[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6ADVA9ZTXWFCTMREHTVXC98":3,"skill-same:01M6ADVA9ZTXWFCTMREHTVXC98":116},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":57,"commitSha":58,"skillDirectory":59,"forksCount":60,"repositoryHtmlUrl":61,"repositoryHomepageUrl":62,"ownerHtmlUrl":63,"ownerBlogUrl":64,"ownerDescription":65,"updatedAt":66,"install":67,"resources":80},"01M6ADVA9ZTXWFCTMREHTVXC98","analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts",null,"Analyze Windows Shellbag (BagMRU) registry artifacts with SBECmd and Shellbags Explorer to reconstruct folder browsing activity and prove user interaction with directories, including removable media and network shares, even after the folders are deleted. Use when reconstructing a user's folder access history or proving access to a since-removed directory in DFIR work.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"analyzing windows shellbag artifacts","windows","artifacts","analyzing","removable-media","bagmru","network-shares","folder-access","shellbags-explorer","sbecmd","shellbags","windows-registry","digital-forensics","directory","network","dfir","user-activity","forensics","registry","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts\ndescription: Analyze Windows Shellbag (BagMRU) registry artifacts with SBECmd and\n  Shellbags Explorer to reconstruct folder browsing activity and prove user interaction\n  with directories, including removable media and network shares, even after the\n  folders are deleted. Use when reconstructing a user's folder access history or\n  proving access to a since-removed directory in DFIR work.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: digital-forensics\ntags:\n- shellbags\n- windows-registry\n- sbecmd\n- shellbags-explorer\n- folder-access\n- user-activity\n- removable-media\n- network-shares\n- bagmru\n- dfir\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- RS.AN-03\n- DE.AE-02\n- RS.MA-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1083\n- T1074.001\n- T1135\n- T1025\n- T1070.004\n---\n\n# Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts\n\n## Overview\n\nShellbags are Windows registry artifacts that track how users interact with folders through Windows Explorer, storing view settings such as icon size, window position, sort order, and view mode. From a forensic perspective, Shellbags provide definitive evidence of folder access -- even folders that no longer exist on the system. When a user browses to a folder via Windows Explorer, the Open\u002FSave dialog, or the Control Panel, a Shellbag entry is created or updated in the user's registry hive. These entries persist after folder deletion, drive disconnection, and even across user profile resets, making them invaluable for proving that a user navigated to specific directories on local drives, USB devices, network shares, or zip archives.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing windows shellbag artifacts\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Familiarity with digital forensics concepts and tools\n- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution\n- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed\n- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities\n\n## Registry Locations\n\n### Windows 7\u002F8\u002F10\u002F11\n\n| Hive | Key Path | Stores |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| NTUSER.DAT | Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\BagMRU | Folder hierarchy tree |\n| NTUSER.DAT | Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\Bags | View settings per folder |\n| UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\BagMRU | Desktop\u002FExplorer shell |\n| UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\Bags | Additional view settings |\n\n### BagMRU Structure\n\nThe BagMRU key contains a hierarchical tree of numbered subkeys representing the directory structure. Each subkey value contains a Shell Item (SHITEMID) binary blob encoding the folder identity:\n\n- **Root (BagMRU)**: Desktop namespace root\n- **BagMRU\\0**: Typically \"My Computer\"\n- **BagMRU\\0\\0**: First drive (e.g., C:)\n- **BagMRU\\0\\0\\0**: First subfolder on C:\n\nEach Shell Item contains:\n- Item type (folder, drive, network, zip, control panel)\n- Short name (8.3 format)\n- Long name (Unicode)\n- Creation\u002Fmodification timestamps\n- MFT entry\u002Fsequence for NTFS folders\n\n## Analysis with EZ Tools\n\n### SBECmd (Command Line)\n\n```powershell\n# Parse shellbags from a directory of registry hives\nSBECmd.exe -d \"C:\\Evidence\\Registry\" --csv C:\\Output --csvf shellbags.csv\n\n# Parse from a live system (requires admin)\nSBECmd.exe --live --csv C:\\Output --csvf live_shellbags.csv\n\n# Key output columns:\n# AbsolutePath - Full reconstructed path\n# CreatedOn - When the folder was first browsed\n# ModifiedOn - When view settings were last changed\n# AccessedOn - Last access timestamp\n# ShellType - Type of shell item (Directory, Drive, Network, etc.)\n# Value - Raw shell item data\n```\n\n### ShellBags Explorer (GUI)\n\n```powershell\n# Launch GUI tool for interactive analysis\nShellBagsExplorer.exe\n\n# Load registry hives: File > Load Hive\n# Navigate the tree structure to see folder hierarchy\n# Right-click entries for detailed shell item properties\n```\n\n## Forensic Investigation Scenarios\n\n### Proving USB Device Browsing\n\n```text\nShellbag Path: My Computer\\E:\\Confidential\\Project_Files\nShellType: Directory (on removable volume)\nCreatedOn: 2025-03-15 09:30:00 UTC\n\nThis proves the user navigated to E:\\Confidential\\Project_Files\nvia Windows Explorer, even if the USB drive is no longer connected.\nThe volume letter E: and directory timestamps can be correlated\nwith USBSTOR and MountPoints2 registry entries.\n```\n\n### Detecting Network Share Access\n\n```text\nShellbag Path: \\\\FileServer01\\Finance\\Q4_Reports\nShellType: Network Location\nAccessedOn: 2025-02-20 14:15:00 UTC\n\nThis proves the user browsed to a network share, even if\nthe share has been decommissioned or access revoked.\n```\n\n### Identifying Deleted Folder Knowledge\n\n```text\nShellbag Path: C:\\Users\\suspect\\Documents\\Exfiltration_Staging\nShellType: Directory\nCreatedOn: 2025-01-10 08:00:00 UTC\n\nEven though C:\\Users\\suspect\\Documents\\Exfiltration_Staging\nno longer exists, the Shellbag entry proves the user\ncreated and navigated to this folder.\n```\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Shellbags only record folder-level interactions, not individual file access\n- Only created through Windows Explorer shell and Open\u002FSave dialogs\n- Command-line access (cmd, PowerShell) does not generate Shellbag entries\n- Programmatic file access via APIs does not generate Shellbag entries\n- Timestamps may reflect view setting changes, not necessarily folder access\n- Windows may batch-update Shellbag entries during Explorer shutdown\n\n## References\n\n- Shellbags Forensic Analysis 2025: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cybertriage.com\u002Fblog\u002Fshellbags-forensic-analysis-2025\u002F\n- SANS Shellbag Forensics: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sans.org\u002Fblog\u002Fcomputer-forensic-artifacts-windows-7-shellbags\n- Magnet Forensics Shellbag Analysis: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.magnetforensics.com\u002Fblog\u002Fforensic-analysis-of-windows-shellbags\u002F\n- ShellBags Explorer: https:\u002F\u002Fericzimmerman.github.io\u002F\n\n## Example Output\n\n```text\n$ SBECmd.exe -d \"C:\\Evidence\\Users\\jsmith\" --csv \u002Fanalysis\u002Fshellbag_output\n\nSBECmd v2.1.0 - ShellBags Explorer (Command Line)\n====================================================\nProcessing hives for user: jsmith\n  NTUSER.DAT:  C:\\Evidence\\Users\\jsmith\\NTUSER.DAT\n  UsrClass.dat: C:\\Evidence\\Users\\jsmith\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UsrClass.dat\n\n[+] NTUSER.DAT shellbag entries:   456\n[+] UsrClass.dat shellbag entries: 1,234\n[+] Total shellbag entries:        1,690\n\n--- Folder Access Timeline (Incident Window) ---\nLast Accessed (UTC)     | Folder Path                                             | Type        | Access Count\n------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------\n2024-01-15 14:34:05     | C:\\Users\\jsmith\\Downloads                               | File System | 45\n2024-01-15 14:36:25     | C:\\ProgramData\\Updates                                  | File System | 3\n2024-01-15 15:05:00     | \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance                                    | Network     | 2\n2024-01-15 15:12:30     | \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance\\Q4_Reports                          | Network     | 1\n2024-01-15 15:30:00     | E:\\                                                     | Removable   | 4\n2024-01-15 15:30:45     | E:\\Backup                                               | Removable   | 3\n2024-01-15 15:31:20     | E:\\Backup\\Corporate_Data                                | Removable   | 2\n2024-01-15 16:12:45     | \\\\FILESERV01\\HR\\Employees                                | Network     | 1\n2024-01-15 16:15:00     | \\\\FILESERV01\\HR\\Employees\\Records_2024                   | Network     | 1\n2024-01-16 02:35:00     | C:\\Windows\\Temp                                         | File System | 5\n2024-01-17 02:44:00     | C:\\ProgramData\\svc                                     | File System | 2\n2024-01-18 01:10:00     | C:\\Users\\jsmith\\AppData\\Local\\Temp                      | File System | 8\n\n--- Network Share Access ---\n  \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance             First: 2023-09-10  Last: 2024-01-15\n  \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance\\Q4_Reports  First: 2024-01-15  Last: 2024-01-15  (NEW)\n  \\\\FILESERV01\\HR\\Employees        First: 2024-01-15  Last: 2024-01-15  (NEW)\n  \\\\DC01\\SYSVOL                    First: 2023-03-15  Last: 2024-01-16  (anomalous access time)\n\n--- Removable Device Access ---\n  E:\\ (USB Drive)\n    Volume Name:    BACKUP_DRIVE\n    First Accessed: 2024-01-15 15:30:00 UTC\n    Last Accessed:  2024-01-15 15:45:22 UTC\n    Folders Browsed: 3 (E:\\, E:\\Backup, E:\\Backup\\Corporate_Data)\n\n--- Deleted\u002FNo Longer Existing Paths ---\n  C:\\ProgramData\\Updates\\                (folder deleted, shellbag persists)\n  C:\\ProgramData\\svc\\                    (folder deleted, shellbag persists)\n  C:\\Windows\\Temp\\tools\\                 (folder deleted, shellbag persists)\n\nSummary:\n  Total unique folders accessed:  1,690\n  Network shares accessed:        4 (2 newly accessed during incident)\n  Removable media:                1 USB device (data staging suspected)\n  Deleted folder evidence:        3 paths (anti-forensics indicator)\n  CSV exported to:                \u002Fanalysis\u002Fshellbag_output\u002F\n```\n","# Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts\n\n## Overview\n\nShellbags are Windows registry artifacts that track how users interact with folders through Windows Explorer, storing view settings such as icon size, window position, sort order, and view mode. From a forensic perspective, Shellbags provide definitive evidence of folder access -- even folders that no longer exist on the system. When a user browses to a folder via Windows Explorer, the Open\u002FSave dialog, or the Control Panel, a Shellbag entry is created or updated in the user's registry hive. These entries persist after folder deletion, drive disconnection, and even across user profile resets, making them invaluable for proving that a user navigated to specific directories on local drives, USB devices, network shares, or zip archives.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing windows shellbag artifacts\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Familiarity with digital forensics concepts and tools\n- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution\n- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed\n- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities\n\n## Registry Locations\n\n### Windows 7\u002F8\u002F10\u002F11\n\n| Hive | Key Path | Stores |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| NTUSER.DAT | Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\BagMRU | Folder hierarchy tree |\n| NTUSER.DAT | Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\Bags | View settings per folder |\n| UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\BagMRU | Desktop\u002FExplorer shell |\n| UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\Bags | Additional view settings |\n\n### BagMRU Structure\n\nThe BagMRU key contains a hierarchical tree of numbered subkeys representing the directory structure. Each subkey value contains a Shell Item (SHITEMID) binary blob encoding the folder identity:\n\n- **Root (BagMRU)**: Desktop namespace root\n- **BagMRU\\0**: Typically \"My Computer\"\n- **BagMRU\\0\\0**: First drive (e.g., C:)\n- **BagMRU\\0\\0\\0**: First subfolder on C:\n\nEach Shell Item contains:\n- Item type (folder, drive, network, zip, control panel)\n- Short name (8.3 format)\n- Long name (Unicode)\n- Creation\u002Fmodification timestamps\n- MFT entry\u002Fsequence for NTFS folders\n\n## Analysis with EZ Tools\n\n### SBECmd (Command Line)\n\n```powershell\n# Parse shellbags from a directory of registry hives\nSBECmd.exe -d \"C:\\Evidence\\Registry\" --csv C:\\Output --csvf shellbags.csv\n\n# Parse from a live system (requires admin)\nSBECmd.exe --live --csv C:\\Output --csvf live_shellbags.csv\n\n# Key output columns:\n# AbsolutePath - Full reconstructed path\n# CreatedOn - When the folder was first browsed\n# ModifiedOn - When view settings were last changed\n# AccessedOn - Last access timestamp\n# ShellType - Type of shell item (Directory, Drive, Network, etc.)\n# Value - Raw shell item data\n```\n\n### ShellBags Explorer (GUI)\n\n```powershell\n# Launch GUI tool for interactive analysis\nShellBagsExplorer.exe\n\n# Load registry hives: File > Load Hive\n# Navigate the tree structure to see folder hierarchy\n# Right-click entries for detailed shell item properties\n```\n\n## Forensic Investigation Scenarios\n\n### Proving USB Device Browsing\n\n```text\nShellbag Path: My Computer\\E:\\Confidential\\Project_Files\nShellType: Directory (on removable volume)\nCreatedOn: 2025-03-15 09:30:00 UTC\n\nThis proves the user navigated to E:\\Confidential\\Project_Files\nvia Windows Explorer, even if the USB drive is no longer connected.\nThe volume letter E: and directory timestamps can be correlated\nwith USBSTOR and MountPoints2 registry entries.\n```\n\n### Detecting Network Share Access\n\n```text\nShellbag Path: \\\\FileServer01\\Finance\\Q4_Reports\nShellType: Network Location\nAccessedOn: 2025-02-20 14:15:00 UTC\n\nThis proves the user browsed to a network share, even if\nthe share has been decommissioned or access revoked.\n```\n\n### Identifying Deleted Folder Knowledge\n\n```text\nShellbag Path: C:\\Users\\suspect\\Documents\\Exfiltration_Staging\nShellType: Directory\nCreatedOn: 2025-01-10 08:00:00 UTC\n\nEven though C:\\Users\\suspect\\Documents\\Exfiltration_Staging\nno longer exists, the Shellbag entry proves the user\ncreated and navigated to this folder.\n```\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Shellbags only record folder-level interactions, not individual file access\n- Only created through Windows Explorer shell and Open\u002FSave dialogs\n- Command-line access (cmd, PowerShell) does not generate Shellbag entries\n- Programmatic file access via APIs does not generate Shellbag entries\n- Timestamps may reflect view setting changes, not necessarily folder access\n- Windows may batch-update Shellbag entries during Explorer shutdown\n\n## References\n\n- Shellbags Forensic Analysis 2025: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cybertriage.com\u002Fblog\u002Fshellbags-forensic-analysis-2025\u002F\n- SANS Shellbag Forensics: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sans.org\u002Fblog\u002Fcomputer-forensic-artifacts-windows-7-shellbags\n- Magnet Forensics Shellbag Analysis: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.magnetforensics.com\u002Fblog\u002Fforensic-analysis-of-windows-shellbags\u002F\n- ShellBags Explorer: https:\u002F\u002Fericzimmerman.github.io\u002F\n\n## Example Output\n\n```text\n$ SBECmd.exe -d \"C:\\Evidence\\Users\\jsmith\" --csv \u002Fanalysis\u002Fshellbag_output\n\nSBECmd v2.1.0 - ShellBags Explorer (Command Line)\n====================================================\nProcessing hives for user: jsmith\n  NTUSER.DAT:  C:\\Evidence\\Users\\jsmith\\NTUSER.DAT\n  UsrClass.dat: C:\\Evidence\\Users\\jsmith\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UsrClass.dat\n\n[+] NTUSER.DAT shellbag entries:   456\n[+] UsrClass.dat shellbag entries: 1,234\n[+] Total shellbag entries:        1,690\n\n--- Folder Access Timeline (Incident Window) ---\nLast Accessed (UTC)     | Folder Path                                             | Type        | Access Count\n------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------\n2024-01-15 14:34:05     | C:\\Users\\jsmith\\Downloads                               | File System | 45\n2024-01-15 14:36:25     | C:\\ProgramData\\Updates                                  | File System | 3\n2024-01-15 15:05:00     | \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance                                    | Network     | 2\n2024-01-15 15:12:30     | \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance\\Q4_Reports                          | Network     | 1\n2024-01-15 15:30:00     | E:\\                                                     | Removable   | 4\n2024-01-15 15:30:45     | E:\\Backup                                               | Removable   | 3\n2024-01-15 15:31:20     | E:\\Backup\\Corporate_Data                                | Removable   | 2\n2024-01-15 16:12:45     | \\\\FILESERV01\\HR\\Employees                                | Network     | 1\n2024-01-15 16:15:00     | \\\\FILESERV01\\HR\\Employees\\Records_2024                   | Network     | 1\n2024-01-16 02:35:00     | C:\\Windows\\Temp                                         | File System | 5\n2024-01-17 02:44:00     | C:\\ProgramData\\svc                                     | File System | 2\n2024-01-18 01:10:00     | C:\\Users\\jsmith\\AppData\\Local\\Temp                      | File System | 8\n\n--- Network Share Access ---\n  \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance             First: 2023-09-10  Last: 2024-01-15\n  \\\\FILESERV01\\Finance\\Q4_Reports  First: 2024-01-15  Last: 2024-01-15  (NEW)\n  \\\\FILESERV01\\HR\\Employees        First: 2024-01-15  Last: 2024-01-15  (NEW)\n  \\\\DC01\\SYSVOL                    First: 2023-03-15  Last: 2024-01-16  (anomalous access time)\n\n--- Removable Device Access ---\n  E:\\ (USB Drive)\n    Volume Name:    BACKUP_DRIVE\n    First Accessed: 2024-01-15 15:30:00 UTC\n    Last Accessed:  2024-01-15 15:45:22 UTC\n    Folders Browsed: 3 (E:\\, E:\\Backup, E:\\Backup\\Corporate_Data)\n\n--- Deleted\u002FNo Longer Existing Paths ---\n  C:\\ProgramData\\Updates\\                (folder deleted, shellbag persists)\n  C:\\ProgramData\\svc\\                    (folder deleted, shellbag persists)\n  C:\\Windows\\Temp\\tools\\                 (folder deleted, shellbag persists)\n\nSummary:\n  Total unique folders accessed:  1,690\n  Network shares accessed:        4 (2 newly accessed during incident)\n  Removable media:                1 USB device (data staging suspected)\n  Deleted folder evidence:        3 paths (anti-forensics indicator)\n  CSV exported to:                \u002Fanalysis\u002Fshellbag_output\u002F\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":44,"author":45,"domain":38,"license":15,"version":46,"nist_csf":47,"subdomain":31,"description":7,"mitre_attack":51},[29,30,28,27,26,35,23,25,24,34],"mahipal","1.0",[48,49,50],"RS.AN-03","DE.AE-02","RS.MA-01",[52,53,54,55,56],"T1083","T1074.001","T1135","T1025","T1070.004","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":68,"prompt":78,"zipAvailable":79},[69,72,75],{"tool":70,"command":71},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill 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artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[123],{"categoryNo":124,"categoryName":125,"taxonomyType":126,"taxonomyTypeDesc":127},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[129,130,131,132,133,38,134,135,136,137,21,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","pr","code","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":148,"name":149,"nameZh":6,"description":150,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":151,"categories":152,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[153],{"categoryNo":124,"categoryName":125,"taxonomyType":126,"taxonomyTypeDesc":127},[155,143,156,157,133,158,38,136,159,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":172,"name":173,"nameZh":6,"description":174,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":175,"categories":176,"keywords":181,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[177,180],{"categoryNo":178,"categoryName":179,"taxonomyType":126,"taxonomyTypeDesc":127},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":124,"categoryName":125,"taxonomyType":126,"taxonomyTypeDesc":127},[165,182,183,184,185,38,186,187,159,188,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":200,"name":201,"nameZh":6,"description":202,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":203,"categories":204,"keywords":206,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[205],{"categoryNo":124,"categoryName":125,"taxonomyType":126,"taxonomyTypeDesc":127},[20,207,208,38,37,209,210,211,34,212,213,214,215,216,31,217,162,218,219,220],"kape","triaging windows with kape","browser","logs","windows-forensics","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":222,"name":223,"nameZh":6,"description":224,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":225,"categories":226,"keywords":228,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[227],{"categoryNo":124,"categoryName":125,"taxonomyType":126,"taxonomyTypeDesc":127},[229,230,231,38,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":249,"name":250,"nameZh":6,"description":251,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":252,"categories":253,"keywords":255,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[254],{"categoryNo":124,"categoryName":125,"taxonomyType":126,"taxonomyTypeDesc":127},[133,256,38,257,258,259,260,261,262,263,264,194,265,195,266,267,268,269,270,271],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]