cargo-supply-chain-audit

cargo-supply-chain-audit

Use this skill when reviewing a Rust / Cargo project or a specific crates.io crate for supply-chain exposure: compromised crate maintainer risk, malicious build.rs or proc-macro execution at build time, dependency or checksum tampering, or a yank/release anomaly. This is the Cargo/Rust counterpart to npm-supply-chain-audit — reach for it whenever the artifact under review is a crate, not an npm package.

Triggers

• "cargo crate supply chain audit"
• "crates.io supply chain"
• "rust dependency audit"
• "malicious crate" / "compromised crate"
• "cargo audit" / "cargo deny" / "cargo vet"
• "build.rs review" / "proc-macro supply chain"
• "Cargo.lock checksum verification"
• ".crate tarball provenance"

Audit sequence

1. Dependency + checksum verification (against Cargo.lock)

Cargo.lock pins each dependency to a version and a registry checksum. Verify the lockfile is present, committed, and internally consistent:

# Lockfile must exist and be committed (binaries always; libraries when pinning matters)
test -f Cargo.lock || echo "MISSING Cargo.lock — no checksum pinning"

# Re-verify every dependency against its recorded checksum without building
cargo verify-project
cargo fetch --locked            # fails if Cargo.lock would change (drift / tampering)

# Inspect the pinned source + checksum for a specific crate
grep -A3 'name = "<crate>"' Cargo.lock

Escalate:

• Cargo.lock missing or not committed for a binary/deployable.
• cargo fetch --locked reports the lockfile would change (unpinned drift).
• A dependency source is a git URL or path override instead of registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index — git/path deps bypass the registry checksum + yank machinery (the Cargo analog of npm's git+/file: exotic sources).

2. .crate tarball hash + provenance (.cargo_vcs_info.json)

A published .crate is a gzipped tarball. Verify its hash matches what Cargo.lock / crates.io records, and inspect the embedded VCS provenance:

# Download the exact published artifact
curl -sSL -o <crate>-<ver>.crate \
  "https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/<crate>/<ver>/download"

# SHA-256 must match the checksum recorded in Cargo.lock for this version
sha256sum <crate>-<ver>.crate

# Inspect commit provenance baked in at publish time
tar -xzf <crate>-<ver>.crate
cat <crate>-<ver>/.cargo_vcs_info.json    # { "git": { "sha1": "<commit>" }, "path_in_vcs": "" }

Escalate:

• .crate SHA-256 does not match the Cargo.lock checksum (artifact tampering).
• Missing or mismatched .cargo_vcs_info.json — the published source can't be tied back to a repository commit.
• The recorded sha1 does not exist in the upstream repo, or the repo tag for this version was force-moved.

3. Previous-vs-patched source diff

For a version bump (especially a patch release of a transitive dependency), diff the actual published sources — not just the repo — because crates.io publishes a snapshot that can differ from the tagged commit:

# Extract both versions' .crate sources and diff
tar -xzf <crate>-<old>.crate && tar -xzf <crate>-<new>.crate
diff -ru <crate>-<old>/ <crate>-<new>/ | less

# Focus on the high-risk surfaces first
diff -ru <crate>-<old>/build.rs <crate>-<new>/build.rs 2>/dev/null
diff -ru <crate>-<old>/Cargo.toml <crate>-<new>/Cargo.toml

Escalate any diff that adds: network calls, process spawns, filesystem writes outside OUT_DIR, new build.rs, new proc-macro crates, base64/hex blobs, or obfuscated string assembly.

4. Cargo.toml dependency + build-script review

build.rs and procedural macros execute arbitrary code at build time — the Cargo analog of npm lifecycle scripts and the primary install-time execution vector:

# Does the crate run a build script or ship proc-macros?
grep -nE '^build\s*=|\[build-dependencies\]|proc-macro\s*=\s*true' Cargo.toml
find . -name build.rs -not -path './target/*'

# Read every build.rs in the dependency tree, not just the top crate
cargo tree -e build,normal --prefix depth | grep -i build

Escalate:

• A build.rs that does anything beyond codegen / linking into OUT_DIR (network, exec, writing outside OUT_DIR, reading secrets/env beyond documented CARGO_*/OUT_DIR).
• New [build-dependencies] or proc-macro = true crates introduced in a patch release.
• Feature unification pulling an unexpected crate into the build.

5. Trust-policy tooling: cargo audit / cargo deny / cargo vet

# Known-vulnerability scan against RustSec advisory DB
cargo audit                      # fails on advisories; `cargo audit fix` for patches

# Policy gate: licenses, bans, advisories, exotic sources, duplicate versions
cargo deny check                 # bans, advisories, licenses, sources

# Supply-chain trust: require human/org review of each crate+version
cargo vet                        # fails on un-vetted crates; `cargo vet certify` to record review

Escalate:

• cargo audit advisories (especially code-execution/memory-corruption).
• cargo deny sources violations (non-crates.io registries, unexpected git).
• cargo vet reports a new un-vetted crate/version in a project that maintains a vet trust policy (supply-chain/config.toml).

6. Publisher / trusted-publishing / yank / release-anomaly checks

# Crate + version metadata: owners, publish time, yank state
curl -sSL "https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/<crate>" | jq '{owners: .crate.id, versions: [.versions[] | {num, yanked, created_at, published_by: .published_by.login}]}'

Escalate:

• Version published by an account that is not an established owner (compromised-maintainer signal — the crates.io analog of npm trusted publishing review).
• A previously-yanked version un-yanked, or a rapid patch following a yank.
• Publish timestamp anomaly (off-hours burst, version published far ahead of the corresponding repo tag).

Incident-response trigger

If any escalation in steps 2–6 confirms tampering or malicious build-time code, treat it as an active supply-chain incident: pin/yank-avoid the affected version in Cargo.lock, run cargo deny/cargo audit across the whole workspace, and route to the forensics framework for evidence handling. See supply-chain-trust for the cross-ecosystem hardening model.

Output format

Produce a findings report with: crate + version under review, each step's verdict (pass / escalate), the exact command output backing each verdict, and a go / no-go recommendation for adopting the version.

References

• npm-supply-chain-audit — the npm counterpart (same threat model, JS ecosystem)
• supply-chain-trust — cross-ecosystem reproducible-build + dependency-pinning model
• dependency-source-policy rule — exotic-source prohibition (git/path bypass registry checksums)
• RustSec advisory DB: https://rustsec.org/; cargo vet: https://mozilla.github.io/cargo-vet/