[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEVSZ47C0RAPP79F5XDFNQ":3,"skill-same:01M6AEVSZ47C0RAPP79F5XDFNQ":100},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":36,"linkOnly":37,"markdownContent":38,"markdownBody":39,"frontMatter":40,"refName":55,"commitSha":56,"skillDirectory":57,"forksCount":58,"repositoryHtmlUrl":59,"repositoryHomepageUrl":60,"ownerHtmlUrl":61,"ownerBlogUrl":62,"ownerDescription":63,"updatedAt":64,"install":65,"resources":78},"01M6AEVSZ47C0RAPP79F5XDFNQ","hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi",null,"Detects WMI-based lateral movement (e.g. wmic process call create, Win32_Process.Create()) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe spawning suspicious child processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe, plus WMI-Activity\u002FOperational events 5857\u002F5860\u002F5861 for subscription-based persistence. Use when hunting for remote code execution via WMI or investigating lateral movement across Windows hosts.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35925,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35],"hunting for lateral movement via wmi","wmi","threat-hunting","process-creation","execution","lateral-movement","sysmon","powershell","analyzing","suspicious","mitre-attack","persistence","win32","code","create","windows","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi\ndescription: Detects WMI-based lateral movement (e.g. wmic process call create,\n  Win32_Process.Create()) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 for\n  WmiPrvSE.exe spawning suspicious child processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe, plus\n  WMI-Activity\u002FOperational events 5857\u002F5860\u002F5861 for subscription-based persistence. Use\n  when hunting for remote code execution via WMI or investigating lateral movement across\n  Windows hosts.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- lateral-movement\n- wmi\n- sysmon\n- mitre-attack\n- process-creation\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1021\n---\n# Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI\n\n## Overview\n\nWindows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity\u002FOperational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line)\n- Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured\n- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries\n- Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior\n\n## Steps\n\n### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events\nExtract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files.\n\n### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes\nFlag processes where ParentImage\u002FParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution.\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns\nIdentify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe \u002Fq \u002Fc, output redirection to admin$ share).\n\n### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions\nParse WMI-Activity\u002FOperational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence.\n\n## Expected Output\n\nJSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.\n","# Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI\n\n## Overview\n\nWindows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity\u002FOperational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line)\n- Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured\n- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries\n- Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior\n\n## Steps\n\n### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events\nExtract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files.\n\n### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes\nFlag processes where ParentImage\u002FParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution.\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns\nIdentify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe \u002Fq \u002Fc, output redirection to admin$ share).\n\n### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions\nParse WMI-Activity\u002FOperational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence.\n\n## Expected Output\n\nJSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.\n",{"name":5,"tags":41,"author":42,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":43,"nist_csf":44,"subdomain":21,"description":7,"mitre_attack":49},[21,24,20,25,29,22],"mahipal","1.0",[45,46,47,48],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[50,51,52,53,54],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1021","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fhunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi",4384,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":66,"prompt":76,"zipAvailable":77},[67,70,73],{"tool":68,"command":69},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi",{"tool":71,"command":72},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi",{"tool":74,"command":75},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi\u002FSKILL.md",true,[79,84,90,96],{"path":80,"resourceType":80,"resourceTypeDesc":81,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":83},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi\u002FLICENSE",{"path":85,"resourceType":86,"resourceTypeDesc":87,"sizeBytes":88,"sourceHtmlUrl":89},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2584,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":91,"resourceType":92,"resourceTypeDesc":93,"sizeBytes":94,"sourceHtmlUrl":95},"run.sh","SCRIPT","脚本",266,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjmagly\u002Faiwg\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagentic\u002Fcode\u002Faddons\u002Faiwg-utils\u002Fskills\u002Faiwg-regenerate\u002Frun.sh",{"path":97,"resourceType":92,"resourceTypeDesc":93,"sizeBytes":98,"sourceHtmlUrl":99},"scripts\u002Fagent.py",8153,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[101,131,155,183,208,235],{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":112,"publishedAt":36},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[107],{"categoryNo":108,"categoryName":109,"taxonomyType":110,"taxonomyTypeDesc":111},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[113,114,115,116,117,35,118,119,120,32,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","pr","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":132,"name":133,"nameZh":6,"description":134,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":135,"categories":136,"keywords":138,"publishedAt":36},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[137],{"categoryNo":108,"categoryName":109,"taxonomyType":110,"taxonomyTypeDesc":111},[139,127,140,141,117,142,35,120,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":156,"name":157,"nameZh":6,"description":158,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":159,"categories":160,"keywords":165,"publishedAt":36},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[161,164],{"categoryNo":162,"categoryName":163,"taxonomyType":110,"taxonomyTypeDesc":111},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":108,"categoryName":109,"taxonomyType":110,"taxonomyTypeDesc":111},[149,166,167,168,169,35,170,171,143,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181,182],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":184,"name":185,"nameZh":6,"description":186,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":187,"categories":188,"keywords":190,"publishedAt":36},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[189],{"categoryNo":108,"categoryName":109,"taxonomyType":110,"taxonomyTypeDesc":111},[34,191,192,35,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,146,205,206,207],"kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":209,"name":210,"nameZh":6,"description":211,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":212,"categories":213,"keywords":215,"publishedAt":36},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[214],{"categoryNo":108,"categoryName":109,"taxonomyType":110,"taxonomyTypeDesc":111},[216,217,218,35,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":236,"name":237,"nameZh":6,"description":238,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":239,"categories":240,"keywords":242,"publishedAt":36},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[241],{"categoryNo":108,"categoryName":109,"taxonomyType":110,"taxonomyTypeDesc":111},[117,243,35,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,178,23,179,252,253,254,255,256,257],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]