analyzing-certificate-transparency-for-phishing
Monitor Certificate Transparency logs using crt.sh and Certstream to detect phishing domains, lookalike certificates, and unauthorized certificate issuance targeting your organization.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- analyzing-certificate-transparency-for-phishing
- tags
- [ "certificate-transparency", "ct-logs", "phishing", "crt-sh", "certstream", "ssl", "domain-monitoring", "threat-intelligence" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- mitre_f3
- { "tactics": [ "resource-development", "reconnaissance", "initial-access" ], "version": "1.1", "techniques": [ { "id": "T1583.001", "name": "Acquire Infrastructure: Domains", "source": "attack", "tactic": "resource-development" }, { "id": "F1020.002", "name": "Create Fake Materials: Fake Website", "source": "f3", "tactic": "resource-development" }, { "id": "T1593", "name": "Search Open Websites/Domains", "source": "attack", "tactic": "reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1598", "name": "Phishing for Information", "source": "attack", "tactic": "reconnaissance" }, { "id": "T1660", "name": "Phishing", "source": "attack", "tactic": "initial-access" } ] }
- nist_csf
- [ "ID.RA-01", "ID.RA-05", "DE.CM-01", "DE.AE-02" ]
- subdomain
- threat-intelligence
- description
- Monitor Certificate Transparency logs using crt.sh and Certstream to detect phishing domains, lookalike certificates, and unauthorized certificate issuance targeting your organization.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1583.001", "T1583.004", "T1566.002", "T1608.005", "T1596.003" ]
- atlas_techniques
- [ "AML.T0052" ]
02 资源文件 3
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md2.8 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py7.3 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Analyzing Certificate Transparency for Phishing
Overview
Certificate Transparency (CT) is an Internet security standard that creates a public, append-only log of all issued SSL/TLS certificates. Monitoring CT logs enables early detection of phishing domains that register certificates mimicking legitimate brands, unauthorized certificate issuance for owned domains, and certificate-based attack infrastructure. This skill covers querying CT logs via crt.sh, real-time monitoring with Certstream, building automated alerting for suspicious certificates, and integrating findings into threat intelligence workflows.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing certificate transparency for phishing
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with
requests,certstream,tldextract,Levenshteinlibraries - Access to crt.sh (https://crt.sh/) for historical CT log queries
- Certstream (https://certstream.calidog.io/) for real-time monitoring
- List of organization domains and brand keywords to monitor
- Understanding of SSL/TLS certificate structure and issuance process
Key Concepts
Certificate Transparency Logs
CT logs are cryptographically assured, publicly auditable, append-only records of TLS certificate issuance. Major CAs (Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, Google Trust Services) submit all issued certificates to multiple CT logs. As of 2025, Chrome and Safari require CT for all publicly trusted certificates.
Phishing Detection via CT
Attackers register lookalike domains and obtain free certificates (often from Let's Encrypt) to make phishing sites appear legitimate with HTTPS. CT monitoring detects these early because the certificate appears in logs before the phishing campaign launches, providing a window for proactive blocking.
crt.sh Database
crt.sh is a free web interface and PostgreSQL database operated by Sectigo that indexes CT logs. It supports wildcard searches (%.example.com), direct SQL queries, and JSON API responses. It tracks certificate issuance, expiration, and revocation across all major CT logs.
Workflow
Step 1: Query crt.sh for Certificate History
import requests
import json
from datetime import datetime
import tldextract
class CTLogMonitor:
CRT_SH_URL = "https://crt.sh"
def __init__(self, monitored_domains, brand_keywords):
self.monitored_domains = monitored_domains
self.brand_keywords = [k.lower() for k in brand_keywords]
def query_crt_sh(self, domain, include_expired=False):
"""Query crt.sh for certificates matching a domain."""
params = {
"q": f"%.{domain}",
"output": "json",
}
if not include_expired:
params["exclude"] = "expired"
resp = requests.get(self.CRT_SH_URL, params=params, timeout=30)
if resp.status_code == 200:
certs = resp.json()
print(f"[+] crt.sh: {len(certs)} certificates for *.{domain}")
return certs
return []
def find_suspicious_certs(self, domain):
"""Find certificates that may be phishing attempts."""
certs = self.query_crt_sh(domain)
suspicious = []
for cert in certs:
common_name = cert.get("common_name", "").lower()
name_value = cert.get("name_value", "").lower()
issuer = cert.get("issuer_name", "")
not_before = cert.get("not_before", "")
not_after = cert.get("not_after", "")
# Check for exact domain matches (legitimate)
extracted = tldextract.extract(common_name)
cert_domain = f"{extracted.domain}.{extracted.suffix}"
if cert_domain == domain:
continue # Legitimate certificate
# Flag suspicious patterns
flags = []
if domain.replace(".", "") in common_name.replace(".", ""):
flags.append("contains target domain string")
if any(kw in common_name for kw in self.brand_keywords):
flags.append("contains brand keyword")
if "let's encrypt" in issuer.lower():
flags.append("free CA (Let's Encrypt)")
if flags:
suspicious.append({
"common_name": cert.get("common_name", ""),
"name_value": cert.get("name_value", ""),
"issuer": issuer,
"not_before": not_before,
"not_after": not_after,
"serial": cert.get("serial_number", ""),
"flags": flags,
"crt_sh_id": cert.get("id", ""),
"crt_sh_url": f"https://crt.sh/?id={cert.get('id', '')}",
})
print(f"[+] Found {len(suspicious)} suspicious certificates")
return suspicious
monitor = CTLogMonitor(
monitored_domains=["mycompany.com", "mycompany.org"],
brand_keywords=["mycompany", "mybrand", "myproduct"],
)
suspicious = monitor.find_suspicious_certs("mycompany.com")
for cert in suspicious[:5]:
print(f" [{cert['common_name']}] Flags: {cert['flags']}")
Step 2: Real-Time Monitoring with Certstream
import certstream
import Levenshtein
import re
from datetime import datetime
class CertstreamMonitor:
def __init__(self, watched_domains, brand_keywords, similarity_threshold=0.8):
self.watched_domains = [d.lower() for d in watched_domains]
self.brand_keywords = [k.lower() for k in brand_keywords]
self.threshold = similarity_threshold
self.alerts = []
def start_monitoring(self, max_alerts=100):
"""Start real-time CT log monitoring."""
print("[*] Starting Certstream monitoring...")
print(f" Watching: {self.watched_domains}")
print(f" Keywords: {self.brand_keywords}")
def callback(message, context):
if message["message_type"] == "certificate_update":
data = message["data"]
leaf = data.get("leaf_cert", {})
all_domains = leaf.get("all_domains", [])
for domain in all_domains:
domain_lower = domain.lower().strip("*.")
if self._is_suspicious(domain_lower):
alert = {
"domain": domain,
"all_domains": all_domains,
"issuer": leaf.get("issuer", {}).get("O", ""),
"fingerprint": leaf.get("fingerprint", ""),
"not_before": leaf.get("not_before", ""),
"detected_at": datetime.now().isoformat(),
"reason": self._get_reason(domain_lower),
}
self.alerts.append(alert)
print(f" [ALERT] {domain} - {alert['reason']}")
if len(self.alerts) >= max_alerts:
raise KeyboardInterrupt
try:
certstream.listen_for_events(callback, url="wss://certstream.calidog.io/")
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print(f"\n[+] Monitoring stopped. {len(self.alerts)} alerts collected.")
return self.alerts
def _is_suspicious(self, domain):
"""Check if domain is suspicious relative to watched domains."""
for watched in self.watched_domains:
# Exact keyword match
watched_base = watched.split(".")[0]
if watched_base in domain and domain != watched:
return True
# Levenshtein distance (typosquatting detection)
domain_base = tldextract.extract(domain).domain
similarity = Levenshtein.ratio(watched_base, domain_base)
if similarity >= self.threshold and domain_base != watched_base:
return True
# Brand keyword match
for keyword in self.brand_keywords:
if keyword in domain:
return True
return False
def _get_reason(self, domain):
"""Determine why domain was flagged."""
reasons = []
for watched in self.watched_domains:
watched_base = watched.split(".")[0]
if watched_base in domain:
reasons.append(f"contains '{watched_base}'")
domain_base = tldextract.extract(domain).domain
similarity = Levenshtein.ratio(watched_base, domain_base)
if similarity >= self.threshold and domain_base != watched_base:
reasons.append(f"similar to '{watched}' ({similarity:.0%})")
for kw in self.brand_keywords:
if kw in domain:
reasons.append(f"brand keyword '{kw}'")
return "; ".join(reasons) if reasons else "unknown"
cs_monitor = CertstreamMonitor(
watched_domains=["mycompany.com"],
brand_keywords=["mycompany", "mybrand"],
similarity_threshold=0.75,
)
alerts = cs_monitor.start_monitoring(max_alerts=50)
Step 3: Enumerate Subdomains from CT Logs
def enumerate_subdomains_ct(domain):
"""Discover all subdomains from Certificate Transparency logs."""
params = {"q": f"%.{domain}", "output": "json"}
resp = requests.get("https://crt.sh", params=params, timeout=30)
if resp.status_code != 200:
return []
certs = resp.json()
subdomains = set()
for cert in certs:
name_value = cert.get("name_value", "")
for name in name_value.split("\n"):
name = name.strip().lower()
if name.endswith(f".{domain}") or name == domain:
name = name.lstrip("*.")
subdomains.add(name)
sorted_subs = sorted(subdomains)
print(f"[+] CT subdomain enumeration for {domain}: {len(sorted_subs)} subdomains")
return sorted_subs
subdomains = enumerate_subdomains_ct("example.com")
for sub in subdomains[:20]:
print(f" {sub}")
Step 4: Generate CT Intelligence Report
def generate_ct_report(suspicious_certs, certstream_alerts, domain):
report = f"""# Certificate Transparency Intelligence Report
## Target Domain: {domain}
## Generated: {datetime.now().isoformat()}
## Summary
- Suspicious certificates found: {len(suspicious_certs)}
- Real-time alerts triggered: {len(certstream_alerts)}
## Suspicious Certificates (crt.sh)
| Common Name | Issuer | Flags | crt.sh Link |
|------------|--------|-------|-------------|
"""
for cert in suspicious_certs[:20]:
flags = "; ".join(cert.get("flags", []))
report += (f"| {cert['common_name']} | {cert['issuer'][:30]} "
f"| {flags} | [View]({cert['crt_sh_url']}) |\n")
report += f"""
## Real-Time Certstream Alerts
| Domain | Issuer | Reason | Detected |
|--------|--------|--------|----------|
"""
for alert in certstream_alerts[:20]:
report += (f"| {alert['domain']} | {alert['issuer']} "
f"| {alert['reason']} | {alert['detected_at'][:19]} |\n")
report += """
## Recommendations
1. Add flagged domains to DNS sinkhole / web proxy blocklist
2. Submit takedown requests for confirmed phishing domains
3. Monitor CT logs continuously for new certificate registrations
4. Implement CAA DNS records to restrict certificate issuance for your domains
5. Deploy DMARC to prevent email spoofing from lookalike domains
"""
with open(f"ct_report_{domain.replace('.','_')}.md", "w") as f:
f.write(report)
print(f"[+] CT report saved")
return report
generate_ct_report(suspicious, alerts if 'alerts' in dir() else [], "mycompany.com")
Validation Criteria
- crt.sh queries return certificate data for target domains
- Suspicious certificates identified based on lookalike patterns
- Certstream real-time monitoring detects new phishing certificates
- Subdomain enumeration produces comprehensive list from CT logs
- Alerts generated with reason classification
- CT intelligence report created with actionable recommendations
References
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