[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEJQXSSN95WRVGXHAR8WAB":3,"skill-same:01M6AEJQXSSN95WRVGXHAR8WAB":132},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":69,"commitSha":70,"skillDirectory":71,"forksCount":72,"repositoryHtmlUrl":73,"repositoryHomepageUrl":74,"ownerHtmlUrl":75,"ownerBlogUrl":76,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M6AEJQXSSN95WRVGXHAR8WAB","detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",null,"Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process hollowing, and APC injection - by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25 for cross-process memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loads. Use when hunting defense-evasion activity that hides code inside legitimate processes, investigating an EDR alert on suspicious cross-process access, or validating Sysmon coverage for injection detection.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35925,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"detecting t1055 process injection with sysmon","t1055","sysmon","ids","dll-injection","mitre-t1055","execution","defense-evasion","defense","edr","detection","suspicious","process-injection","analyzing","threat-hunting","file","validation","code","cybersecurity","memory","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\ndescription: Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process\n  hollowing, and APC injection - by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25 for\n  cross-process memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loads. Use\n  when hunting defense-evasion activity that hides code inside legitimate processes, investigating\n  an EDR alert on suspicious cross-process access, or validating Sysmon coverage for injection\n  detection.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- process-injection\n- sysmon\n- mitre-t1055\n- defense-evasion\n- dll-injection\n- process-hollowing\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Content Format Conversion\n- File Content Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1055.001\n- T1055.002\n- T1055.003\n- T1055.012\n---\n\n# Detecting T1055 Process Injection with Sysmon\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes\n- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation\n- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants\n- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25\n- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection\n- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters\n- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection\n- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+\n- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8)**: Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.\n2. **Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10)**: Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.\n3. **Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7)**: Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.\n4. **Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25)**: Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).\n5. **Correlate with Process Creation**: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.\n6. **Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity**: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).\n7. **Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques**: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |\n| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |\n| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |\n| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |\n| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |\n| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |\n| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |\n| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |\n| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |\n| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |\n| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |\n| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed\u002Finjected code |\n| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=8\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\\.exe$\"), \"high_value_target\", \"normal_target\")\n| where suspicious=\"high_value_target\"\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadId\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where match(GrantedAccess, \"(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)\")\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### KQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType == \"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (\"csrss.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"services.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| where FileName in~ (\"svchost.exe\", \"explorer.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"winlogon.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n    FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection\n```yaml\ntitle: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: create_remote_thread\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith:\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n            - '\\explorer.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\winlogon.exe'\n    filter_legitimate:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\services.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1055\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Classic DLL Injection**: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.\n2. **Process Hollowing (RunPE)**: Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.\n3. **APC Injection**: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.\n4. **Reflective DLL Injection**: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.\n5. **Process Doppelganging**: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSource Process: [Injecting process path]\nSource PID: [Process ID]\nTarget Process: [Target process path]\nTarget PID: [Process ID]\nInjection Type: [DLL\u002FShellcode\u002FHollowing\u002FAPC]\nSysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]\nAccess Mask: [Granted access value]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]\n```\n","# Detecting T1055 Process Injection with Sysmon\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes\n- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation\n- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants\n- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25\n- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection\n- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters\n- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection\n- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+\n- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8)**: Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.\n2. **Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10)**: Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.\n3. **Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7)**: Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.\n4. **Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25)**: Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).\n5. **Correlate with Process Creation**: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.\n6. **Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity**: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).\n7. **Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques**: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |\n| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |\n| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |\n| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |\n| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |\n| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |\n| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |\n| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |\n| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |\n| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |\n| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |\n| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed\u002Finjected code |\n| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=8\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\\.exe$\"), \"high_value_target\", \"normal_target\")\n| where suspicious=\"high_value_target\"\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadId\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where match(GrantedAccess, \"(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)\")\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### KQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType == \"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (\"csrss.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"services.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| where FileName in~ (\"svchost.exe\", \"explorer.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"winlogon.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n    FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection\n```yaml\ntitle: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: create_remote_thread\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith:\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n            - '\\explorer.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\winlogon.exe'\n    filter_legitimate:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\services.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1055\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Classic DLL Injection**: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.\n2. **Process Hollowing (RunPE)**: Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.\n3. **APC Injection**: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.\n4. **Reflective DLL Injection**: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.\n5. **Process Doppelganging**: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSource Process: [Injecting process path]\nSource PID: [Process ID]\nTarget Process: [Target process path]\nTarget PID: [Process ID]\nInjection Type: [DLL\u002FShellcode\u002FHollowing\u002FAPC]\nSysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]\nAccess Mask: [Granted access value]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":51,"domain":42,"license":15,"version":52,"nist_csf":53,"subdomain":38,"description":7,"mitre_attack":58,"d3fend_techniques":63},[38,36,26,29,31,28,50],"process-hollowing","mahipal","1.0",[54,55,56,57],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[59,60,61,62],"T1055.001","T1055.002","T1055.003","T1055.012",[64,65,66,67,68],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Content Format Conversion","File Content Analysis","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",4384,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":80,"prompt":90,"zipAvailable":91},[81,84,87],{"tool":82,"command":83},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",{"tool":85,"command":86},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",{"tool":88,"command":89},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill 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artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[139],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[141,142,143,144,145,42,146,147,148,41,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","pr","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":160,"name":161,"nameZh":6,"description":162,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":163,"categories":164,"keywords":166,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[165],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[167,155,168,169,145,170,42,148,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181,182],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":184,"name":185,"nameZh":6,"description":186,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":187,"categories":188,"keywords":193,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[189,192],{"categoryNo":190,"categoryName":191,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[177,194,195,196,197,42,198,40,171,199,200,201,202,203,34,204,205,206,207,208],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":210,"name":211,"nameZh":6,"description":212,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":213,"categories":214,"keywords":216,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[215],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[217,218,219,42,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,174,232,233,234],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":236,"name":237,"nameZh":6,"description":238,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":239,"categories":240,"keywords":242,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[241],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[243,244,245,42,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254,255,256,257,258,259,260,261],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":263,"name":264,"nameZh":6,"description":265,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":266,"categories":267,"keywords":269,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[268],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[145,270,42,271,39,272,273,274,275,276,33,204,30,205,277,278,279,280,281,282],"triaging security incident","siem","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]