implementing-siem-correlation-rules-for-apt
Write multi-event correlation rules in Splunk SPL and Sigma format that detect APT lateral movement by chaining Windows authentication events (4624, 4648), process execution (4688, Sysmon Event 1), and network connections (Sysmon Event 3) across hosts within sliding time windows. Use when building SIEM correlation searches to surface multi-stage attack sequences that single-event detections miss, such as pass-the-hash or lateral movement chains.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- implementing-siem-correlation-rules-for-apt
- tags
- [ "siem", "correlation-rules", "apt-detection", "lateral-movement", "windows-event-logs", "security-operations" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "DE.CM-01", "RS.MA-01", "GV.OV-01", "DE.AE-02" ]
- subdomain
- security-operations
- description
- Write multi-event correlation rules in Splunk SPL and Sigma format that detect APT lateral movement by chaining Windows authentication events (4624, 4648), process execution (4688, Sysmon Event 1), and network connections (Sysmon Event 3) across hosts within sliding time windows. Use when building SIEM correlation searches to surface multi-stage attack sequences that single-event detections miss, such as pass-the-hash or lateral movement chains.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1078", "T1190", "T1059", "T1021", "T1550" ]
02 资源文件 7
- 参考文档agents/openai.yaml254 B
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 许可证LICENSE.txt10.5 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md1.7 KB
- 参考文档references/prompt-template.md12.3 KB
- 参考文档references/security-controls-and-assets.md1.6 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py10.4 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Implementing SIEM Correlation Rules for APT
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing siem correlation rules for apt capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- Familiarity with security operations concepts and tools
- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
Instructions
- Install dependencies:
pip install requests pyyaml sigma-cli - Connect to the Splunk REST API and define correlation searches that chain multiple event types across hosts.
- Build Sigma rules in YAML that express multi-step detection logic for lateral movement patterns:
- RDP logon (4624 LogonType=10) followed by service installation (7045) on same target within 15 minutes
- Pass-the-Hash: NTLM logon (4624 LogonType=3) followed by process creation (4688) of admin tools
- PsExec-style: Named pipe creation (Sysmon 17/18) correlated with remote service creation (7045)
- Convert Sigma rules to Splunk SPL using
sigma-cli convert. - Deploy correlation searches to Splunk ES via the REST API.
- Run the agent to generate and install correlation rules, then audit existing rules for coverage gaps.
python scripts/agent.py --splunk-url https://localhost:8089 --username admin --password changeme --output correlation_report.json
Examples
Detect RDP Lateral Movement Chain
index=wineventlog (EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10) OR (EventCode=7045)
| transaction Computer maxspan=15m startswith=(EventCode=4624) endswith=(EventCode=7045)
| where eventcount >= 2
| table _time Computer Account_Name ServiceName
Sigma Rule for PsExec Lateral Movement
title: PsExec Lateral Movement Detection
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
pipe_created:
EventID: 17
PipeName|startswith: '\PSEXESVC'
service_installed:
EventID: 7045
ServiceFileName|contains: 'PSEXESVC'
timeframe: 5m
condition: pipe_created | near service_installed
level: high
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