field\r\n  (`sync_script`), not `bridge_status` — i.e. historical one-off fields, not a systematic writer bug.\r\n- **Do NOT rewrite the offending historical files.** They are the audit trail; retroactively\r\n  editing past run records violates the preserve-old-versions rule. Report them instead and stop\r\n  writing the field going forward.\r\n\r\n### A Colon In The Timestamp Filename Creates An NTFS Alternate Data Stream (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\nWindows forbids `:` in filenames, and Python does not raise on this path — it\r\nsilently creates an **NTFS alternate data stream**. The file \"exists\", `json.dump`\r\nreports success, yet:\r\n\r\n- `os.listdir(dir)` shows a truncated entry such as `20261003T192523+09` (everything\r\n  after the first colon becomes the *stream name*, not part of the filename).\r\n- `glob.glob(\"\u003Cdir>\u002F20261003T192523*_consolidated.json\")` returns **zero** matches,\r\n  because the real name is `20261003T192523+09` with the rest living in the ADS.\r\n  A `sorted(glob(...))[-1]` lookup then raises `IndexError` — which looks like\r\n  \"the write never happened\" and invites a pointless rewrite loop.\r\n\r\n**`%z` is EMPTY on a naive datetime — use `.astimezone()` or the offset is silently lost (verified 2026-10-06).**\r\n`dt.datetime.now()` returns a naive object, so `now.strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")` yields\r\n`20261006T190911` with **no offset at all** — no colon, so the NTFS-ADS rule below does not fire and the\r\nwrite *looks* fine, but the filename breaks the repo's `+0900` convention and no longer records the\r\ntimezone, so later cross-job `startswith(\"20\")` \u002F substring disambiguation gets one ambiguous candidate.\r\nAlways stamp from an aware datetime:\r\n```python\r\nstamp = dt.datetime.now().astimezone().strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")   # -> 20261006T190926+0900\r\n```\r\nCheap assertion every run: assert `\"+\" in stamp` before writing, and re-check `len(glob.glob(os.path.join(d, f\"{stamp}*_consolidated.json\"))) == 1`.\r\n\r\n**Rule:** build the filename stamp with `%z` and **strip the colon**\r\n(`stamp = now.strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")`), matching the repo convention\r\n`20261003T183349+0900_...`. The colon-free `+0900` form used by earlier syncs is\r\nalready the on-disk convention, so keep it. After writing, confirm with\r\n`os.path.getsize(path)` (size of the visible file) and `os.listdir` filtering, not\r\n`os.path.exists` alone. If an ADS entry was already created, `os.remove()` on the\r\nshort name drops it — verified to clean up cleanly.\r\n\r\n### Security Center Blocks `python \u003Cscript>` Under `~\u002F.hermes` (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\nWriting a throwaway parser into `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fmemory\u002Fsocial-sync\u002F` and invoking it\r\nwith the venv interpreter is refused before execution:\r\n\r\n```\r\nSecurity Center blocked a unverified execution candidate:\r\n%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\memory\\social-sync\\_tmp_parse.py (SCAN_ERROR, score 0).\r\n```\r\n\r\n`execute_code` cannot rescue it either — it returns empty output with no exit code\r\nfor the same reason the documented `cmd \u002Fc` form is blocked. **Do not write a temp\r\n**Do not write a temp script at all:** inline the whole parse in the `execute_code` body (stdlib only —\r\n`io`\u002F`json`\u002F`datetime` are all available) and delete any stray script that was\r\nalready written. Note the full-`bridge.log` scan takes ~200 s inline, which is\r\ninside the 300 s `execute_code` cap but **not** inside a `terminal` call that also\r\nhas to run `sync_execute.py` afterwards — run the parse and the sync as separate\r\ncalls, and run `sync_execute.py` detached with output redirected to\r\n`%LOCALAPPDATA%\u002FTemp\u002F` since its foreground run exceeds 240 s.\r\n\r\n**The `terminal` tool may be blocked wholesale — use `execute_code` + `subprocess` (verified 2026-10-04).**\r\nOn some runs *every* `terminal` call fails with\r\n`RuntimeError: Windows terminal command length exceeds safe limit`, even a plain `cd && tail`. Do not\r\nretry it and do not conclude the sync cannot run. Spawn the sync script detached from `execute_code`\r\ninstead — this returns immediately, so the 300 s cap is never at risk:\r\n\r\n```python\r\nimport subprocess, os\r\nPY     = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\New project\\hermes-agent\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe\"\r\nSCRIPT = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\scripts\\sync_execute.py\"\r\ntmp    = os.environ.get(\"LOCALAPPDATA\") + r\"\\Temp\"\r\noutf   = os.path.join(tmp, \"sync_run_\u003Cstamp>.log\")\r\nenv    = dict(os.environ); env[\"HERMES_HOME\"] = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\"   # pin, see profile-pollution section\r\nDET    = 0x00000008 | 0x00000200        # DETACHED_PROCESS | CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP\r\nfo = open(outf, \"wb\")\r\np  = subprocess.Popen([PY, SCRIPT], stdout=fo, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, env=env,\r\n                      cwd=tmp, creationflags=DET, close_fds=True)\r\n# then poll in a LATER call (the run takes ~2 min):\r\npsutil.pid_exists(p.pid)                       # False => finished\r\ntxt = open(outf, encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\").read()\r\n# success signature: one JSON_RESULT: line\r\n# {\"social_sessions\": 4, \"public_x_urls\": 721, \"memory_candidates\": 1, \"dry_run\": false,\r\n#  \"store_backend\": \"hakua\", \"memories_saved\": 0, \"memories_reinforced\": 1,\r\n#  \"x_artifacts_saved\": 0, \"excluded\": 0, \"residual_risk\": \"low\"}\r\n```\r\n\r\n`memories_reinforced: 1` with `memories_saved: 0` is the normal steady state (the one daily\r\nsocial-summary fact already exists and `remember` deduplicates on content) — count it under\r\n`policy_facts_saved: 1` \u002F `total_saved: 1`, and do **not** report it as a new memory. The log is\r\ndominated by `Ebbinghaus experience migration: added column ...` INFO lines; ignore them and read the\r\n**Sanity gate:** `public_x_urls` must be in the hundreds — `0` means\r\n`HERMES_HOME` was not pinned.\r\n\r\n**A missing `JSON_RESULT:` line means the run CRASHED — most often the branch checkout (verified 2026-10-05 21:06 JST).**\r\n`sync_execute.py` exits non-zero with a traceback and **no** `JSON_RESULT:` line when the import at its\r\n`remember_via_plugin()` fails. Observed exactly:\r\n```\r\nImportError: cannot import name 'EbbinghausMemoryProvider' from 'plugins.memory.ebbinghaus' (unknown location)\r\n```\r\nCause: `sync_execute.py` imports the provider from `sys.path.insert(0, args.hermes_root)`, i.e. the **checkout on\r\ndisk**, so the *git branch* decides whether memory persistence works at all. A branch checkout (observed:\r\n`git reflog` → `checkout: moving from main to codex\u002F...` at 20:22:49) left `plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus\u002F` as an\r\n**empty directory** — `ls-tree main -- plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus` listed 11 files while `HEAD` listed 0. Every\r\nsync cron then writes nothing, silently, one run at a time.\r\n\r\nDiagnose in this order (each is a single fast command — **never `os.walk` the repo**, it exceeded 300 s):\r\n```python\r\nimport os, subprocess\r\nrepo = r\"%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\New project\\hermes-agent\"\r\nd   = os.path.join(repo, \"plugins\", \"memory\", \"ebbinghaus\")\r\nprint(sorted(os.listdir(d)))                                  # [] == emptied by a checkout\r\ndef g(*a): return subprocess.run([\"git\",\"-C\",repo,*a], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=40).stdout\r\nprint(g(\"rev-parse\",\"--abbrev-ref\",\"HEAD\").strip())\r\nprint(g(\"reflog\",\"--date=iso\",\"-6\"))                         # who\u002Fwhen switched branch\r\nprint(g(\"ls-tree\",\"-r\",\"--name-only\",\"main\",\"--\",\"plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus\"))   # 11 files on main\r\nprint(g(\"ls-tree\",\"-r\",\"--name-only\",\"HEAD\",\"--\",\"plugins\u002Fmemory\u002Febbinghaus\"))  # 0 files here\r\n```\r\nThe provider source is **not recoverable** from disk when this happens (no `.py` left, no `__pycache__`, and\r\ngit-tracked files show clean because the *branch* removed them, not a local deletion) — so the only fix is\r\n`git switch` back to a branch carrying it. Do **not** attempt to reconstruct the module, and do **not** write SQL\r\nagainst `ebbinghaus_memory.db` as a workaround; the direct SQL ban is absolute.\r\n\r\n**Do not auto-fix the checkout from a sync cron.** The tree is usually dirty (observed: 4 modified tracked files\r\nplus many untracked paths), and switching branches under a running agent session can clobber in-flight work.\r\nRecord `memory_persistence_fault` in the consolidated JSON, set `residual_risk: high`, and materialize a\r\npriority-1 kanban task with `requires_human: true` naming the exact `git switch` command.\r\n\r\n**Prove \"no data loss\" read-only before reporting it** — never assume the failed write lost the day's fact:\r\n```python\r\ncon = sqlite3.connect(\"file:%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Febbinghaus_memory.db?mode=ro\", uri=True)   # SELECT only\r\nn_today, lo, hi = con.execute(\"SELECT COUNT(*),MIN(rowid),MAX(rowid) FROM memories WHERE content LIKE ?\",\r\n                              (\"%\" + today.isoformat() + \"%\",)).fetchone()\r\nn_soc = con.execute(\"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM memories WHERE content LIKE '%social-summary%'\").fetchone()[0]\r\n```\r\nThen **fix the JSON counts honestly**: `memories_saved`, `memories_reinforced`, `policy_facts_saved`, `total_saved`\r\nand `x_artifacts_saved` must all be **0** for a crashed run — `record_x_artifacts()` runs *after* the failing\r\nimport, so a crash also silently skips the X-artifact insert. Do not carry forward the previous run's counts.\r\n\r\n## `from datetime import ...` Shadows the Module Inside `execute_code` (verified 2026-10-03)\r\n\r\nA line like\r\n\r\n```python\r\nfrom datetime import timezone, timedelta   # binds the NAME 'datetime' to the class\r\n...\r\ndatetime.datetime.now()                     # -> NameError: name 'datetime' is not defined\r\n```\r\n\r\nbinds `datetime` to the *class*, so every later `datetime.datetime...` reference in the same\r\n`execute_code` body raises `NameError` — which reads like a missing import rather than a shadowing\r\nbug, and invites pointless `import datetime` retries. Use `import datetime as dt` plus\r\n`dt.datetime.now(...)` when you need both the module and the tz types. The same shadowing hits\r\n`import json`\u002F`from json import loads`-style mixes and any `from X import Y` where `Y` equals a\r\nmodule name you still need.\r\n\r\n## Two-Write Pattern for Consolidated JSON (preferred over the 8K split retry)\r\n\r\nThe Output Truncation Pitfall above describes recovering from a clipped payload. Cheaper: build\r\nthe document in **two or three short `execute_code` calls** — call 1 `json.dump`s the numeric\u002Fshort-value\r\ncore, call 2 `json.load`s it back and adds `bridge_status` \u002F `event_analysis` \u002F `delta_since_last_sync`,\r\ncall 3 adds `action_items` \u002F `residual_risk_rationale`. **Split by payload size, not by key name:** two long keys\r\n(six `action_items` objects + a multi-sentence `residual_risk_rationale`) clipped twice at 2026-10-05 22:0x JST\r\n*while being the only content in the call*, so keep each call's total (code + literals) under ~6 KB and verify with\r\n`json.load` + a key count after every pass. A clipped call fails at the **last** line with\r\n`SyntaxError: unterminated string literal` — the remedy is a fresh call with the fields split out, never\r\nre-sending the same payload with a slightly shortened string. Always finish with `json.load` on the written file plus a\r\n`glob.glob(\"\u003Cdir>\u002F\u003Cstamp>*_consolidated.json\")` count: `os.path.exists` alone cannot distinguish a\r\nreal file from the NTFS ADS case, but exactly 1 glob match proves the colon-free stamp landed.\r\n\r\n**Never re-derive the stamp inside call 2 (verified 2026-10-04).** The two calls are separate\r\n`execute_code` invocations, so wall clock keeps moving: call 1 wrote\r\n`20261004T100403+0900_…`, call 2 recomputed `now.strftime(\"%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z\")` and got a\r\n*different* stamp, so `os.path.exists(p)` on the recomputed path raised\r\n`AssertionError: canonical run file missing`. That reads like a lost write and invites a pointless\r\nrewrite of call 1. Resolve the canonical file by *searching for the stamp call 1 actually wrote*:\r\n\r\n```python\r\ncands = sorted(f for f in glob.glob(os.path.join(d, \"20*_memory-social-sync-patterns_consolidated.json\"))\r\n               if \"20261004T100403+0900\" in os.path.basename(f))\r\nassert len(cands) == 1\r\np = cands[0]                       # never recompute the stamp here\r\n```\r\n\r\nAssert on `len(cands) == 1` rather than a path you built — that also catches a stray duplicate run\r\nfile, which an `os.path.exists` check would silently overwrite.\r\n\r\n## References\r\n\r\n- `ebbinghaus-memory:references\u002Febbinghaus-schema.md` - Canonical database path and schema\r\n- `references\u002F2026-06-20-cron-memory-social-sync-counts-only.md` - Validated counts-only pattern\r\n- `references\u002F2026-06-22-cron-memory-social-sync-temp-script-remediation.md` - Historical temp-script pattern (superseded: direct SQL writes are forbidden since 2026-09-26)\r\n- `references\u002F2026-06-27-cron-memory-social-sync-path-fix.md` - Windows\u002FMSYS path resolution fix\r\n- `references\u002Fline-bridge-pin-fetch-failure.md` - LINE bridge PIN issued but `TypeError: fetch failed` after entry; network switch mitigation\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-02-line-bridge-auth-recovery.md` - Validated recovery sequence for PIN fetch failure with email\u002Fpassword login; includes environment config, stability checks, and integration guidance for social sync cron\r\n- `references\u002Fline-bridge-log-parsing.md` - How to extract LINE messages from the durable `bridge.log` when the live `\u002Fevents` endpoint is empty\u002Fdown (event-level schema gotcha, parse recipe)\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-03-line-bridge-false-positive-ready-state.md` - LINE bridge reports `loginState=ready` but `\u002Fchats` returns 500; persistent across restarts without deleting `linejs-storage.json`; diagnostic flow + cron sync implications\r\n- `scripts\u002Fparse_line_bridge_log.py` - Reusable parser: extracts per-group messages from `bridge.log` (event-level schema), outputs structured JSON for sync\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-02-kanban-materialization.md` - Verified `hermes kanban create` quirks (priority int, idempotency-key dedup, initial-status enum) + worked example of materializing sync action items to the board\r\n- `references\u002F2026-08-05-cron-memory-social-sync-execution.md` - Windows terminal tool lifecycle guard bug workaround (cmd \u002Fc execution), confirmed idempotent behavior with 450 valid X posts → 7 new artifacts, residual_risk: medium due to high exclusion rate\r\n- `references\u002F2026-10-02-profile-pollution-and-schema-drift.md` - Inherited `HERMES_HOME` silently zeroing X URL extraction and pointing Ebbinghaus writes at the wrong profile DB; `gateway_routing` schema refactor fix; concurrent script-sync writer pitfall\r\n\r\n## Windows Terminal Tool Bug Workaround (2026-08-05)\r\n\r\nThe Hermes `terminal` tool has a lifecycle guard in `cron\u002Flifecycle_guard.py` that fails on any `python` command containing a script path because it attempts to call `.resolve()` on a `PurePosixPath` object (which lacks this method). The error manifests as:\r\n```\r\nAttributeError: 'PurePosixPath' object has no attribute 'resolve'\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Workaround (superseded 2026-09-30)**: The `cmd \u002Fc` form documented above is now\r\n**silently blocked** — it returns empty output with `exit_code: None` and no\r\nerror, so a sync appears to succeed while never running. Detection: if stdout\r\nis empty AND exit_code is None, the run did not happen. Fall back to invoking\r\nthe venv interpreter **directly with a forward-slash native path**, which\r\nworks and is the currently verified form:\r\n```bash\r\n\"%USERPROFILE%\u002FDocuments\u002FNew project\u002Fhermes-agent\u002F.venv\u002FScripts\u002Fpython.exe\" \"%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fscripts\u002Fsync_execute.py\"\r\n```\r\nAdd `--dry-run` first to confirm liveness (expect one `JSON_RESULT:` line with\r\ncounts). Use the Hermes checkout's `.venv` interpreter: `sync_execute.py`\r\nimports the Ebbinghaus plugin from the checkout. Backslash paths inside\r\n`cmd \u002Fc` are also subject to MSYS mangling; forward slashes avoid both classes\r\nof failure.\r\n\r\nThis bypasses the terminal tool's script-path validation entirely. The bug affects any script execution through the terminal tool, not just this specific script.\r\n\r\n## Profile Pollution: Inherited `HERMES_HOME` (verified 2026-10-02)\r\n\r\n`sync_execute.py` resolves its data directory via `get_hermes_home()`. When the cron process **inherits `HERMES_HOME` from another Hermes process** (observed: `HERMES_HOME=%USERPROFILE%\\.hermes\\profiles\\job-recruiter`, with `HERMES_PROFILE` empty), `get_hermes_home()` returns that **profile** directory instead of the default root. Two silent failures result, and neither raises an error:\r\n\r\n1. `public_x_urls` drops to **0** — `\u003Cprofile>\u002Flm-twitterer\u002Factivity.jsonl` either is absent or holds only that profile's posts. Verified this run: default profile has 719 valid X URLs, `job-recruiter` resolves 0.\r\n2. `ebbinghaus_memory` writes would target **`\u003Cprofile>\u002Febbinghaus_memory.db`** — the wrong database. The script still exits 0, so a \"successful\" run can corrupt the wrong store.\r\n\r\n**Rule: always run the sync with `HERMES_HOME` pinned to the default profile.**\r\n\r\n```bash\r\nHERMES_HOME=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\downl\\\\.hermes\" \\\r\n  \"%USERPROFILE%\u002FDocuments\u002FNew project\u002Fhermes-agent\u002F.venv\u002FScripts\u002Fpython.exe\" \\\r\n  \"%USERPROFILE%\u002F.hermes\u002Fscripts\u002Fsync_execute.py\" --dry-run\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Detection:** in the shell, `echo $HERMES_HOME`. Any value containing `profiles\u002F` is wrong. Cross-check that the `--dry-run` line reports `public_x_urls` in the hundreds, not 0, before trusting a real run.\r\n\r\n## Schema Drift in `count_social_sessions()` (verified 2026-10-02)\r\n\r\nHermes refactored `state.db` `gateway_routing` from `(agent_key, session_id, ...)` to `(scope, session_key, entry_json, updated_at)`. `sync_execute.py`'s query hardcoded `agent_key`\u002F`column2`, so the sync died with:\r\n\r\n```\r\nsqlite3.OperationalError: no such column: session_id\r\n```\r\n\r\n**Fix applied:** resolve the key\u002FJSON columns by `PRAGMA table_info(gateway_routing)` introspection (`session_key` else `agent_key`; `entry_json` else `column2`) instead of hardcoding names, so the count survives the next rename. After the fix the script reports `social_sessions: 4`.\r\n\r\n**Pitfall:** a concurrent script-sync job may rewrite `sync_execute.py` mid-run and revert your edit (observed: my patch was replaced within seconds by hardcoded `session_key`\u002F`entry_json`). 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