AGENT SKILL

adversarial-review

Adversarial second-pass review that tries to break code, designs, plans, or ADRs. Use when stakes are high and a normal review already ran.

License 许可
MIT
最近更新
2026-11-15
Stars
★ 60
Forks
6

01 前言 Front Matter

args
[target] [focus directive]
name
adversarial-review
model
opus
created
1782000000000
modified
1793059200000
reviewed
1788307200000
description
Adversarial second-pass review that tries to break code, designs, plans, or ADRs. Use when stakes are high and a normal review already ran.
allowed-tools
Agent, Read, Glob, Grep, Bash(git diff *), Bash(git log *), Bash(gh pr view *), TodoWrite
argument-hint
path|PR|file|plan description; optional 'focus on X'
compatibility
claude-code

02 资源文件 6

03 SKILL.md 正文

Adversarial Review

A normal review asks "is this right?" and confirms intent. Adversarial review asks "how could this be wrong?" and hunts for the fault the first pass rationalised away. It is a second pass for residual risk on high-stakes work — not a replacement for the first pass, and not for low-stakes or reversible changes where it only manufactures busywork. Red-teaming is the same posture aimed at a proposal rather than a finished change: actively try to break the proposed approach before you commit to an architecture or design.

This is a thin posture, not a new checklist. It layers four moves — isolation, inverted objective, a triage gate, and a bounded loop — on top of the domain checklists that already live in code-review, security-audit, verify-before-plan, and cold-read-gate. It dispatches an isolated reviewer with the matching lens and then triages what comes back, because an agent told to find faults will invent them.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when... Use something else instead when...
Stakes are high and a normal review already passed, but residual risk remains First-pass review of a diff/PR → code-quality-plugin:code-review
Red-teaming an architecture decision, ADR, or migration plan before commit Verifying plan facts (counts, paths, build state) → agent-patterns-plugin:verify-before-plan
Stress-testing a design's failure modes and invariants Pure security audit → agents-plugin security-audit / /security-review
Probing whether outward text survives a reader → wrap cold-read-gate Legibility of outward text on its own → agent-patterns-plugin:cold-read-gate
The change is hard to reverse and a missed fault is expensive The change is low-stakes, reversible, or throwaway — skip; it wastes tokens

The Four Moves

Move What it means Borrowed from
Isolation The reviewer gets the artifact with no author context — bias can't leak in cold-read-gate
Inverted objective Brief says "enumerate failure modes," never "confirm it works" this skill
Triage gate Separate genuine faults from manufactured objections before acting cold-read-gate Step 3
Bounded loop One revise round; a third means a structural problem the gate can't fix cold-read-gate Step 4

Model choice is the inverse of cold-read-gate. That skill uses haiku on purpose — the weak reader is the measurement instrument for legibility. Adversarial review wants opus: finding subtle faults is a reasoning task, not a low-context-reader simulation.

Parameters

Parse $ARGUMENTS:

  • Target (first positional) — what to attack: a path, a PR ref (#123 or URL), a file, or a free-text description of a plan/decision. If absent, default to the current diff (git diff + staged) and say so.
  • Focus directive (optional, free text after the target, e.g. focus on the failure path, ignore style) — biases the lens. It steers, never overrides: it must not cancel a live user boundary stated earlier in the session (the auto-mode.md conversation-boundary hazard).

Execution

Execute this adversarial review:

Step 1: Precondition gate

Confirm both hold before spending tokens:

  1. Stakes are high — the change is hard to reverse, or a missed fault is expensive. If not, stop and recommend a normal review instead.
  2. A first pass exists — a normal review/lint/test pass already ran. If not, run that first (code-review) — adversarial review is a second pass, and leading with it skips cheap, high-yield findings.

If either fails, say so and redirect rather than proceeding.

Step 2: Name the target and pick the lens

State in one line what is under review, then select the lens. The lens supplies the domain attack vocabulary — delegate to the owning skill's checklist rather than restating it:

Target type Lens / attack vocabulary Delegate the checklist to
Code, diff, PR Logic errors, edge cases, race conditions, error-swallowing code-quality-plugin:code-review, code-review-checklist
Security surface Injection, authz gaps, secret exposure, trust boundaries agents-plugin security-audit, /security-review
Architecture / ADR Coupling, failure domains, blast radius, reversibility blueprint adr-validate, adr-relationships
Plan / wave premise Premise truth, stale facts, name≠behaviour agent-patterns-plugin:verify-before-plan
Outward text / docs Legibility under zero context agent-patterns-plugin:cold-read-gate
Research claims Unverified or single-sourced claims .claude/skills/deep-research

Step 3: Dispatch the isolated reviewer

One Agent per lens on model: opus — adversarial review is judgement-tier work (.claude/rules/agent-development.md § "Model Selection for Agents"), so not a place for sonnet or haiku — and model: fable is sanctioned too: it is exactly the hardest delegated reasoning, so the reviewer must not be weaker than the author it is attacking. Dispatch lenses in parallel only when there are several and the session is not on a 1M-context model (every Fable 5.1 session, or Opus with the [1m] suffix) — the parallel-subagent rate-limit caveat in skill-fork-context.md. Template:

subagent_type: general-purpose
model: opus   # judgement tier; fable also sanctioned — see agent-development.md
prompt: |
  You are an adversarial reviewer. Your ONLY objective is to find ways this
  is WRONG, fragile, or unsafe — do not confirm that it works, do not
  praise it. Assume a fault exists and locate it.

  Read ONLY the target (no scope beyond it):
  <target path / diff / pasted plan>

  Attack along this lens: <lens from Step 2, with its checklist>.
  <focus directive, if any>

  Produce:
  1. FAULTS — each as: SEVERITY=critical|high|medium  EVIDENCE=<file:line or
     quoted claim>  FAILURE=<the concrete way it breaks>.
  2. ASSUMPTIONS-ATTACKED — load-bearing assumptions you tried to falsify,
     and whether each held.
  3. VERDICT: exactly one of `sound` | `flawed`.
  Cite evidence for every fault. Your final message is the deliverable.

Step 4: Triage — genuine fault vs manufactured objection

The reviewer was told to find faults, so some "faults" are noise. Triage before acting (this is the load-bearing step — skipping it is how adversarial review sends you down the wrong path):

Genuine fault — act on it Manufactured objection — drop it
A concrete input/state that breaks the code, with evidence A defense against an input the contract makes impossible
A failure mode with real blast radius A hypothetical with no realistic trigger
A violated invariant or unhandled error path Style/preference dressed up as a fault
A premise that is actually false Re-litigating a trade-off already decided with rationale
A missing edge case the spec implies Scope the change didn't touch and isn't responsible for

Step 5: Report and bound the loop

Emit a prioritised report: target, verdict, surviving genuine faults (severity-ordered, with evidence and a suggested fix), and explicitly note the objections you dropped in triage and why. Apply or hand off the genuine fixes. Re-dispatch a fresh reviewer only if the verdict was flawed; do not loop more than twice — a third round means a structural problem the review can't resolve.

Workflow harness (template)

workflows/find-verify.workflow.js (an existing change) and workflows/design-review.workflow.js (a spec drafted from recon) ship beside this skill. Each is a TEMPLATE to adapt, not a script to run verbatim. Read it, then rewrite it for the work in front of you. Step 1's gate stays in prose here; no gate agent goes inside a harness.

Adapt freely: lens prompts and their skills, context, decided, measured, verifyCap (≤ 6), controlSample (≤ 2), the verifier run hint and isolation, the spec sections. A find-verify lens may be an external model (finder: { pal: '<model>' }).

Agent budget: 3 + 1 x <verifiers or architect passes> — the counted 3 are the lens agents (lenses.slice(0, 3) in both files); find-verify adds one verifier per ranked finding up to verifyCap plus the control sample (≤ 11 in all), design-review adds the drafter and the reviser (5).

Preserve across any adaptation: a caller-chosen lens list of 2–3, never truncated; the Rank barrier and refute-by-default verdict; nothing dropped past the cap, behind a dead verifier, or folded into a duplicate; a resolution row per design issue; read-only agents; a status that is never clean over a coverage gap. The full list is in REFERENCE.md.

Never Workflow({resumeFromRunId}) to retry a few failed worktree agents — a resume re-runs agents that already succeeded and opens duplicate PRs (#1868). Re-dispatch the failed units fresh and sequentially after checking gh pr list --head <branch> --state all --json number,state.

Push, PR creation, and GitHub mutations happen only in the single sequential finalise stage, never inside a fanned-out agent. These templates have no such stage.

Skip the harness when: there is one lens on one target — dispatch one reviewer (Step 3) and triage inline. The Execution steps remain the authoritative description of what each stage must produce; the harness only fixes how the work is split.

Anti-patterns

Mistake Correct approach
Running it as a first pass It's a second pass — a normal review runs first (Step 1)
Using it on low-stakes / reversible work Skip it; the precondition gate exists to say no
Acting on every objection the reviewer raises Triage first (Step 4); the inverted objective guarantees noise
Using a weak model "to be tougher" Opus — subtle faults are a reasoning task (inverse of cold-read-gate)
Restating each lens's checklist inline Delegate to the owning skill; this is a posture, not a checklist
Looping until the reviewer goes silent One revise round; persistent faults = structural problem

Related

  • REFERENCE.md — audit sweeps: find, verify adversarially, then resolve settled facts before editing; apply an undecided finding only where the facts make it policy-neutral, never "TBD" or a plausible owner
  • cold-read-gate — the isolation + triage + bounded-loop pattern this skill generalises (legibility lens; uses haiku)
  • verify-before-plan — adversarial review of premises; the plan/wave lens delegates here
  • execution-grounded-review — the sibling verifier for running behaviour against acceptance criteria (this skill attacks a design; that one grounds each criterion in execution evidence)
  • code-quality-plugin:code-review — the first-pass review this layers on top of
  • agents-plugin security-audit / /security-review — the security lens
  • .claude/rules/skill-fork-context.md — the [1m] parallel-dispatch caveat
  • .claude/rules/loop-integrity.md — looping skills delegate their stop-condition judgement to an isolated reviewer like this one (Pillar 1)

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